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 ABSTRACT 
THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR NATURAL LAW THEORY 
AND CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL NATURALISM 
 
 
 
Bernard Mauser, B.S., M.A.A., M.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2011 
 
 
This dissertation explores some objections to natural law theory- many of which 
are also leveled against contemporary naturalism. Despite the way the natural law 
tradition has fallen into disrepute in much of the American academy, this dissertation 
defends a classical Thomistic approach to natural law from some modern and 
contemporary criticisms. It begins with a brief explanation of the theory of natural law 
that will be defended from these contemporary objections. Chapter three examines G.E. 
Moore and David Hume’s classical problems posed to natural law, along with some 
contemporary defenders of Moore’s position.  These arguments are purported to 
undermine using human nature as a basis for ethics. Chapter four considers how moral 
relativism, especially the form given by Gilbert Harmon and David Wong, offers a 
unique challenge to natural law that must be answered and one that seems to undermine 
any ethical theory than any account relying on human nature. Chapter five explores the 
relation between neo-naturalism and natural law. Although neo-naturalism is a position 
often thought of as opposed to natural law, the two share many similarities in the 
positions they oppose.  The last chapter examines how natural law reasoning is used in 
making medical decisions.  The overarching thesis is that, insofar as natural law is 
coherent and answers many major criticisms, the proposal to reexamine this ethical 
theory stands as viable. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY 
NATURALISM 
 
 
 "Folks are dumb where I come from; they ain't had any learnin'. Still they're 
happy as can be, doin' what comes naturally!" – From Annie Get Your Gun 
 
Although this was a catchy tune in the musical, the question it raises is whether a 
person can be happy if he has no education. What does it mean to do ‘what comes 
naturally?’ What is the happiness that people experience from doing things this way? The 
answers to these questions are hotly debated. Philosophers disagree with each other over 
what acts are “doing what comes naturally.” Naturalistic and natural law philosophers 
would want to qualify what doing what comes naturally has to be in order to result in 
happiness. In addition, when broaching the topic of doing what is natural, one should sort 
through which natural law theory is being drawn upon. The natural law theorist should 
answer the major objections that have led many to abandon this theory.  Some 
philosophers outside the natural law tradition take the idea of doing what comes naturally 
to imply that there is no human nature limiting what is morally good.1 This dissertation 
sorts through these issues and argues that natural law should not be dismissed. The theory 
is viable.  
                                                          
1
 Theories considered as non-cognitivist, including emotivism and prescriptivism, because they 
deny that moral statements have truth-value and are meaningful, clearly deny the natural law account.  
Marxist accounts may also oppose natural law accounts as they deny any “such thing as a fixed, individual 
human nature, that what is true of them in one society or period may not be true of them in another place or 
time.” Leslie Stevenson & David Haberman, Ten Theories of Human Nature, 3rd ed. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1998): 140. 
2 
 
This dissertation is a defense of natural law ethical theory. I feel very strongly 
about the truth of natural law as I explain it. The entire dissertation should be read with 
this in mind. The version of natural law that I will be defending is more fully explicated 
in the second chapter. Also, because natural law has such a rich history and contains 
much that is relevant for ethics today, I think it is an important tradition to restore.  
It takes very little time when researching ethical theory to find that natural law has 
fallen into disrepute in the American academy. Perhaps part of the reason is the influence 
of Darwinism and the ideas that follow from it. It may be that Darwinism has motivated 
the development of theories which deny several things necessary for natural law theory. 
One such denial is the existence of a fixed human nature. Darwin’s theory explains that 
life begins in something like primordial soup, and eventually evolves from simple to 
complex life. There are no ‘fixed’ unchanging essences that stabilize a species, as one 
species gives rise to other species. Dismissive of any essence or nature, those following 
this view state that there is no basis for establishing an ethical theory on a fictional thing 
like human nature. Another denial inherent in Darwinism is that there is no teleology or 
final causality in nature. Human nature, teleology and final causality, which were 
embraced in an Aristotelian framework, were replaced by mechanism and the search for 
purely material causes in the realm of science.2 Because of these things, there is only an 
‘appearance of design’ in organisms which is simply illusory.3 This theory may be 
                                                          
2For a complete history of this phenomena see Etienne Gilson, From Darwin to Aristotle and Back 
Again, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). 
3
 For the complete modern argument that presses this point see Richard Dawkins, The Blind 
Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design, London: W.W. Norton & 
Co. 1996.  
3 
 
summarized as saying, “man is the result of a purposeless and natural process that did not 
have us in mind.”4  
This is not to say that all philosophers view the natural law as completely 
incompatible with Darwinism. Indeed, among those promoting a return to natural law 
include some Darwinists. Larry Arnhart is one of the most influential Darwinian natural 
law theorists and has defended human nature, teleology, and Darwinism as completely 
consistent.5 Although many of his conclusions are consonant with other theories of 
natural law, not all agree that Arnhart’s Darwinist foundation is up to the task of 
justifying his ethical theory.6 By and large, the Darwinist rejects theories of natural law 
based on an unchanging human nature because of something built in to their explanation 
of Darwinistic evolutionary theory.  This theory holds two important presuppositions 
opposed to natural law. The first is that in the existing species the nature of each 
creature’s offspring can suddenly change. The second is that each change from one 
species to another occurs because there are no fixed essences.7  Arnhart and others may 
simply point out that certain natural ends are given, such as reproduction and survival, 
and one can use these ends as a basis for natural law. Regardless of whether Darwinism 
and natural law can be reconciled, the influence of Darwin may be responsible for many 
to reject crucial components of natural law. 
                                                          
4George Gaylord Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1967): pp. 344-45.   
5
 Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature, Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1998.  Both Darwinists and non-Darwinists should concede that 
reproductive success seems to be a natural end that factors into morality 
6
 For a complete critique of Arnhart’s position and how unlike natural law what he espouses is see 
J. Budziszewski, The Line Through the Heart: Natural Law as Fact, Theory, and Sign of Contradiction, 
(Wilmington: ISI Books, 2009): Chapter 5. 
7
 Peter Doyle, Understanding Fossils, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996): p. 67-69. 
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One of the components that Darwin calls into question is the Aristotelian 
teleological conception of the universe. W. T. Jones explains the effect of this shift of 
beliefs from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance: 
The fact that men of the classical period and the Middle Ages agreed that values 
are objectively real is connected, of course, with the teleological conception of the 
universe that they shared. If the purpose anything subserves gives it value, and if 
purposes are objective, values will be objective. Anything will be good (really 
good, apart from some individual’s feeling about it) insofar as it consciously or 
unconsciously realizes its purpose; anything will be bad insofar as it fails to 
accomplish its purpose….It follows that, in abandoning the teleological 
conception of the universe, the modern mind abandoned this easy way of 
establishing the objectivity of value. Moreover, modern men did not merely 
abandon the teleological conception of the universe; gradually they substituted for 
it a conception of the universe that seemed incompatible with the objectivity of 
values.8  
 
Although one may doubt aspects of this account provided by Jones (e.g., it wasn’t the 
case that everybody in the classical and medieval period held a teleological conception of 
the universe, Democritus for instance), one cannot be too dismissive of his main point. It 
may be the case that Darwinism actually came long after the dismissal of teleology, but 
nonetheless one may contend that is has played a crucial role for the dismissal of natural 
law.   
 There is also a rejection of Aristotle’s physics that comes into play when 
considering why natural law is rejected. Modern science seems chiefly concerned with 
material and efficient causes. They primarily want to study what initiated the change 
from outside what is studied and the material out of which it is composed. Although final 
causality seems somewhat irrelevant to this endeavor, it is not irrelevant to natural law.  
                                                          
8
 W.D. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy: Hobbes to Hume, 2nd Ed. (Chicago: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, Inc. 1969): p. 2.  
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Despite the widespread rejection of teleology of living things in academia, there 
has been a modest revival of the natural law tradition.9 Still, it is far from a popular 
theory. Why have so many philosophers looked askance at natural law even though 
historically it has such a rich philosophical heritage?  
One may find the presumption in some departments of philosophy the view that 
natural law has nothing to offer as an ethical system.  Up until the 18th century some of 
the greatest minds in philosophy accepted natural law.10 Through the middle ages and 
into late modern times many people judged the acceptability and morality of civil law on 
the basis of how well it was in accord with natural law.11 Not only were civil laws judged 
this way, war was also justified in cases where rights that were based on natural law were 
violated. For example, the justification for the American Revolution was that the King of 
England was violating certain unalienable rights (that were based on the natural law). 
There is something about the way man is that helps one determine (and understand) what 
is good to do. Actions that are determined to be good are naturally good for man. 
                                                          
9Although Vernon Bourke, Henry Veatch, Ralph McInerny, and Anthony Lisska were read in 
some circles, Germain Grisez and John Finnis were arguably the most influential contemporary natural law 
theorists in that they greatly impacted the field of political science thus reviving natural law.  
10The Stoics and Christians promoted natural law in ancient times. In the middle ages, Aquinas 
synthesized aspects from several philosophers on natural law.  The modern period marked the natural law 
theory of Grotius, Pufendorf, Cumberland, Culverwell, Harrington, and Locke. See Moral Philosophy from 
Montaigne to Kant: An anthology, Vol. I, ed. J.B. Schneewind, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990. David Braybrooke also argues in Natural Law Modernized that Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, David 
Hume, and David Copp are all natural law theorists. Contemporary defenders include Vernon Bourke, 
Ralph McInerny, Russell Hittinger, Philip Devine, Jean Porter, Janet Smith, Germain Grisez, John Finnis, 
Patrick Lee, Joseph Boyle, William May, and Robert George.  
11Consider the words of one of the greatest jurists of the 18th century, William Blackstone, “Good 
and wise men, in all ages...have supposed, that the deity, from the relations, we stand in, to himself and to 
each other, has constituted an eternal and immutable law, which is, indispensably, obligatory upon all 
mankind, prior to any human institution whatever. This is what is called the law of nature, which, being 
coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is, of course superior in obligation to any other.  It is 
binding over all the globe, in all countries at all times.  No human laws are of any validity, if contrary to 
this; and such of them as are valid, derive all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original."  
Commentaries on the Laws of England in the chapter Of the Nature of Laws in General. 
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One can find in the late 18th century and early 20th century two major arguments 
that were supposed to put the nails into the coffin of any natural law theory. The one, 
attributed to David Hume, has been called the Is-Ought fallacy. Those said to commit this 
fallacy believe that certain facts entail values, which is also the view held by natural law 
theorists. The other, proposed by G.E. Moore, is called the naturalistic fallacy. Those said 
to commit this fallacy believe that goodness is a natural property. This is also a view held 
by some natural law theorists. Despite the influence these fallacies had on secular 
approaches to natural law, many working in the field of theological ethics continued 
writing on natural law ethical theory and applying it to situations people encounter in 
day-to-day living.12  
The emphasis of this chapter is to briefly explain the following: 1) the problems 
of natural law as an ethical theory; 2) what natural law theory in general is; 2) the 
arguments that seem to have put natural law theory on her death bed; 3) the parallels 
natural law theory has with contemporary naturalism; and 4) an overview of the work to 
be done in the chapters that follow. 
 
 
A. What are the Problems of Natural Law? 
 
 
This section highlights the problems intrinsic to natural law theory. The 
arguments against natural law are historically significant because they led to its 
abandonment by many from the nineteenth century until the late twentieth century. 
Although there are some thinkers that still worked on natural law ethics in the Catholic 
tradition during this time, most outside this tradition developed different ethical theories 
                                                          
12
 Some of those that continued this work in natural law included Heinrich Rommen, A. P. 
D’Entreves, Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson, Yves Simon, Henry Veatch, and Thomas Davitt. 
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to avoid the ‘errors in reasoning’ found in natural law.13 Among these errors is included 
discovering an ‘ought’ in what ‘is’ the case, the challenge of relativism, and in deriving 
an ethical theory from human nature.  
 David Hume formulates a significant argument that has been leveled against 
natural law theory. This argument has classically become known as the ‘Is-Ought’ fallacy 
or Hume’s Fork. This argument states that there cannot be more in the conclusion than is 
in the premises of a deductive argument. The common moral syllogism has only facts in 
the premises, and within them there is nothing of value. However, this syllogism often 
concludes with a value-judgment about how one ought to act. In other words, although 
the two premises concern only what is the case, the syllogism concludes by stating what 
ought to be done. If this as it seems to be, is illicit, then it seems Hume has a case against 
those who use facts about reality to deduce how one ought to act. Thus, Hume concludes 
that the moral theorist has made an error in reasoning. 
 G.E. Moore offers the second major argument against traditional approaches that 
emphasize the ‘natural’ as a basis for that which is morally good. The objection he has 
developed has come to be called the open question argument.  Although the seeds of this 
argument may stem from Hume, Moore’s argument is certainly different. The argument 
is basically this: For any proposed definition of ‘good’ couched solely in naturalist terms, 
say X, Y, Z, it is always an open- that is, not self-answering, “analytic”- question whether 
good is X, Y, Z. If you say that any X is Y, and you can doubt whether X is Y (because the 
two do not entail each other conceptually), then it is an open question whether the two are 
                                                          
13Henry Veatch suggests what he sees as the bankruptcy of all the modern ethical theories as being 
rooted in the abandonment of natural law and the embracing of Hume and Moore’s arguments. This is the 
subject of his work titled, For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory. 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971).  
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the same.  Goodness is not something that can be defined in naturalistic terms. In every 
case the definition of goodness (where goodness is Y)  that appears in the form goodness 
is Y, one finds that the definition (which is Y) is not analytically true. Naturalistic 
definitions of ‘good’ are simply mistaken. All the theories that claim to define ‘good’ in 
terms of certain ‘natural’ properties are simply committing the ‘naturalistic’ fallacy. 14 
This is a brief synopsis of the argument, although it will be more fully explained in 
chapter three. 
As a result of Hume and Moore, and as a response to the resuscitation of natural 
law and other naturalist theories, moral relativism has emerged to challenge this 
revival.15Moral relativists hold that there is no single true system of morality. They also 
point to the evidence that there are foundationally different beliefs or standards about the 
same subject. They maintain, as Philip Devine writes, that “There is sometimes no further 
standard to which appeal can be made in order to determine which of the rival standards 
is correct.”16 The arguments the moral relativists provide are given to provide an alternate 
                                                          
14
 Of course it is not the case that natural law theorists hold that goodness is natural as yellow is. 
In this case, Moore’s argument may be a moot point. However, Ralph McInerny writes of the influence of 
this view of Moore’s as saying that there is no natural thing that we seek that can be equated with Good. 
(Ethica Thomistica, p. 27) Henry Veatch’s  focus on the naturalistic fallacy involves the problems of 
defining goodness and avoiding circularity in definition. (For an Ontology of Morals, p. 108-117) These are 
real problems that need to be addressed even if natural law doesn’t hold that goodness is a natural property 
like yellow is.  
15
 Moral relativism is not coherentism. Coherentism is an epistemological account that attempts to 
justify certain beliefs; moral relativism is a meta-ethical account about the way ethics is. Peter Murphy 
explains, “It implies that for a belief to be justified it must belong to a coherent system of beliefs. For a 
system of beliefs to be coherent, the beliefs that make up that system must “cohere” with one another. 
Typically, this coherence is taken to involve three components: logical consistency, explanatory relations, 
and various inductive (non-explanatory) relations.” From “Coherentism in Epistemology,” Internet 
Encylopedia of Philosophy, (Oct. 15, 2006).  
16Philip Devine, Relativism, Nihilism, and God, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1989): p. 43.   
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account of morality. These arguments must be answered if one is going to have a 
plausible account of natural law.17    
 There also seems to be a general problem of finding how ethical norms can be 
taken from human nature. If there is a common human nature, can one discover common 
moral principles that can guide human action? It seems obvious that there are certainly 
aspects of human nature that are mutable. How can a nature that is so mutable possibly 
reveal to us anything about how we ought to act?   
 The arguments of Hume, Moore, and the relativists are the central considerations 
that will be dealt with in this dissertation.  Each uniquely presents problems for natural 
law and naturalist theories of ethics. Hume ends up reducing moral judgments to mere 
feelings. He argues that there is nothing in the act that is seen that is bad or good. The 
basis for moral judgments is not something that is objective, but merely arises from the 
feelings one has due to certain observations or thoughts. Natural law also claims that 
what one ought to do is based upon what a person is. Hume severs that connection. Some 
note that Moore’s theory also challenges several aspects of natural law theory. The 
classical natural law theorist often claims that what is good is a natural property (at least 
at times). Natural law also says that goodness can be defined. Moore’s argument counters 
these claims. The relativist challenge to natural law comes from those that deny moral 
truth and that universal moral rules apply to all people.   
  
                                                          
17
 Contrary to what is commonly thought of as a corollary to relativism, Crispin Wright argues that 
one may be a relativist and still hold that there are some ethical truths. See Truth and Objectivity (Harvard 
University Press, 1992).  I will discuss relativism in more detail in chapter four.  
10 
 
 
B. What is Natural Law Theory? 
 
 There are three different species of natural law, but all share some common 
ground. Although there are characteristics of the theories that distinguish them as theories 
of natural law, there are also other aspects of natural law theory that are shared with other 
ethical theories.  This section explicates what natural law is, common features found in 
every natural law theory, and one particular aspect of natural law that is shared among 
many normative theories.  
Natural law bases the goodness of certain acts on what is natural to humans. The 
natural law theorist must explain what is natural and what law means. In natural law that 
which is most natural to man is that which makes him different from other animals.18 
Thus, a man acts naturally when he acts according to the principle that makes him unique 
among all animals, namely, reason. Reason is said to be the distinguishing principle by 
which a human acts. Law is, according to St. Thomas, “an ordinance of reason for the 
common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the community.”19 The natural 
law theorist follows St. Thomas in emphasizing that law has the following properties: 
1. A prescriptive order 
2. Given by reason 
3. Supporting the common good 
4. Commanded by a ruler. 
                                                          
18Occasionally the term ‘man’ and the masculine pronoun will be used in this dissertation as a 
generic reference to all mankind.  I hesitate to use ‘he/she’ or alternate ‘he’ with ‘she’ because doing so 
tends to call attention to itself and impede ready understanding of the text. 
19St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Ed. By Anton Pegis, in the Basic Writings of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1973): q. 90, a. 4, c 
11 
 
Natural law combines what is unique in man, i.e. reason, with law. Natural law is the 
combination of these two functions. Reason acts in man to discern good and evil.20 
Natural law is the determining characteristic that aids a person in discovering whether an 
act is good. 21  Natural law in man is called right reason, which is the measure of good 
acts.22 Ralph McInerny states it succinctly, “Natural law is the rational direction of 
action, the formulation of precepts stating how the good is to be achieved, how evil 
avoided.”23 
What do all the varieties of natural law share in common? One thing every natural 
law theorist holds is that morally good acts are based on aspects of mankind that are 
common to humanity. The philosopher Philip Devine explains,  
A common theme in the natural law tradition is the unity of humanity, and 
consequently the existence of goods, virtues, and moral principles accessible to, 
and binding upon, men and women as such. Universal human rights also flow 
naturally from a natural law perspective, though not more easily than universal 
human goods and universal human virtues. Natural law theorists affirm, 
moreover, that questions of the good and right are matters of knowledge and truth 
in as good a sense as, or better than, that of natural science.24 
 
The common element of all mankind to which the natural law theorist appeals is 
universal.  Although natural theorists disagree to some extent about what this common 
element is, all agree that there is something that is common to man. 
 There are significant implications for these two common elements of natural law. 
The natural law theorist holds that a man knows what is right by right reason and that 
                                                          
20Ibid. ST, I-II, q. 91, a. 2   
21In St. Thomas eternal law is said to be the supreme measure. Also, this eternal law for St. 
Thomas is identical to the divine essence.   
22Ibid.  q. 21, a.  1 
23Ralph McInerny, Aquinas On Human Action: A Theory of Practice, (Washington D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1992): P. 150.   
24Philip Devine, Natural Law Ethics, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000): p. 1.  
12 
 
there is a universal element of man.  As Devine says, the theory is also cognitivist, i.e. it 
holds that it is possible to know what is right or wrong. Because everyone has right 
reason, and everyone can discover the universal aspect of man, everyone can, in 
principle, know whether an act is good or evil. This is not to say that natural law theory 
doesn’t recognize that there are difficult circumstances that must be considered in some 
cases. It also doesn’t mean that every case is clear cut as to how one should act. But it 
does mean that many cases are clear, and that one can know how to act in difficult 
situations sometimes from guidance one has in clear cases.  
 The third element that is common to every natural law approach concerns the use 
of the the first principle of practical reason. St. Thomas identifies this as the universal 
moral obligation to do good, and avoid evil.25 Insofar as any action is to be done it falls 
under the aspect of this universal good found in the first principle. It is said that this first 
principle has content, and other self-evident principles can be drawn from it.  
In brief, all natural law theorists share some common beliefs about natural law. 
All say that right reason is the way one makes moral decisions. Also, all recognize that 
there is an aspect of man that is universal. Each also recognizes the first principle of 
practical reason and that there are certain self-evident principles that follow from it. The 
nature of these self-evident principles is such that one immediately recognizes their 
goodness upon formulation.  Although these three common threads are essential 
components of all natural law theories, the most important relates to the guidance it 
provides for action. McInerny writes, “Natural law is the claim that there are common, 
                                                          
25
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part, Ed. By Anton C. Pegis. 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1945): Q. 94, Art. 2, p.774 
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general guidelines for action, easily formulated by practical reason, with universal 
application.”26  
There are many ways to classify types of natural law theory. For the purposes of 
this treatment, I will categorize natural law theory into three major types. The 
methodology of each type reflects the metaphysical basis of that theory. This is a brief 
survey of each of the views, including the one expounded in this work.  
  There are two major ways of interpreting natural law. The first of these is 
proportionalism.27 Proportionalism holds that the good aspects of any act must override 
the evil aspects.28 This position does not support the view that any act is in and of itself 
intrinsically evil or wrong.29 According to proportionalist Charles Curran, “Catholic 
theologians thus appealed to commensurate reason, proportionate reason or the 
calculation of consequences to indicate that premoral evil could on some occasions be 
justified.”30 (Italics mine) Insofar as goodness and evil are not intrinsic to an act, and thus 
not natural elements of an act, this removes the emphasis on what is natural as a basis for 
action. Instead, the proportionalist considers an individual’s intentions and attitudes. 
Thus, one source of goodness and badness arises from the intention or the motive for 
acting.  
The proportionalist claims his theory is better than others which overemphasize 
one consideration to the detriment of others. A deontologist is said to reduce all morality 
to merely following a set of rules. A teleological system of ethics is said to reduce all 
                                                          
26McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action, p. 134.  
27Bernard Hoose’s survey of proportionalism is an excellent introduction into the debate between 
different natural law theorists in his work Proportionalism: The American Debate and its European Roots. 
Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987. 
28Curran, Charles E., “Utilitarianism and Moral Theology,” in Readings in Moral Theology No. 1, 
ed. By Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, (New York: Paulist Press, 1979): p. 353 
29Ibid.    
30Ibid.   
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morality to consequences. The proportionalist insists one cannot reduce all morality to 
either duty or consequences.31  Accordingly, the proportionalist claims to avoid the 
excesses of deontology and teleology, and adopt the best aspects of each. The 
proportionalist recognizes duty as an important aspect in an ethical system, and also 
accepts the fact the consequences of an act is another important element in a moral 
theory. Proportionalism may be a mixed, unqualified, impure consequentialism.32 The 
contention here is that considering intentions, duties involved, and consequences are all 
important when evaluating the goodness of an action. One can hold to this without 
holding that there is any intrinsically wrong action. Because the nature of an action 
comes from its end (read consequences), the consequences are of primary importance 
even if they are not the only factor which is important.   
The proportionalist holds a unique view on the universality of moral norms and 
whether any act can be judged as evil before it occurs.33  Proportionalist Joseph Fuchs 
explains,  
This notion of a static-universal system of norms is valid to the extent that it 
believes man is and always will be man (tautology!) and that he must always 
conduct himself rightly—that is, as man. But this quite accurate perception does 
not entail as a necessary consequence a static-universal system of moral norms. 
The state of being man does not, in the first place, exclude that the human state 
may differ in different epochs and cultures, just as it is actualized in different 
individuals and life situations without placing man’s nature in question….For 
even that which essentially constitutes man, that which therefore belongs to his 
nature unalterably, as also his permanent structures, is basically mutable. 
Mutability belongs to man’s immutable essence; irrevocably, man is man 
(tautology!). To be sure, a priori, some essential elements of man’s nature can be 
identified: body-soul unity, personality, accountability, interpersonality; while one 
                                                          
31Ibid. 353-357.  
32A full discussion of the different views proportionalists hold related to consequentialism, see 
Bernard Hoose, pp. 76-81. It is also possible that proportionalists are non-hedonistic consequentialists. The 
problem is how one weighs certain consequences over another.  
33Although not all proportionalists agree with each other on every issue of how to respond to 
arguments against natural law, there is a general agreement about these two aspects.    
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cannot say with equal a priori validity, respecting other components of existential 
man, whether they belong necessarily and unchangeably to human nature.34 
(Italics mine) 
  
Fuchs emphasizes that there is not a universal system of moral norms relying on an 
immutable human nature because man’s nature has mutable aspects. Proportionalist Peter 
Knauer writes,  
I plead for a kind of objective relativism in ethics. I think that there are no 
prefabricated judgments which can be made, but that the judgment of conscience 
depends on what a particular event is in reality. Whether, for example, particular 
behavior is hatred of God cannot be known in advance; it requires examination. It 
may be that the hatred is directed to a false image of God which the person 
refuses to serve.35  
 
Knauer’s ‘objective relativism’ simply refers to the fact that one can know the objective 
truth of whether an act is good, but not before it occurs in reality when the motivation and 
consequences are also known.   
The second major theory of natural law relies on the first of two absolutist 
interpretations. This theory, which has been called a basic goods theory, was developed 
by Germain Grisez and John Finnis.  In this theory, which tries to avoid problems 
attributed to a common human nature, a list of goods common to man is appealed to as 
the foundation for ethics.36  That which is universal and absolute on this account are these 
common goods. So, although there is no common or universal human nature, one can 
discover a universal list of goods that are necessary for every human. Also, no good listed 
is of any greater importance than any other. Thus, all goods are equally good.  
                                                          
34Joseph Fuchs, “The Absoluteness of Moral Terms,” in Readings in Moral Theology No. 1, ed. 
By Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, (New York: Paulist Press, 1979): p. 107.  
35Peter Knauer, “The Principle of Double Effect,” in Readings in Moral Theology No. 1, ed. By 
Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, (New York: Paulist Press, 1979): 27-28. 
36One can find this position explained in John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1980); and Germain Grisez, “The First Principle of Practical Reason,” in Aquinas: A Collection 
of Critical Essays, ed. A. Kenny (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), 340-382.    
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This second major elaboration of natural law was developed as a response to Pope 
Paul VI’s encyclical Humanae Vitae, just as proportionalism was. However, Grisez and 
Finnis reject proportionalism.  The thrust of Grisez and Finnis’ attack on proportionalism 
is that there is no hierarchy of goods that justifies doing evil. The proportionalist says that 
an evil means (i.e., action) may be justified by a good consequence.37 A person is to 
consider if the consequence is proportionately greater than the act that is done when the 
act as a whole is considered.38   Grisez and Finnis respond that an evil act is forbidden 
because of an absolute prohibition against performing an evil act. These two men contend 
that the list of goods is self-evident, and no good is superior to another. J. Budziszewski 
summarizes this view: 
The basic theory of the new natural-law theory is simple. First, we have “pre-
moral practical principles” that identify the various kinds of human good as self-
evident objects of pursuit. Second, we have “modes of responsibility,” equally 
self-evident, that tell us how to pursue them. Third are ordinary moral rules, 
which result.39 
 
Principles are pursued as ends, ‘modes of responsibility’ are the means to attain these 
principles, and our moral rules emerge from the recognition of these first two. There are 
seven principles each should seek: 1) self-integration, 2) authenticity, 3) Justice and 
friendship, 4) holiness, 5) life, 6) knowledge, and 7) exercises of skill.40 Although there 
are eight ‘modes of responsibility’ or means to pursue these ends, the seventh and eighth 
can be leveled against the proportionalist. The seventh ‘mode’ is to “respect every human 
                                                          
37Contrary to Grisez and Finnis’ description, many proportionalists deny this charge. The reason 
lies in most, if not all, actions entailing a form of the doctrine of double-effect. Thus, even when it may 
appear that an evil act is done this is only because one is not able to observe the simultaneous good act that 
is willed. When the good willed is proportionate or greater than the evil allowed the action is good (or at 
least neutral).  
38Peter Knauer, “The Principle of Double Effect,” in Readings in Moral Theology No. 1, ed. By 
Charles Curran and Richard McCormick, (New York: Paulist Press, 1979) 
39
 J. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart: The Case for Natural Law, (Downers Grove: Intervarsity 
Press, 1997): p. 197. 
40Ibid.  
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good in every act,”41 and the eighth is “never sacrifice any human good to any other; in 
other words, never do evil that good may result.”42 Basic goods or principles are equal 
and the means to pursue them require that this be recognized. According to this line of 
thinking, the proportionalist is wrong in his assessment that a greater good justifies a 
lesser evil, because there is no greater good.   
There is also a third elaboration of natural law.  This third view, one elaborated on 
by Ralph McInerny and those considered as ‘Thomists,’ offers a different approach to 
natural law than the other two. It notes that Grisez and Finnis must consider that a prima 
facie case can be made for a hierarchy among a list of goods for man.  Grisez and Finnis 
hold that basic goods are incommensurable and thus no hierarchy can be made.43 
Contrary to this, the third elaboration of natural law recognizes a hierarchy of goods, and 
retains human nature as the foundation for ethics instead of a list of goods. Also, the third 
approach to natural law rejects Grisez and Finnis’s acceptance of the ‘Is-Ought’ maxim. 
The third approach also differs in its understanding of ends that need weighing, and 
process of weighing certain acts versus others, than that of the proportionalist. So, 
although there is certainly some overlap in aspects of these systems, these unique features 
of the third view distinguish it from the other two.  
This approach is considered in this dissertation as the classical account.44 The 
classical view of natural law, one that has been defended especially by Roman Catholics 
since Pope Leo XIII recommended studying St. Thomas, embraces a different conception 
                                                          
41Ibid. 198.  
42Ibid.   
43Robert George defends this view, called the incommensurability thesis, in his work In Defense of 
Natural Law in the article titled “Does the ‘Incommensurability Thesis’ Imperil Common Sense Moral 
Judgments?” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): pp. 92-101.  
44
 Although I will not defend the thesis that this is really the classical account in terms of being 
old, I believe it is the classical Thomistic account of natural law broadly stated.  
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of reality than the modern view. In response to Hume’s Fork, this classical position 
methodologically derives obligation (or what one ought to do) from the nature of man (or 
what is the case). The moral relativist will also be opposed to the classical natural law 
theorist. It is this third type of natural law theory that will be explained and defended 
from several common objections in this dissertation.  
 
C. Natural Law in Practice 
 
 The application of natural law to actual cases finds a number of difficulties 
emerging. This may be expected in cases where it seems there are a lot of ambiguities in 
interpreting the situation. However, it may also be charged that the real problem emerges 
in so-called ‘clear-cases’ of decision-making where people with the same foundational 
principles disagree. It would be easier there was some way to decide who is right between 
rival theories of natural law when they come to different conclusions about what to do. 
The last section of this dissertation deals with practically applying natural law to a 
medical issue. 
 The difficulty of practicing natural law comes from at least two areas. First, 
applying general principles to concrete situations sometimes creates difficulties because 
of conflicts between principles. Second, deriving concrete norms from general principles 
for guidance can also be difficult. This may be due to the differences in how the general 
principles can be applied. For example, if a general principle is that one should promote 
human happiness, how does one carry out such a general principle when there are limited 
resources? Involved in discovering how one can do this is an assumption of what 
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happiness entails and a certain metaphysical background against which one makes 
judgments. These presuppostions will have to be explored more fully in chapter two.   
  
D. A Brief Overview of the Remaining Chapters 
 
There are some areas of disagreement between different forms of natural law, 
even if there is some agreement. Of course an obvious point of investigation is to 
discover just what is meant by ‘natural.’ In this and the proceeding chapters the different 
arguments for and against natural law theory will be presented. The natural law theory 
advanced in this work attempts to remain faithful to what I’ve referred to as a classical 
approach.  
The structure and metaphysical basis for the classical account of natural law 
theory is set forth in chapter two.  The first part of the chapter addresses some of the 
metaphysical presuppositions and elements of natural law, as well as the distinction 
between metaphysical and moral goodness. The three aspects of an act that determine the 
morality of it will also be discussed.  Lastly, there is an extensive discussion of the 
virtues, as well as some common objections to virtue-theories. 
The third chapter unpacks the two arguments that Hume and Moore offer. These 
arguments are presented in the best possible light, as are similar arguments offered by 
several contemporary defenders. A natural law and neo-naturalist response is made to 
these arguments to show the fallacies they commit. Although there are some errors that 
are obvious in Hume and Moore, others are not. 
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The fourth chapter deals with the arguments that moral relativists advance against 
a natural law approach.  Distinctions between the different kinds of moral relativism are 
drawn, and there is a brief discussion of arguments normally used against moral 
relativism that are not successful. The chapter concludes with what I consider to be 
several plausible arguments against moral relativism.  
The fifth chapter discusses the tension between natural law theory and neo-
naturalism. The first part of the chapter draws the distinction between naturalism and 
neo-naturalism. The second part explains more completely the similarities between the 
two views. The third introduces and answers arguments posed by a ‘Christian’ 
philosopher against classical natural law theory. The fourth part of this chapter explains 
the real difference between natural law and neo-naturalism. The fifth part exposes why a 
natural law approach is foundationally different than a divine command theory. 
The sixth chapter sets forth a practical guide for making bioethical decisions. This 
last chapter advances a proposal about the ways a natural law approach may help all the 
people involved to make the right choice in life or death decisions. Last, a classical 
bioethical problem is examined, and the natural law solution is offered.   
The goal of this work is threefold.  First, I will explain natural law and the 
naturalistic metaphysical basis for making moral decisions. Second, some of the common 
objections to natural law and naturalistic ethics will be exposed and cleared away. 
Although many of these objections have been accepted in the other two approaches to 
natural law, the third vigorously attacks the arguments as fallacious in some way.  Third, 
it will be shown how natural law can aid in decision-making in medical ethics.   
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Chapter 2 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE STRUCTURE OF NATURAL LAW 
 
 
 
 The aim of this chapter is to set forth the ethical foundation upon which classical 
natural law theory rests. Classical natural law, to the best of my understanding, follows 
the same explanation that St. Thomas Aquinas provides.45 This theory offers all the tools 
necessary for ethical analysis, and provides a solid basis from which any ethicist can 
work. In this chapter I will first explain natural law theory, and then expose the 
metaphysical underpinnings of natural law.   
  The chapter is divided into six major sections. The first section expounds the 
metaphysics of the principles of nature used in natural law. Section two explains the 
relationship between first principles of being and action. Section three discusses the 
knowledge of being and goodness. Section four discusses the relation between human 
nature and the end of man.  Section five delves into the moral determinants of action in a 
natural law account. Section six examines the role of virtue in natural law theory. 
 
                                                          
45Although I will not argue that my interpretation is the ‘true reading’ of St. Thomas, I do 
recognize that there are different schools of thought regarding his ethics. I have simply taken what I 
thought to be elements of his theory that I thought to be relevant to this project and used them here.   
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A. The Principles of Nature 
 
The basic elements of Thomistic metaphysics, that is, the theory of how St. 
Thomas describes the way things are ultimately composed, is the foundation upon which 
one can attain a proper understanding of classical natural law theory. An understanding of 
these elements also will help one grasp the role the transcendental terms ‘goodness’ and 
‘being’ play in natural law. The elements ‘act’ and ‘potential’ are the focus in this 
section, with ‘being’ and ‘goodness’ as related to these two elements explained in the 
next. Knowing what act and potency mean, and their relation at various levels of reality, 
is vital for two reasons. It aids a person in grasping the foundational elements of a natural 
law theory, and reveals how one can employ act and potency to describe different aspects 
of reality.  
  The classical natural law theorist holds the view that one may consider all of 
reality from the perspective of act and potential. There are many derivations of these two 
terms. The Latin word for act that St. Thomas uses is actus, which was translated from 
Aristotle’s Greek terms dynamis, energeia, or entelecheia. The meaning of the term ‘act’ 
can refer to actuality, determination, perfection, activity, or action. The Latin potentia 
corresponds to the English potency, power, potential, or capacity. The term ‘potency’ or 
‘potential’ refers to something that can be or act, but is not or has not acted. For example, 
when Mr. T threatens to throw that fool Murdoch off the building this implies that he has 
not yet done so. One may say that Mr. T has the potential to do so, but has not actualized 
it. Similarly, if Socrates is standing, then he has the potential to sit. He does not have the 
potential to stand because he is actually standing. In this case, Socrates does not exist in a 
seated position, and for this reason has the potential to sit.  One may just as easily 
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consider either the contrast or the relationship between the concepts act and potential to 
understand them. Potential or potency is, in some sense, non-being. Potential or potency 
refers to an aspect of a thing that can be done or actualized but is not. Potency only exists 
as something that can be in the future. Potency requires that something make it actual in 
order for it to change. This is also referred to as being reduced from potency to act. 
One may also consider how potency and act can be applied to the nature of things.  
The essence of one thing may have the potential to do something or it may not. If it has 
the potential, then the potential can be actualized. In view of this, a rock cannot be said to 
have the potential to see, nor can it actually see. It is not in the nature of the rock to do 
this sort of activity. The nature or the essence of a rock limits how it acts or what its 
potential is.46 Or, consider whether the nature of a dog allows it to fly like a bird. It does 
not take a rocket scientist to realize that in the nature of a dog there is no potential for it 
to fly. With this limitation one would not expect this to actually ever occur. Similarly, it 
takes little effort to realize that a rock has no potential to see, although it does have the 
potential to fall. A rock’s nature has nothing in it that allows for vision, although due to 
its material nature it is subject to the laws of physics.   
                                                          
46
 All reality can be examined using the terms act and potency. Things that exist are said to 
actually exist. Things that could exist are said to have the potential to exist. If something has no potential to 
exist, like a square circle, then it can never come to be. Aquinas explains, “Being signifies that something 
properly exists in actuality, as asserted in a. 3: Every being insofar as it is a being exists in actuality.” St. 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa of Theology, I, a. 4, a. 1, ad. 1, in An Aquinas Reader: Selections from the 
Writings of Thomas Aquinas, Ed. Mary Clark, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999): 62. Things 
that do not currently exist, like my grandchildren, have the potential to come to exist. Potential is here 
contrasted with actuality and is its opposite principle that refers to non-existing. Potential is not to be 
understood of in this case as referring to a power. A thing must exist to have any properties, and thus the 
property of ‘potency-to-be’ cannot be attributed to something that does not ‘be.’  
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   One may also use the terms act and potency to analyze existence as an aspect of 
reality.47 In the realm of existence, there can be two types of existing beings. The first 
type refers to beings that actually exist in reality. This class of beings is not a fictional or 
mental construct, but exists outside and independent of the mind. The second refers to 
beings that could exist in reality, but do not. This class only exists in the mind and 
contains mental fictions. With this second class there is nothing contradictory about the 
nature of the fictional creature that keeps it from existing, but neither is there anything in 
reality that has given us any evidence that it exists beyond the mind. For example, one 
may recognize that there is nothing contradictory in the nature of a unicorn that keeps it 
from existing. The idea of a unicorn certainly exists in the mind of some people. 
However, this is something that we have yet to find existing in reality. Thus, it has the 
potential to exist, but we have yet to find it actually existing except in the mind.  
Act and potency can also be used in moral evaluation. In regard to morally 
relevant action, one speaks of acting where it is possible to actualize the potential. The 
usefulness of applying this terminology to moral evaluation comes from analyzing it as 
good or bad as it relates to act and potency. One may have the potential to do a harmful 
or a good act. A person can analyze the potential to do harm or good, and the actuality of 
doing harm or good. More importantly, the action of a person can make that person better 
or worse by actualizing (or determining) specific potentials within his nature.  The next 
section deals with how act and potency may be used in moral evaluation. 
                                                          
47
 One can see how the distinction between act and potency can be applied at the level of existence 
or action. Only an existing thing can act. Thus, existence must precede action. Action is the second level to 
which these terms can be applied. A thing only has the potential to act if it already exists.  This allows St. 
Thomas to say that a thing may be metaphysically good insofar as it exists, and morally bad insofar as its 
actions do not conform with its proper end. Because everything in act is a being (i.e., in act a being exists), 
and being is good in a certain sense, and beings also perform evil acts, there must be different levels to 
which one can apply the terms good and evil to the same being at the same time.   
25 
 
At this point one can see how all of reality may be discussed in terms of act and 
potency.  Act can mean various things, but is normally used to refer to that which perfects 
something in potency. Of course, potency can mean a power, but in this context it refers 
to something that can be perfected and made actual but is not yet actualized. Grasping the 
meaning of these two terms and the way they may be used in various contexts is 
important in the natural law analysis. The way these two terms are applied to being, 
goodness, and moral evaluation is discussed in the next section.  
 
B.The Metaphysics of Being and Goodness 
 
The metaphysical foundation for natural law theory rests on the intrinsic relationship 
between being and goodness. This section discusses three significant features of natural 
law that explain this relationship. The first concerns the development of the meta-ethical 
basis for morals in the derivation of goodness from being. The second is the definition for 
goodness given the relationship of being and goodness. The third is how goodness and 
being are employed in evaluation.  
How does one make the connection between being and goodness? Although there are 
different senses in which a thing is called good, St. Thomas also thinks goodness and 
being are convertible in some way.48 The term ‘being’ simply means existing. Is the 
claim that goodness also only means existing?  The essence of this explanation is that 
saying something is good expresses a desirableness or perfection that saying something is 
does not.  He says that although there is no real difference between goodness and being, a 
person can make a distinction in his mind between the two. The reason is that the term 
                                                          
48
 Aquinas, St. Thomas. Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Summa Contra Gentiles,  
Summa Theologica. Vol. I and II. Ed. By Anton C. Pegis. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1945): Q. 5, 
Art. 1. 
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“being” is too general to fully express the aspect of being that people call “good”.49  For 
example, one readily recognizes the difference between saying something is an apple and 
that it is a good apple. An apple simply refers to the existing object without any mention 
as to whether it is good.   
Following Aristotle, Aquinas also notes the desire all things have for goodness.  
The claim is ‘good is what all desire.’ The emphasis here is that good and desirable are 
connected in some way. The connection comes through the desire things have for 
perfection. A thing desires the good in order to become more complete. The perfection of 
the good is that which completes a person desiring it.50 Thus, there is not only a 
                                                          
49
 Explaining more fully the process of St. Thomas’ reasoning in his identification of being and 
goodness, Thomistic scholar Jan Aertsen writes,“The starting point is the concept (ratio) of good. This 
consists in the good’s being “desirable,” for the good is the end for appetite. Thomas refers here, of course, 
to Aristotle’s definition at the beginning of the Ethics. The second step in the argument is that the 
“desirable” is identified with the “perfect” (perfectum): “Now it is clear that a thing is desirable insofar as it 
is perfect, for all things desire their own perfection.” In this step the transition is made from the concept of 
good to the nature of the good. Proper to the good as good is that it is perfect. “Perfect” is that which has 
attained its end: the notion expresses completeness. The third step is the identification of what is “perfect” 
with what is “in act” (in actu). A thing is not perfect when its potentialities are not yet actualized. It is not 
completed until it has attained its act. Only then is the thing what it can be. By means of the notion of “act” 
Thomas is now able to establish the connection between good and being. For to be (esse) is the actuality 
(actualitas) of every thing. With this final step Thomas has arrived at the foundation of the thesis that every 
being is good.” Jan A. Aertsen, “Thomas Aquinas on the Good,” in Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in 
Honor of Norman Kretzman, Ed. Scott MacDonald & Eleonore Stump, (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1999): 240 This description of Aquinas’s reasoning shows that the key moves are 
identifying the concept of the good with the nature of the good, and moving from the desirable to the 
perfect. Once one has accepted these distinctions, St. Thomas points out that the perfect is fully act, which 
is not only being, but also good because it is desirable. 
50
 There are two potential objections. First, one may say that this definition of goodness is circular. 
However, something is desirable insofar as it is perfect. A thing is perfect insofar as it is complete.  The 
term complete does not mean good. Just because a student completes a test it doesn’t mean that the test is 
good. One can say that although everything that is good is complete, not everything that is complete is 
good. This is an illicit conversion of an A term. Second, one may object that if the good is what all desire, 
then it seems to follow that pedophiles desire what is good, which is absurd. However, just because 
something is able to be desired it does not follow that it is truly desirable. This confuses the real with the 
apparent good. The real good is truly desirable and the apparent good is not. Despite this explanation, 
however, one must recognize that there are certainly some desires that we have that we recognize as bad, 
but feel that we are unable to restrain ourselves from acting upon. For example, suppose I recognize 
alcoholism as bad, but truly feel that I cannot keep another drink from my lips. While there may be 
biological factors contributing to my difficulties, the point that needs to be made distinguishes the real and 
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connection between being and goodness, but there is also a connection between goodness 
and the desirable. One may see from this description where Aquinas comes up with the 
definition that goodness is being insofar as it is desirable. One may also not only identify 
specific examples of what is good where something is actual over and against the 
potential, but can think about degrees of goodness in a thing. So, for example, when a 
person is courageous, as opposed to only being potentially courageous, it is far better 
(i.e., there is greater goodness inherent within the person) as the virtue has been 
actualized.   
 There needs to be at least one qualification at this point. It is not being said that 
all things that are desired are desirable in every way. That is not the claim. This is simply 
talking about the definition of good. Although identifying the real good is important in 
morality, the definition of good is such that everything that is desired only is that way 
because of some aspect of good that it has. Ralph McInerny explains, 
The ratio boni offered in the context of this discussion is that quod omnia 
appetunt. The further assumption is that, whatever is desired is desired as 
perfective of the desirer. This is as true of the apparent good as of the real good, 
so that from the point of view of the ratio boni, there is no need to distinguish 
between what is desired and what ought to be desired, between the desired and the 
desirable. This being the case, that the good ought to be pursued, follows from the 
meaning of “good.”51 
 
 One can admit that some things that are desired are indeed not wholly desirable. Some 
beings with understanding understand the real good, and some do not.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
apparent good.  One may try to act on the real good in a variety of ways that will make it impossible for 
him to act on the apparent good. Also, each thing that is desired is desired under the formality of something 
good. Nazis could then justify killing human beings for some arbitrary reason that reduced them in the eyes 
of a greater good like holding mankind back from its true potential.  
51Ralph McInerny, Aquinas On Human Action: A Theory of Practice, (Washington D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1992): p. 132.  
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 However, another objection may be raised to Thomas’ implicit claim that ‘all 
things’ have desire or seek the good. Does he really believe that rocks have desire? Two 
possible solutions spring to mind when it is said that ‘all things seek the good.’ One says 
the word ‘seek’ here applies differently to different objects. In other words, ‘seek’ is 
being used metaphorically here, just as one can say ‘desire’ is. Natural law certainly does 
not promote panpsychism, which says all things have some form of consciousness or 
desire. The foundational constitution of every substance is called a dispositional 
property.52 As very substance has these properties, each ‘seeks’ the preservation of its 
being. Insofar as each thing resists its destruction, it ‘seeks’ its sustained existence. 
Because of human nature, there is a way a human seeks its preservation differently from 
the rock. Humans ‘seek’ preservation in a way rocks do, but also rationally. When there 
is a conflict between them, rationality is superior. There is something in man that 
motivates him to seek for the truth that rocks do not have because of their nature.   
A second way to understand this phrase emphasizes that it is a principle of 
practical reason. As such, it only applies to creatures with rationality. One may argue that 
this legitimately eliminates non-rational things like rocks from consideration as having 
desires. This first principle is a moral principle that is used to judge the action of rational 
beings. St. Thomas writes, “When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be 
understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all, but that whatever is desired has 
                                                          
52As Anthony Lisska has pointed out, because the term ‘inclination’ may have a misleading 
Freudian connotation, dispositional property is preferred to some in the natural law tradition to avoid 
problems associated with the false concepts many have given to what was readily understood in the past. 
The worry may also that one would build natural law upon every desire one has. However, this is not the 
claim. There are two types of desires that can be distinguished- natural and artificial. Natural desires exist 
in every person. Artificial desires do not. Natural desires include things that St. Thomas lists in Prima 
Secundae article 94 of the Summa Theologica. These include continued existence in all things, and don’t 
include artificial desires like running faster than a speeding bullet.      
29 
 
the nature of good.”53 If one then links the goodness in this phrase with the first principle 
of morality then non-rational things like rocks don’t desire anything, even if humans do.    
Because the terms ‘goodness’ and ‘being’ can be applied to all the categories they 
are called transcendental. They cannot be limited by genus or species. The categories of 
which something can apply were first identified in Aristotle’s Organon. These categories 
are based on the ways a person can enumerate anything that is contained in a subject or a 
predicate. The major two divisions of the categories are between substance and accidents. 
Although there are ten categories, nine of them are accidents. The accidents are 1) 
quality, 2) quantity, 3) time, 4) relation, 5) place, 6) position, 7) state, 8) action, and 9) 
affection. One can apply the terms ‘being’ and ‘goodness’ to substance, to accidents, or 
to both. For example, if a person has a particular quality that they ought to have, such as 
seeing, then there is a particular goodness in that person that ought to be there. There is a 
perfection, as is entailed in the definition of goodness, that exists in a person who sees as 
they ought. A transcendental term, like the term ‘goodness’ in this example, is called this 
because one can apply the term across these categories.   
Consider a more detailed analysis of how one can use the term ‘goodness’ or a 
specific instance of the ‘good.’ When a person applies the term ‘goodness’ to different 
things he may mean it is good in a certain respect or good absolutely.  For example, a 
person can refer to the goodness of God and mean that he is good absolutely. Or, a person 
can refer to the goodness of a movie and mean that it is good in a certain way (perhaps it 
has a good plot). It is accidental goodness that is referred to if one only applies the term 
‘good’ to a certain aspect of a movie. 
                                                          
53
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q. 6. Art. 2. Ad. 2. “Ad secundum dicendum quod, 
cum dicitur bonum est quod omnia appetunt, non sic intelligitur quasi unumquodque bonum ab omnibus 
appetatur, sed quia quidquid appetitur, rationem boni habet.” 
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Similarly, something can be being absolutely or being in a certain respect. A 
person may refer to God as being, and mean that he is being absolutely and without any 
qualification. Or, a person can refer to a person as being tan. This second example refers 
to the person as being in a qualified way or in a certain respect. The fact that the person is 
tan simply qualifies something accidental to the person. It is not necessary for one to be 
tan to be a person, and thus it is not essential qua person that they be tan.  
How does being apply to substance and accident? The primary definition of 
being, as has already been mentioned, is that which is in act.   Each substance and 
accident, when it exists, can be called being. Of course, one must point out how 
substance and accident differ in relation to being or existing. The difference between 
substance and accident is that they exist in different ways. Substance exists in itself; 
accidents exist in another.   The substance of something is what is essential to it. It is 
essential to humans that they have a rational nature. It is an accident that a human has 
light or dark skin color. Because one can be a human regardless of skin color, this is 
accidental to the humanness of man. However, one cannot have a non-rational nature and 
be human. This is because rationality is essential to humanness. The distinction between 
substance and accident points to the difference in how things exist. 
How does goodness apply to substance and accident? It has been mentioned that 
the common or primary definition of goodness is that which is desirable.  Every existing 
thing can be called good insofar as it is desirable. There are various degrees of goodness 
that are applied to a subject, one with a substance and accidents. The degrees of goodness 
are also applied differently when one speaks of metaphysical versus moral goodness. 
Metaphysical goodness simply refers to the wholeness of a being. A good man, 
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metaphysically speaking, is one who has all he needs to have physically. A good man, 
morally speaking, is one who acts in accordance with his nature, i.e., rationally. He who 
acts rationally perfects his own rational nature and this is what is truly desirable. 
The way goodness applies to substance and accident touches on the classical 
distinction between what is called the first and the second act. As St. Thomas writes, 
“Act, however, is duplex: first and second; first act is the form and integrity of a thing; 
second act is operation.”54 First act refers to the metaphysical substance of a thing, and 
second act refers to how a thing acts. The first was referred to as metaphysical goodness 
and the second is referred to as moral goodness. Metaphysical goodness simply speaks to 
the completeness of the substance. Moral goodness takes into account how a thing 
operates. These two levels of goodness are the first and second act. 
Let us consider how the natural law account emphasizes how the good absolutely 
and the good in some way relate to the first and second act.55 A thing is good absolutely 
only if it is good in the level of action, or as the Scholastics call it, in the second act. A 
thing is good in some way at the level of being, or sometimes called the first act, because 
at least insofar as it exists it is good. Having actualities added to substantial being makes 
something good absolutely and is the ultimate perfection. This only occurs in the second 
act. For example, imagine the difference between a man who does nothing and a man 
who acts virtuously at every opportunity he has. The first man can be said to exist or have 
                                                          
54St. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 48, a. 5 c.  
55
 St. Thomas discusses the relation between being and goodness as they are found when 
answering the first objection in Q. 5 of the Summa Theologica. In response to Aquinas’s contention that 
there is a conceptual difference, the objector quotes the authority Boethius who says, “that in nature the fact 
that things are good is one thing, that they are is another.”  (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 
Prima Pars, Q. 5, Art. 1, Ad. 1.)   This is the point at which Aquinas draws the distinction between the two 
acts. He writes, “[This] is to be referred to being good absolutely, and being absolutely. Because, regarded 
in its first actuality, a thing is a being absolutely; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good 
absolutely, though even in its first actuality, it is in some way good, and even in its complete actuality, it is 
in some way being.” (Ibid.) 
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being, but not to necessarily be very good. In other words, it is good that he exists, but he 
does nothing good to enrich his existence. This man is properly viewed as far from 
perfect as he does nothing. On the other hand, the second man who acts virtuously adds 
actualities or becomes more perfect. The virtuous man can be said to be good absolutely 
as he fully actualizes his potential.  
 Now consider how being applies at the level of first and second act. A thing is 
being absolutely in the first act, and being in some way in the second act. A subject is 
called being in some way in the second act because the actualities in addition to its being 
simply add actualities to something which is already in being.56 The actualities added to a 
subject are simply accidents in the second act, and thus they exist in another. However, 
when considering being in the first act this is being absolutely as the subject would not 
exist without this being.  
 Now consider the complex relationship between goodness as an end at the level 
of action (hereafter, LA) with goodness at the level of being (hereafter, LB).57 The LA is 
                                                          
56Aertsen, 241.   
57
 These two levels are referred to by the scholastics as first and second act. As St. Thomas writes 
in Sententia Libri Ethicorum, Lec. 1, 12: “Finale bonum in quod tendit appetitus uniuscuiusque est ultima 
perfectio eius. Prima autem perfectio se habet per modum formae, secunda autem per modum operationis.”   
First act refers to what has been described as the first level, and second act is identified with the second 
level. Appetites in creatures are directed to satisfying desire, and these acts refer to the operation of the 
creature. Aertsen clarifies the scholastic notion of first and second act, “The perfection to which the 
appetite of everything is directed is the operation, because through the activity the powers and faculties 
inherent in its substance are actualized. In Scholastic philosophy, this actuality is called ‘the second act.’ 
The first act is the specific form whereby a thing has being; the second act is its operation. By its first act, 
its substantial being, a thing is “being absolutely”; by its second act, its activity, it is ‘good absolutely.’” 
(Aertsen, “Thomas Aquinas on the Good,” 242)A thing can be good in a certain respect, or it can be good 
absolutely. Through the second act a thing can perfect its nature and become good absolutely. The powers 
of a substance are inherent within it. It is only when these powers are exercised or activated that they work 
to actualize the potential. Each substance is drawn to its final cause or the good and attains it only through 
the exercise of the second act.  The second act of a thing is what allows a substance to attain complete or 
perfect being. As Aertsen explains, “the first act is for the sake of the second act; both are an actuality 
(actualitas). Since actuality is always the actualization of being, the absolute goodness of a thing can also 
be seen as its completed and perfected being.” (Aertsen, 242-243). The first act is what makes something 
exist and is identified as the substantial form of a thing. The second act of a thing brings the first act into 
completion or fulfillment. Although the first act causes a thing to be, it is the second act that makes a thing 
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dependent upon the LB insofar as the basis for calling an action good is that it is 
perfective of the being’s nature. Actions that cause a person’s nature to become more 
complete or perfect are called good.58 In one scenario, the way that goodness at the LA is 
different from goodness at the LB is that one can perform an evil at the LA, and still be 
good in some way at the LB. For example, one may feed oneself food when hungry, 
which will satiate the appetite, but have inappropriately stolen the food as well.59  
Consider a second scenario, where the person feeds himself in order to have the strength 
to rescue Murdoch from Mr. T. This reveals something good at both the LB and the LA.  
The end of good human acts perfect man’s nature in some way inasmuch as the person 
develops his virtue in rescuing Murdoch.  
In brief, this section treated three major aspects of the metaphysics of being and 
goodness. First, being and goodness are interconnected after a consideration of perfection 
and the desirable. Second, being is defined as existence, and goodness as that which is 
desirable. Goodness expresses a specificity of desirableness that existence does not 
capture. Third, being and goodness can be employed in analysis in two different ways. 
One can look at how being and goodness relate to something accidentally or essentially. 
Or, one can look at the way being and goodness relate to the first and second act.   At the 
LA, which is the second act, goodness may be considered as the actual over and against 
                                                                                                                                                                             
morally good. A substance actualizes its potential through its second act. Thus, in moving itself from 
potency to act, the substance becomes more fully actualized, and a more complete being. 
58
 I realize the case has not been made for a human nature at this point. It is simply assumed 
during this part of the explanation.    
59But something cannot be completely evil at the LB and good at the LA because a thing cannot be 
if it is completely evil.  Evil, following Augustine and St. Thomas, is seen as a privation of being or 
goodness. Evil is not a thing in itself, but, like an accident, always exists in something existing.  Aquinas 
writes, “Just as the color white is spoken of in two ways, so also is evil. For in one way when white is said, 
it can refer to that which is the subject of whiteness, namely, the accident or quality itself. And likewise 
when evil is said, it can refer to that which is the subject of evil, and this is something; in another way, it 
can refer to the evil itself, and this is not something but is the privation of some particular good.” Q. 1, On 
Evil, Art. 1, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995): p. 4-5. 
34 
 
the potential.  Acts that perfect the nature of man, on the LA, are ends to be sought. An 
application of the definition of goodness to action reveals that the desirable act that is to 
be sought is the one that perfects a person’s nature.   
 
C. Knowledge of the First Principles of Being and Action 
 
 The preceding section explained the intricate relationship between being and 
goodness. St. Thomas and virtually all other natural law theorists use the first principle of 
being to reflect on the first principle of action. This section will briefly explain the role of 
the speculative and practical intellect; the natural law theorist’s account for the source of 
knowing being and goodness; and touch on the role of the practical syllogism.  
 Knowledge of what is good comes from the interaction of the speculative with the 
practical intellect. The interaction between the speculative intellect, i.e., that aspect in 
man dealing with matters of truth, and practical intellect, i.e., the aspect dealing with 
action, allows the natural law theorist to explain how one judges what is good and what 
to do.  Regarding the first principles of being and action St. Thomas writes: 
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended by men. 
For that which first falls under apprehension is being, the understanding of which 
is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Therefore the first 
indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at 
the same time, which is based on the notion of being and not-being: and on this 
principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaphy. Iv. Now as being is the first 
thing that falls under the apprehension absolutely, so good is the first thing that 
falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action 
(since every agent acts for an end, which has the nature of good). Consequently, 
the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the nature of good, 
viz., that good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first precept of 
law, that good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided.60  
 
                                                          
60St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Prima Secundae, Q. 94, Art. 2, P. 774.   
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In this passage St. Thomas explains that the first principle of action is parallel to the first 
principle of being. One can see his reasoning much more clearly in light of the 
metaphysical explanation offered above that goodness is being insofar as it is desirable.  
 What is the role of the intellect in this explanation? The speculative intellect is 
used in natural law theory to discover truth and the principles of being. The practical 
intellect is used whenever someone makes a decision related to action. These two aspects 
of the intellect are treated differently because they differ in the objects that they study. 
The object of one is truth, and the other is action. The study of truth does influence how 
one will act, and thus the practical intellect takes into consideration the order and nature 
of being that the speculative intellect discovers.      
 Moreover, the practical intellect uses the Aristotelian logical structure for 
decision-making. This logical structure includes the practical syllogism. The first 
principle of action --- good should be done and evil avoided --- is the first premise in the 
practical syllogism. This principle of action guides people in deciding how to act.  In 
addition, there are other precepts that can be derived from the first, and they also can 
serve as the first premise in practical syllogisms. Natural law theorists have developed 
various ways of discovering what these precepts are.61 Here is an example St. Thomas 
gives: 
Some things are derived [derivantur] from common principles of the law of 
nature in the manner of a conclusion [per modum conclusionis], as ‘one should 
not kill’ can be derived as a kind of conclusion [ut conclusio quaedam derivari 
potest] from ‘one should do harm/evil [malum] to no one’.62  
 
                                                          
61A couple different treatments include Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics, By Thomas 
Higgins, (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1949), and Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, By 
John Finnis, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).     
62St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II Q. 95 a. 2c.   
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These precepts are at the highest level and known per se, or per se nota.63 This simply 
means that the precepts are known in themselves or through their terms. 
 The various general precepts associated with good acts refer to the goodness in 
the nature of each act. Every action has a nature that can be judged as having the 
character of either goodness or badness. As Aquinas writes: 
The moral precepts are distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts, for they 
are about things pertaining of their very nature to good morals. Now since human 
morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the proper principle of human 
acts, those morals are called good which accord with reason, and those are called 
bad which are discordant from reason. And as every judgment of the speculative 
reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so every judgment 
of the practical reason proceeds from naturally known principles.64 
 
In this passage Aquinas notes several things. The goodness or badness of an act proceeds 
from the nature of the act itself. There are naturally known principles of what acts are 
good and what are bad. These are seen once one understands the terms involved. When 
the act is in accord with reason, which is the nature of man, the act is called good. When 
it is not, it is bad.  The goodness or badness of an act can be judged by looking at how the 
act helps a person move towards or away from his or her proper end. People can use 
reason to come to know the goodness or badness of an act in two ways. First, they may 
come to know through grasping the terms involved. They may reason, for example, that it 
is wrong to do evil, and murdering is an evil, so it is wrong to murder. Second, they may 
come to know when they observe an act. Because each act has the formality of being 
good or bad, when a person observes an act, he has the potential to discern whether it is 
good.  
                                                          
63
 According to Aquinas, these moral norms are per se nota. For example, Summa Theologica I-II, 
q. 100 a. 1c.  
64Ibid.  Q. 100. Art. 1. c.   
37 
 
How are goodness and being known? Each action has a certain form. The form of 
the act has a degree of goodness that exists in it. We all recognize some acts as better 
than others. For example, it is better to comfort than to torture your child for fun. These 
acts can be said to be better insofar as they have a greater degree of goodness than other 
acts. The form of these acts, where the goodness may be recognized, comes to exist in a 
person’s mind. The form is an immaterial aspect of the act. The immateriality of form 
allows it to both exist in the act itself and in the mind. The forms of things are their 
determinate natures. When these things are known these natures exist in both the knower 
and what is known. The goodness and being comes from the act—the form of these 
things comes to exist in the intellect.65 
 In sum, there are three major aspects to consider in knowing being and goodness. 
The first is the relationship between the practical and speculative intellect. The 
speculative intellect provides facts that are included in making the moral judgment. 
Among these facts is the hierarchy of beings that are involved as well as the different 
means one uses to carry out the act. The practical intellect works with the speculative in 
assessing what one ought to do, but is alone in the process of choosing. The source of 
knowing the being and goodness of an act or any particular thing is the object under 
consideration. The speculative and practical intellect each play a role in the practical 
syllogism that people use to decide what to do, even if a person is unaware of such a 
process. 
  
                                                          
65Although this is an explication of how we know, a defense of this position is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. It is simply presupposed that this is true.  
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D. On Human Nature and The End of Man 
 
 Much of the preceding section referred to human nature and proper end, so this 
section will explain three things. First, it will explain what the natural law theorist means 
by human nature and its end. Second, arguments against these concepts will be exposed. 
Third, responses to these arguments will be provided.  The explication of human nature 
and the end of man will reveal how what is natural helps the natural law theorist decide 
what is good. 
The classical natural law theorist, grounding his ethical theory in human nature 
and its end, follows Aristotle’s explanation of nature or essence. This theory, as Anthony 
Lisska explains, emphasizes the central feature to grasp is that of dispositional properties.  
Dispositional properties make up the underlying metaphysical structure of a natural law 
metaphysics of morals. Lisska writes, “A dispositional property is developmental in 
character.”66 These properties are such that they not only have the potential to be 
actualized, but they are good when brought to fruition.67 One can see from this that the 
                                                          
66Anthony J. Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996): p. 103.  
67It is certainly the case that some dispositions allow a person to develop in a good way, and some 
in a bad way. These are characterized by virtues and vices. There are several things that may cause a 
person’s good habits or good dispositional properties become corrupted or fade away. Good dispositions 
can be corrupted by reasoning contrary to good (because of ignorance, passion, or choice), alterations to a 
person’s body (e.g., sickness causing dementia), or through lack of exercise (unruly desires may destroy 
virtue if not exercised). Aquinas’s full treatment of dispositions is found in the Summa Theologica, Prima 
Secunda, Q. 49-54. Anthony Kenny, in the Blackfriars preface to this section writes, “Again, two 
dispositions may differ simply in that one is a good disposition and the other a bad disposition. Chastity and 
unchastity are both dispositions of the same faculties; they have a common object, for both of them are 
attitudes to sex; they differ only in that chastity is a good attitude to sex and unchastity a bad one. What is a 
good disposition and what is a bad disposition is to be decided by reference to the nature of the possessor of 
the disposition; in the case of human beings, by reference to reason (54,3).”  
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metaphysical explanation of dispositional properties is dependent on a proper grasp of the 
meaning of the terms act and potency.  
There is a structure that underlies a theory of natural law. The essential part of this 
structure is based on human nature and the end sought.  Lisska identifies nine 
components that are part of the structure underlying a classical natural law theory.68 
Dispositional properties, which are properties inherent in a human’s nature, are 
foundational. The most important of these include the fact that “the natural bent of a 
dispositional property is towards the completion of the developmental process; the well-
being of a human person is determined by the harmonious completion of the dispositional 
properties, which determine the content of a human essence; the end- i.e. well-being- is, 
by definition, a good; to frustrate a natural process in a human being denies the 
possibility of attaining human well-being.”69  The emphasis in this account is on how the 
end actualizes human nature. Dispositional properties exist in all men and have the 
potential to be made actual, i.e., fully functioning. These dispositional properties 
constituting man’s nature can be examined in terms of act and potential. The end that 
actualizes the potential is the object to be sought. In view of this, it is the fully 
functioning human person that is the unchanging end toward which men strive. Once a 
particular property has been made actual or reached its end, it is good. 
It is this unchanging standard, i.e., the goal, that is inextricably connected to the 
function of man. One may consider this unchanging end to be a formal aspect of man, but 
it is the formal cause that has actualized the final state. Because of this, one can consider 
in what respect the nature of man is unchanging, and one can use this as a basis for 
                                                          
68Ibid.  
69Ibid. Lisska derives these principles from St. Thomas’s account on natural law in the Summa 
Theologica q. 94. a. 2. 
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discovering what is common for the good of man.70 Thus, it is what a human is that 
determines whether what he does is good, as what he does either actualizes a 
dispositional property or frustrates it. As Philip Devine notes, “What is good for a human 
being, and what makes for a good human being, are functions of what a human being 
is.”71   
At this stage one can try to discern what is unique to the nature of man that sets 
him apart from other material things. It becomes apparent that a man shares many desires 
with other material things.  Humans desire sustenance, self-preservation, and procreation. 
However, there is a rational aspect to man that sets him apart from other material 
creatures. This rational aspect is pointed to as being the substantial form that sets man 
                                                          
70
 Some holding the modern, scientific point of view reject an unchanging species or nature. 
However, this objection does not apply to my argument for three reasons. First, the scientist merely 
measures the material aspect of a given species. The formal aspect of each species is non-material and thus 
beyond measurement by the scientist. The DNA certainly is observable, but even DNA, which is a material 
aspect of an organism, is relatively stable across a species. For example, human DNA generally has 23 
pairs of chromosomes. In rare cases where there are more or less chromosomes that the normal 23 pairs, 
people have what is called Turner’s syndrome (only 45 chromosomes instead of the usual 46) or Down’s 
syndrome (those with 47 chromosomes). Despite these occasional anomalies, the human species tends to 
have a stable material structure at the DNA level. On Aristotle and Aquinas’s account, DNA would be an 
accidental form of an animal. This is different than the substantial form, which is unchanging, that is a 
human’s nature. Veatch explains these accidental forms, “Indeed, when a particular man grows old and dies 
and is no more, we do not for a minute suppose that human nature has therefore changed or ceased to be. 
Accordingly, without matter the things and substances of the world would never change; and with matter, 
what must be understood is that any thing or substance in the world, in addition to being what it 
determinately is at any given moment—that is, in addition to its substantial form and all of the accidental 
forms as a result of which it is just this kind of a thing with these particular characteristics and determinate 
features at this particular moment.” (Henry Veatch, Aristotle: A Contemporary Appreciation, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1974: p. 35) Second, the scientist holding this view does so despite all the 
evidence against his presupposition that all life evolved from a single-celled organism that could self-
replicate. So, as there is no evidence to indicate members of one species can produce members of another, 
why hold to this view? Third, the scientist holding to the Darwinist and materialist philosophy cannot 
explain why the genetic information of a species is actually relatively stable. For example, no matter how 
many species of dogs one breeds, the dogs do not have the genetic capacity to ever make an elephant. 
Changes within a species like dog-breeding, finch-beak variation, and mutated fruit-flies are irrelevant 
(which is why Darwinists like the late Steven Jay Gould proposed Punctuated-Equilibrium).    See Michael 
Behe, Darwin’s Black Box, (New York: The Free Press, 1996); Phillip Johnson, Darwin On Trial (Downers 
Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1993); William A. Dembski, Intelligent Design (Downers Grove: Intervarsity 
Press, 1999); A.E. Wilder-Smith, The Scientific Alternative to Neo-Darwinian Evolutionary Theory (Costa 
Mesa: The Word For Today Publishers, 1987)   
71Devine, Natural Law Ethics, p. 31.   
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apart as distinct from other creatures. Because man is a rational creature he ought to 
strive to function rationally. The proper function of a man, or his good, is dependent upon 
what he is.  
One objection to this is that if a man is already a rational creature, are not his 
actions by definition rational? When a natural law theorist says a human should act 
rationally, he means that humans should act rationally well. In other words, there is no 
difference between acting rationally and rationally well. But, someone may say, a good 
thief may be using his rationality well and this is what makes him good at thieving. 
However, one can point out the obvious fact that a good thief is not a good man. In the 
same way, just because someone is a good poker player, dancer, or surgeon, it does not 
follow that the individual is a good man. Thus, when a man performs the function that 
helps him attain the end in an individual act, the act may be called good in a certain 
sense. Yet in another sense, the act may be called bad because the action leads man away 
from his superordinate end or good. When a particular end is attained and it undermines 
in some way a person’s ability to become perfect, then it is bad. When an action 
performed in some way perfects a person and contributes to his good, the act is viewed as 
good. The natural law theorist is looking for constitutive acts that are good qua man, and 
not qua thief, basketball player, dancer, or martial artist.  
 Yet, this explanation needs to extend into the second act, or level of operation, to 
fully capture how one can discover what is good for man. Ethical judgment plays a role 
in evaluating the operating (acts in that sense) of a person, and the particular aspects of 
the situation are considered to determine the goodness of each act.  The basis for deciding 
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what is good in the second act must first consider the relation between the first act and 
the proper end of man.  
One way that some have approached the problem is to posit some general end to 
which all people are drawn. In addition to being desirable, the good sought when man 
acts is viewed as an end. It motivates action and is considered a final cause. For example, 
suppose a student desires to eat because he is hungry. Once food is attained, there is a 
sense of rest because he has moved from potentially having the good (food) to actually 
possessing it. The good is an end that is considered to be a first cause in that it is that 
which is desired and the initial cause of movement. In issues of morality, a person does 
not begin to move if there is no attraction toward another thing he desires.   
A person can agree that the end motivates action, but this explanation seems to 
fall short in some ways. Although the student in the example attained food, is the food a 
final cause beyond which nothing else is desired? Also, it is readily seen that it is natural 
to desire food, but is this necessarily a moral issue? 
 The distinction can be drawn that something can be desired, and therefore good, 
in three ways. A thing may be desired for some other end. An example of this is 
acquiring a car in order to reach places that would have kept you from other goods.  A 
thing may be desired for its own sake and some other end. An example of this may be 
eating a sandwich in order to remain healthy and pursue other goods. Or a thing can be 
desired simply for its own sake. In this third way one may desire a particular virtue, or 
the penultimate, supreme, or superordinate good. 
How then does one decide on the proper end of man? The traditional account in 
natural law closely follows Aristotle’s reasoning in the Nichomachean Ethics. On this 
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view, the nature of a thing is that which makes it uniquely what it is. The proper end of 
each thing is that which perfects its nature. McInerny writes, 
The ends of inclinations are natural, that is, given, it is not our choice whether to 
have them or for them to have the objects they do. What does fall to us is to 
regulate the pursuit of these goods, and precepts do this by ordering these goods 
to the good of the whole man, to the common good. This is what is meant by 
“regulantur ratione: regulated by reason.”72 
 
Each thing naturally seeks what it perceives as good. The good that is sought is 
desired because it is supposed to perfect the seeker in some way. For instance, a man 
desires health and chooses to exercise to attain it. Health is good and acts as an end in a 
man’s decision to exercise. Two things are noteworthy in this example. First, health is the 
condition that the unhealthy desire because it is good. Health allows a living being to 
function normally. Second, health is a condition that is viewed as natural.  The reason 
health is natural is because if nothing impedes the maturation of an organism it will 
remain healthy and function properly.   
 In agreement with Aristotle’s observation, the end of man is that at which all 
things aim. It is true that each man aims at many different goods. For example, a banker 
may seek to gain as much money as possible, or a politician may seek to gain as much 
power as possible. It seems from these examples that there are many different ends. 
However, the question is whether there is any one ultimate end that all men seek. The 
classical natural law theorist answers in the affirmative. Although one can recognize that 
there are as many goods as there are actions, there is one superordinate good to which all 
other goods are constituents. McInerny explains: 
The human good, man’s chief good, is variously expressed as happiness 
(eudaimonia), acting well (eu prattein), living well (eu zen), that for the sake of 
which (hou kharin), and ultimate end (ariston teleion). What these terms mean is 
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not some particular good among others (cf. 1097b17-19). Thus, the human good 
cannot be the end of a particular action, of some one action as distinct from all 
other human actions. The ultimate good, then, must be that which makes the 
countless goods at which human actions aim human goods. 73 
 
Thus, the classical view is that the constituent good human acts are necessary, but not 
sufficient for the superordinate good of man, namely, happiness.  
 Happiness is viewed as the superordinate good at which all humans aim. Yet, 
Aristotle and the natural law theorist do not define happiness in the modern subjective 
sense. Many modern people take happiness to be a feeling that one experiences one day 
and loses the next. Aristotle’s definition of happiness, to the contrary, is an activity of the 
soul in accordance with virtue in a complete life (1098a16-19). Happiness, in Aristotle’s 
account, turns out to be an objective state of being that is achieved when the human soul 
becomes good because of a lifetime of virtuous action at the end of a well-lived life.74 
The Thomistic natural law theorist holds that the human soul comes to an ultimate state 
of rest once the superordinate good is attained. From this one can take the proper end of 
man to be happiness. In the realm of action, man seeks constitutive goods needed to 
achieve a happy state.75  
 However, the objector can point out that some things that appear natural are not 
good according to natural law theory. This is a criticism raised against both natural law 
theory and neo-naturalism, which also holds that saying something is good is an assertion 
of a fact of nature.76 How can natural law say that the natural is good when many people 
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45 
 
follow their natural desires and perform acts that natural law condemns? That is to say, 
why does the natural law theorist call some acts natural compared with others that feel 
just as natural to some people? For example, many types of sexual behaviors, which are 
also performed among species of non-human animals, are condemned on most natural 
law accounts. If these behaviors were not natural, then why would non-human animals 
perform them?  
 The natural law theorist needs to make distinctions in order to answer the 
objections. First, when natural law theory says an action is natural, ‘natural’ refers to acts 
that are perfective of the nature of the subject. Cancer, although it is natural in one sense, 
is unnatural in another. The confusion arises because of the ambiguity of the term 
‘natural.’ Cancer clearly doesn’t allow for a being to perfect itself physically because it 
physically destroys its subject. Thus, cancer is a naturally bad disease or a physical evil. 
Second, in the realm of action, when a person’s act helps perfect him it is considered 
natural.  An act is not called natural just because it is spontaneously desired. Natural acts 
are those that are done according to what is reasonable. An act done in consonance with 
the specific difference of man, i.e., his rationality, is an act performed in accord with right 
reason.  
 The critic may object that the natural law theorist equivocates on ‘right reason’ in 
his explanation.  At certain times the natural law theorist says that right reason is that by 
which one knows what is the correct course of action. Call this right reason1.  At other 
times he says that acts are right when they are done in conformity with right reason. This 
will be right reason2. The exemplar cause, which is the pattern after which correct action 
46 
 
occurs, is said to be right reason2.  Thus, the critic may ask whether there is the fallacy of 
equivocation occurring in the natural law theorist’s explanation.  
 The natural law theorist can respond to this objection in several ways. First, in the 
classical natural law explanation sometimes ‘right reason’ refers to the exemplar cause, 
and at other times it is that by which one knows what act is right. The context of the 
explanation determines which of these is used. Second, it may be that the natural law 
theorist does not clearly draw the distinction between these two uses of the same term. 
However, this does not mean that he himself does not recognize the distinction, or that a 
cautious natural law theorist would not be wise to take heed of the critic’s objection. One 
should clearly draw the distinction between these two uses of the term “right reason.”  
 Let us make clear this distinction between exemplar cause and efficient cause. 
The exemplar cause is the pattern or course of action that is recognized as the one to take. 
The efficient cause refers to a person’s intellect and is that by which he recognizes the 
action to take. The exemplar cause is external to the person; the efficient cause is internal 
and part of the person. The exemplar cause is referred to as right reason some times, and 
the efficient cause is referred to at others.  
 Yet, the objector may point out, there is still a circularity to the natural law 
explanation. The argument runs as follows. The natural law theorist claims to know by 
right reason1 what is the right action. The right action is known because it conforms to 
right reason2. In addition, it seems as if right reason2
 
is determined by what is called 
right reason1.  If this is the case, then the natural law theorist is caught in a vicious circle 
from which escape is impossible.  
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 The central problem with this objection shows up in the conclusion. Right reason2 
is not determined by right reason1. Right reason1 is used to discover what is right, and 
not determine what is right. Right reason2 refers to the conformity of the act between a 
human’s nature and his proper end. Right reason1
 
is often called the proximate standard 
of human actions by which acts are judged to be right or wrong.77  Thus, right reason1
 
examines right reason2 in evaluating action. This means, contrary to the critic’s claim, 
that there is no circle. The goodness of the action comes from the relation of the act itself 
to right reason2, and is discovered as being good by right reason1. 
 The most natural thing for man turns out to be that which perfects his nature and 
allows him to attain happiness. There is a natural desire for perfection in mankind and 
when a person does what is really good it helps him to come closer to this perfection.  A 
natural act helps man to perfect his intellectual or moral virtues.78 Humans must use their 
reason to order their perceptions of what is good so that they choose a good that will 
further actualize their nature and perfect the virtues.79  
 After dealing with some objections to this account of human nature and the end of 
man, one is left with the following. One must consider two aspects of human nature in 
assessing what is good for man. These two are the dispositional properties in every 
human’s nature and the recognition that man is essentially rational. Also, because man is 
                                                          
77Vernon Bourke, Ethics, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966): p. 125.   
78
 As Henry Veatch points out in his book Rational Man, “[W]hen a man thus becomes 
intelligently aware of what the natural goal for him as a human being is, he sees that, so far as its content is 
concerned, what this natural human end consists in is simply to live intelligently. There is thus a two-fold 
sense in which, on Aristotle’s view, the natural goal or end of man is a rational and intelligent one. It is 
intelligent in that it is rationally defensible and justifiable: we can see why it is the true and proper end for 
us, simply because it is the natural end for us. And also, it is intelligent in that what this end consist in and 
what it calls upon a man to be and to do is simply to be intelligent and to live intelligently. That is to say, 
the rationally defensible and justifiable end of a human being is simply to be as rational and intelligent as 
possible in all that he chooses and does.” (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962): 118. 
79See the subsequent section on The Virtues and Natural Law for a more complete treatment on 
the role of the virtues.  
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essentially rational, truly human acts are those that are rational. Dispositional properties 
imply that there are certain capacities that can be potentially actualized.   Actualizing 
these is good, and frustration of these is bad. As McInerny notes, 
The general moral task is to act well with respect to the gods that are the ends of 
inclinations [i.e., dispositions] that enter into our makeup, that is, to insure that the 
pursuit of particular goods does not jeopardize the good of the whole man, 
something that happens when the pursuit of the ends of lesser inclinations 
impedes the pursuit of the ends of higher inclinations. The tempering of the lower 
appetites and making them amenable to rational guidance is what is meant by 
moral virtue.80 
 
Actions that perfect the rational nature of man are good as well. The ultimate good 
completely fulfills this nature, and is known as happiness. 
 
E. The Moral Determinants of the Goodness of Action 
 
 This section will explain the particular elements of moral decision making 
according to natural law theory. Although each element is conceptually distinct, some 
elements seem identical at certain times. In addition, the natural law theorist is well aware 
that people do not, in general, reflect on the conceptual elements involved in the process 
of deliberation in deciding on which action to perform. However, even if a person does 
not do so, the majority of people realize that three determinants for deciding the goodness 
of an action are important. These three moral determinants are the object, the 
circumstances, and the end.81  
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 In the Summa Theologiae, First Part of the Second Part, Q. 18, St. Thomas discusses the 
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First, what is the formal object of an action? Vernon Bourke explains that the 
formal object of a person’s action is the “judgment which formally determines the act of 
choice which he elicits through his will.”82   Basically, what this says is that the formal 
object is a person’s reason for acting. When a person comes upon a problem that requires 
action, the person first determines the ultimate end that he wants to attain. Then the 
person chooses between several courses of action that he may take in order to actualize 
the aforementioned end. The formal object includes the intention for acting in one way 
rather than another to attain a certain end. Although the intention is included in the formal 
object, it is not all that makes up the formal object. Another aspect of the formal object of 
action is the means one uses to acquire a given end. An individual must use reason to 
judge the morally appropriate means by which the end is to be reached. Bourke notes, 
“Besides intending the right end, the agent must think of a certain species of external 
action which, in his best judgment, will reasonably attain this end.”83 Thus, in order to 
determine whether an action was good or bad, one must take into account the reasons 
why a person acted the way he did, as well as how well he thought through the alternative 
means to attain the end. The object of an action is primarily the reason one has to take 
one course of action rather than another in a given situation.  
Second, one needs to take into consideration the circumstances of the person. This 
element is obvious. The circumstances surrounding an act have great importance for 
deciding whether a person made a morally good choice. Suppose, for instance, one 
decides that the only way to stop a person from bleeding to death from a gunshot wound 
is to cauterize the wound. If one is stranded deep in the mountains on a hunting trip, then 
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the decision may be justified. However, if the hospital is two minutes away, it would take 
longer to light the fire needed to cauterize the wound than it would to take the person to 
the hospital. In the latter case one could think of several reasons why it would be bad to 
attempt this procedure.  
Third, the end is actually the first in the order of action and refers to a person’s 
motive. An act is initiated is because of a person’s motive for acting. One may have 
several motives. These may be very complex. If the motives are good, the act may be 
good. However, if the motives are bad, the act is evil. If one takes into consideration the 
various elements of the decision-making process, and one follows a choice ordered to 
man’s ultimate end, then one acts rightly. Consider the case of cauterizing a person’s 
wound. If the motive for doing so is to see him suffer, then the act is bad because of the 
bad motive. According to the classical natural law approach, if any one of the 
aforementioned aspects of the human act is bad, then the whole act is bad. That is to say, 
if one has improper motives, or does not reason about the proper means to reach the end, 
or does not take into consideration the immediate relevant circumstances, the act is bad.  
In short, there are three moral determinants of the goodness of action for the 
natural law theorist. These are the object, the circumstances, and the end. If any one of 
the three elements is not considered one could end up in error about whether the action 
was good or bad. The object refers to both the person’s intention and means used to carry 
out the act. The circumstances refer to the relevant accidental characteristics that qualify 
a particular act. The end is the person’s motive for acting.  Some blur the difference 
between the object and end due to confusing the meaning of ‘intention’ and ‘motive.’  
Eleonore Stump clarifies the distinction, “The object of an action is what the agent 
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intends to accomplish as a direct result of her action, while its end is why she intends to 
accomplish it.”84 This is a very important difference between the elements in moral 
evaluation.  
 
F. The Virtues and Natural Law 
 
In his treatment of human action, Aquinas has no less than eighteen different 
chapters that discuss virtue to some extent. Given such an extensive treatment, the virtues 
apparently have an important role to play in natural law theory. This section explains 
what the role of virtue is, how one can use virtue in deciding how to act, the use of the 
cardinal virtues, and some common objections to the concept of virtue. 
What exactly does it mean to say that virtue is to be sought or desired? Virtue is 
usually understood as a power to think or act rightly. Louis Pojman explains, “virtues are 
excellences of character- trained behavioral dispositions that result in habitual acts.”85 
One can desire excellence of character and have excellence of character. Virtue can be 
something one desires and be seen as an exemplar or ideal. Our earlier explanation of 
virtue was: “The second nature or habit which determines an otherwise indeterminate 
appetite to the true good.”86 It can also be the character one already has that aids one to 
act in the right way. Virtue may pertain to thinking rightly or to acting rightly. McInerny 
notes the difference between intellectual and moral virtues: “Habits which inhabit 
appetite are virtues in the full sense of the term. Thanks to them, we have not only a 
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capacity to perform in a certain way, but an inclination to use that capacity. Intellectual 
virtues, by contrast, give the capacity, but not the inclination to use it.”87 Of these two, 
we are here concerned with acting rightly because it deals with moral virtue.  
The moral virtues are each related to the common aspects of human nature in 
relation to a good act. Temperance, fortitude, prudence, and justice serve as broad guides 
to the different aspects of human action. These have traditionally been called the four 
cardinal virtues. For instance, one aspect of human nature is the desire for food. The 
virtue associated with the proper regulation of the consumption of food (i.e., the human 
act) is called temperance. St. Thomas explains that a man with prudence, “which is right 
reason in things to be done, a man must be well disposed regarding ends, which is 
brought about by a rectified appetite. Therefore prudence requires moral virtue through 
which appetite is rectified.”88 A third deals with situations in which a person must 
overcome new obstacles or fears. Courage or fortitude aids one in this task. A fourth 
relates to treating others fairly, giving to each what is owed. This is called justice. Each 
one of the virtues aids an individual in understanding the proper relationship between 
human nature- specifically dispositions, and action.  
Moreover, each virtue is a mean between two vices.89 Because extreme actions 
destroy a man, the extremes are to be avoided. When one acts too strongly (exhibiting an 
excess) or not strongly enough (exhibiting a deficit) in an act, as opposed to acting in a 
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way proportionate to the situation, one is not acting according to a mean.  This excess or 
deficit in an act is not referring to how passionately it is done, but how it relates to virtue. 
For example, when a person is courageous he is neither foolhardy (an excess), or a 
coward (a deficit). The mean is virtue. The natural law theorist follows Aristotle’s 
explanation that acting in excess or defectively destroys virtue, while acting according to 
the mean preserves virtue.90  
One objection that is commonly lodged against virtue-centered ethical theories is 
that it seems one must have the virtues in order to do virtuous acts.91 If one does not have 
the virtues, then how can one act virtuously? And, if one has the virtues, then how can 
one not act virtuously? In other words, doesn’t virtuous action presuppose that one is 
already virtuous in some way?   
However, the critic is wrong here in assuming the virtuous man only becomes so 
because he has already established a habit of choosing to act virtuously. In such a case, 
virtue would be an exemplar cause or a model for a man’s action. When one considers 
how to act in regard to a particular situation, one must consider the relevant virtue and act 
accordingly. For example, suppose a man must defend his city against enemy attackers. 
The virtue that would be needed in this case is fortitude or courage. However, one must 
also consider all the options available in the situation. Prudence is needed. It would be 
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foolish for the person orchestrating the defense to be in the front line of attack, because 
this person may be killed. Since the defense of the city is the goal, one must take into 
account the relevant circumstances in order to best achieve that goal. In this case a 
number of virtues must work together.  
The classical natural law approach considers the primary virtue to which the act is 
related. St. Thomas explains: 
Now that which is not in accord with reason in the object considered can diversify 
the species of sin in two ways: in one way materially, in another way formally. 
Materially, by opposition to virtue, for virtues differ in species according as 
reason arrives at a mean in different matters; for example, justice according as 
reason establishes a mean in exchanges and distributions and the like, temperance 
according as reason establishes a mean in matters of concupiscence, fortitude 
according as reason establishes a mean in matters of fear and daring, and so on in 
other matters.92 
 
Aquinas explains that the moral goodness of an act can be discovered by looking at the 
virtue under which it falls. However, one may suggest that the mean for some actions still 
can be considered as immoral. For example, most who hold to natural law theory think no 
amount of adultery is acceptable. Aquinas agrees with this and responds: 
Hence too in moral matters, it must surely be the case that virtues diverse in 
species are concerned with different matters in which reason arrives at a mean in 
diverse ways. For example, in concupiscible matters reason arrives at a mean by 
restraining; hence virtue established in these matters is nearer to deficiency than 
to excess, as the very name “temperance” denotes. But in matters of daring and 
fear, reason arrives at a mean not from restraining but rather in attacking; hence 
virtue in these matters is nearer to excess than deficiency, as the very name 
“fortitude” denotes; and we see the same in other matters relating to the virtues.93   
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As it relates to virtue, the mean is not a certain allowable amount per se.  On the contrary, 
Aquinas makes it clear that the nature of the virtue itself, as it opposes evil, provides the 
proper mean. The mean is not the median, but the proper amount. If one means the proper 
amount when referring to an allowable amount, like in cases where there is a mean 
between extremes, then one understands properly. However, if one takes an allowable 
amount a median amount (or even a proper amount) of evil as acceptable, then there is a 
misunderstanding of the act itself. One considers the virtue to which the act is related. As 
adultery can in no way be a virtue, then there is no proper or allowable amount.  
 In addition, the cardinal virtues apply to each act. When considering an act a 
person examines the corresponding virtue to make sure the act should be done, and if it 
should be done, he or she considers how it should be done. The action, insofar as it 
accords with reason (i.e., is a virtuous act), is a good that should be done.  
 An objection may be brought against this account is that different people have 
different lists of what they consider virtue, so for example, a hedonist may consider 
temperance as a vice and not as a virtue.  
 The defender of the cardinal virtues can respond in several ways. One is to point 
out that because people disagree about what the virtues are, it does not follow that no one 
is correct. This is a non-sequitur.  Another response is that it may be the case that the 
objector is morally blind. If the objector replies that it is the natural law theorist who is 
morally blind, the natural law theorist may ask what the primary moral virtues are and 
what is wrong with using the cardinal virtues as a guide. The objector himself assumes 
that prudence or wisdom is a virtue that someone can use to properly discern what is 
56 
 
true.94 But, if this is the case, then at least one of the cardinal virtues is correct. In 
addition, most people seem to understand that being a coward or a fool in the face of 
danger is bad.  Again, this understanding supports the claim that courage is good.  
Moreover, it just seems right (prima facie) that people should receive what is due them. 
The innocent should not be punished for the actions of the wicked. The natural law 
theorist would say that human reason can judge the rightness of the action because of the 
goodness in the act of justice. Much the same applies to temperance. Because there is 
goodness in temperate acts, human reason judges them to be good. If the hedonist does 
not fully understand this one particular virtue, then perhaps he is failing to make a 
distinction between the real and the apparent good.  
Perhaps the reason that different people have different lists of what they consider 
to be virtuous is that they are dealing with abstractions from the cardinal or primary 
virtues. People may disagree about the best traits to have in order to achieve the cardinal 
virtues. For example, some may say that having pride will help one to overcome certain 
challenges and help a person be courageous. On this view pride is a kind of virtue 
because it helps one acquire the virtue of courage. Others may contend that pride takes 
away from being virtuous, and leads to foolishness because the prideful person thinks of 
himself more highly than he ought to. This group says that pride undermines the virtue of 
prudence.  Both groups agree on the cardinal virtues because they are primary. The 
debatable issue is about the excellences and attitudes one should have in order to attain 
the primary virtue.  
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The most potent objection deals with the teleology intrinsic to a natural law 
account and the virtues. Alasdair MacIntyre has pointed out Aquinas’s dependence on 
Aristotelian cosmology and writes: “We have every reason to reject Aristotle’s physical 
and biological science.”95 If the essence of natural law ethics is a rejected and false 
teleological account, why should any person accept natural law? 
 Several things must be noted in response to this charge. First, not everything that 
Aristotle or St. Thomas said about science must necessarily be true in order to accept 
natural law. One can reject many aspects of their account and still hold that natural law 
theory is at least useful in guiding action. Second, scientists actually do recognize the 
teleological structure of many body parts. For example, the heart is a pump and its 
function is to circulate the blood throughout the body.  The teleological structure of the 
body is evident in the mechanisms necessary for blood clotting, the biological machinery 
in the cell, and the biochemical components involved in multiple organic processes.96 
Third, both therapists and physicians aim at restoring function to various parts and 
processes of the body when working. Although pain management is often a vital aspect 
of helping an injured person, rehabilitation aims to help a person regain lost functionality. 
Fourth, the teleological structures of each part is subservient to the individual’s total well 
being. Although there may be some difficulties in applying some treatments, the vast 
majority aim at the total well being of the individual. In other words, an individual’s 
complete well-being has a greater weight than any one part in the vast majority of cases. 
So, as teleology is not a concept that is rejected, especially in modern medicine, it 
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 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984): 179. 
96These are described in detail by Michael Behe in Darwin’s Black Box. The Lilliputian biology 
shows specified complexity beyond the levels man has attained artificially for even basic functions which 
occur all the time in our bodies.   
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certainly seems reasonable that one should also not reject it or dismiss it quite so easily 
when considering moral evaluation in natural law.  
Why is there such a significant difference between the physics of the ancients and 
that of today? Certainly our understanding of certain areas is greater today. There is no 
disputing that. However, the wholesale rejection of the use of all four causes in modern 
science probably is a result of misunderstand Aristotle’s use of them. Modern science 
seems most concerned with the efficient and material causes. Efficient causality is the 
agent involved in producing an action. It is the external source of change. Veatch 
explains the material cause is that material substance which undergoes change, has the 
potency to change, or sustains change.97   The material cause of the tree, i.e., that which 
can change, is the wood of the tree. It may be larger or smaller and remain the same tree. 
Formal causality may be more disputed. The formal cause of something is that 
determinate nature that the subject will become. Asking what a thing is questions its 
formal cause—its nature.    
Final causality has been the main subject of criticism against teleology in nature. 
This seems appropriate to the modern mind if the final cause only has to do with 
intention. How can an acorn intend to become a full grown oak? This seems like obvious 
nonsense. If final causality is comparable to the purposive actions of intelligent beings, 
then there is no room for discussing final causality in the rest of nature. However, it is 
important to look at how final causes actually function in an Aristotelian or Thomistic 
account of things.  Final causes do not refer to intention when discussing unintelligent 
agents.  Veatch explains: 
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All the same, the moment we stop to reflect upon it, is it not obvious that the 
actions, influences, effects—call them what you will—of the various agencies and 
efficient causes that are operative in the natural world are always comparatively 
determinate, or, perhaps one should say, regular? Thus we expect the action of the 
sun’s rays on the stone sill to have the effect of warming the sill, not of turning it 
blue, or of chipping it into a thousand pieces, or of standing it on end, or of 
causing it to fly off an float about like a cloud in the sky….in other words, since 
natural agents and efficient causes, as far as we can properly identify them and 
come to understand them, are found to have quite determinate and more or less 
predictable results, to that same extent we can also say that such forces and 
agencies are therefore ordered to their own appropriate consequences or 
achievements: it is these that they regularly tend to produce, and it is these that 
may thus be said to be their proper ends, though not of course, in the sense of any 
deliberate or conscious purpose. Aristotelian final causes are no more than this.98  
 
The kind of being from which action comes determines the final cause. If the being is 
intelligent, then one may expect the purpose or goal of action for this being to be the final 
cause. If the subject is not intelligent, the final cause is the “regular and characteristic 
consequences or results that are correlated with the characteristic actions of the various 
agents and efficient causes that operate in the natural world.”99 
 It seems that man is justified, prima facie, in a teleological ordering of the world 
as part of his ethical theory. Certainly certain goods are necessary for what men call 
happiness and others are not. At least some virtues also seem to be necessary for a good 
life. Although there are certainly some that hold that with knowledge comes sorrow (the 
writer of Ecclesiastes), perhaps the reason for this has less to do with knowledge and 
more to do with people not doing what they ought to do. Of course, it also seems 
reasonable to believe that it takes more than knowledge to be happy. The combination of 
knowledge and moral virtue certainly seems to be the most reasonable path to happiness. 
Thus, the virtues are needed not only to help people decide what to do, but also to 
help them to do it. Practical reason helps each person discern goodness in an action. Each 
                                                          
98Veatch, Aristotle, p. 47-48.  
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act is to be examined in light of its corresponding virtue. Although people differ in their 
lists of the excellences, it seems that the cardinal virtues remain the foundational 
principles needed for a person to decide how to act rightly. Cultures or people that form 
different lists of virtues overlook natural law claims about the role of virtue. The natural 
law theorist does not claim that all virtues are equal. The four cardinal virtues are the 
principle virtues one can use to guide decision-making regarding moral matters.  
Although the critic may scoff at this assertion of the unchanging character of the cardinal 
virtues, even he would be hard pressed to find a culture that touted cowardice, 
foolishness, intemperance, and injustice as virtues to be cultivated.  
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Chapter 3 
Modern Objections to Natural Law 
 
People often speak as if murder, torture, and rape are really bad, and that self-
sacrifice, love, and acts of kindness are really good. However, are people justified in 
predicating goodness or badness of acts as they normally do? Some philosophers say that 
moral statements which attribute goodness to an act cannot express moral facts, and if 
they did, one could not know it. Others, such as natural law theorists and neo-naturalists, 
hold the view that such statements about acts really do express moral facts and that they 
can be known.  Many in this latter camp also hold that goodness is in some way natural in 
these acts.  
This chapter explains several aspects of natural law theory and contemporary 
neo-naturalism that provide the foundation for answering the objections initially brought 
against it by G.E. Moore, via the open question argument, and David Hume, via the is-
ought fallacy. These objections are often thought to be fatal to naturalistic ethics. The 
basis for the dispute concerns the definition of ‘good,’ or even whether good can be 
defined, and how one knows what is good. In addition, Moore’s open question may be 
said to make reason-giving impossible for judgments of goodness. As Henry Babcock 
Veatch explains: 
This consequence, accepting Moore’s thesis of the indefinability of goodness, is 
that it becomes difficult if not impossible for one ever to give reasons for 
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considering something to be good or valuable or worthwhile. In the very logic of 
the case it would seem that if I say that something is good or worthwhile, and you 
ask me “Why?” I can answer in all sorts of ways: “Because I like it,” or “Because 
it gives pleasure,” or “Because it is personally ennobling,” or “Because it 
contributes to the greater well-being of humankind.” Yet ultimately, if I am 
pressed as to why my liking something, or finding it pleasant, or considering that 
it makes for the general welfare, should necessarily make it good, I am forced to 
fall back on something like a definition of goodness, or a declaration as to what 
goodness by its very nature is.100 
 
As an essential part of their theory, and contrary to Moore, the natural law theorist and 
neo-naturalist define ‘good.’ The challenge for any naturalistic account is to answer to 
Moore’s objections and to give a justification for using reason in calling something good. 
The answer to Moore comes from considerations, which were explained in 
detail in the second chapter, that the neo-naturalist and the natural law theorist share. 
These considerations are the foundation upon which one makes judgments about the 
definition of good, which act is good, and whether one should act in a given situation. 
The structure of natural law is implemented in answering Moore throughout the rest of 
this chapter. 
Both Moore and Hume offer substantive arguments against any form of 
naturalist ethics. If successful, the arguments challenge the natural law theorist’s 
metaphysical view of goodness upon which he bases his epistemology. A result of 
accepting these arguments has led many to abandon a natural law approach. The task of 
this chapter is to grapple with these arguments and show how they do not undermine 
natural law theory. 
Thus, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section explains the 
open question argument and how it is tied to the naturalistic fallacy. The second reveals 
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the arguments Caj Strandberg and Connie Rosati present against traditional accounts of 
goodness based on the open question. The third section provides a response to these 
objections. The fourth section exposes and answers David Hume's objection.  
 
A. The Open Question Argument 
 
This section explains the details of the Open Question Argument (hereafter 
OQA).  The OQA is given to support Moore’s view of what ‘good’ is. Because it is 
important to understand Moore’s views on ‘good,’ this is discussed first. Next, the 
naturalistic fallacy, which says it is fallacious to identify anything natural as good, is 
addressed and how it relates to the OQA. This is followed by a summary of Moore's 
position. 
Let us first consider Moore’s claim about the ‘good.’ His position is that ‘good’ is 
not a natural property, but is a non-natural and simple property.101 Moore explains, in the 
Preface of his book Principia Ethica, the following three tenets: 
(I) Good is not the same as anything but itself; 
(II) Good cannot be a property capable of analysis; 
(III) Good is not a natural or metaphysical property.102 
Those committing the naturalistic fallacy err in violating one of these three tenets. In his 
Preface, Moore also adds a qualification that is given to bolster the plausibility of these 
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tenets. His qualification is simply that the good is not identical to a property of a certain 
class.103 
Moore explains that good can only be explained by reference to itself. One cannot 
overlook the importance of Moore’s view of defining good. Moore writes,  
If I am asked ‘What is good?’ my answer is that good is good, and that is the end 
of the matter. Or if I am asked ‘how is good to be defined?’ my answer is that it 
cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it. But disappointing as these 
answers may appear, they are of the very last importance. To readers who are 
familiar with philosophic terminology, I can express their importance by saying 
that they amount to this: That propositions about the good are all of them 
synthetic and never analytic; and that is plainly no trivial matter.104  
 
A synthetic proposition is one that adds to a subject a concept not contained in the 
subject. All propositions about good do this sort of thing, and because of this cannot be 
definitions since they go beyond the concept of good. According to Moore, one cannot 
define goodness in terms other than itself. For instance, if one postulates that goodness is 
something that gives pleasure, one can ask if something that ‘gives pleasure’ and ‘good’ 
mean the same thing. If giving pleasure and goodness are not identical, then they are not 
the same thing. If they are identical, then one has really given no new information. For 
example, if ‘good’ means ‘pleasant,’ then when one says pleasure is good, it is really like 
saying goodness is good.  
 Moore first presents the naturalistic fallacy, based on the open question argument, 
in the Principia Ethica. In Moore’s unpublished Preface to a later edition of the 
Principia, he says he would define the naturalistic fallacy as follows: 
                                                          
103Moore, “Preface  to the Second Edition,” in Principia Ethica, ed. Thomas Baldwin, rev. ed. 
(1903; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993),  p. 15. 
104Moore, Principia, p. 7: Ch. I. 6. 
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‘So-and-so is committing the naturalistic fallacy’ means ‘He is either confusing 
Good with a natural or metaphysical property or holding it to be identical with 
such a property or making an inference based upon such a confusion.’105   
Any who say, ‘A is good,’ mistakenly think good is the same as the natural or 
metaphysical property of A. 
Much of this discussion may hide an ambiguity in the terms being used. One may 
ask what exactly Moore means when he refers to natural properties. One may also ask 
what is normally meant when referring to these properties. Perhaps more importantly, 
when Moore says that the ‘Good’ is ‘non-natural,’ what is he saying? It is clear that he 
thinks that ‘Good’ is simple. It is common in modern times to use the term ‘natural’ to 
refer to the material world.106 Moore means something more than just using the term 
natural in this way. Moore explains his view in The Conception of Intrinsic Value.107  
Aaron Preston summarizes Moore’s view in The Conception: 
Moore holds that value concepts alone are to be counted as non-natural, so that 
“non-natural” is practically equivalent to “moral” and “natural” to “non-moral.” 
Thus, in the end, it seems that Moore did have a much broader understanding of 
“natural”—and a correspondingly narrower conception of “non-natural”—than is 
articulated in the Principia.108 
 
Assuming this view is correct, then it means that natural is equivalent to value neutral, 
and only non-natural properties can have value.  
Moreover, Moore advances the argument that the notion of ‘good’ is similar to the 
notion of ‘yellow.’109 These notions are both simple and as such are indefinable. In the 
same way that one cannot be expected to understand what ‘yellow’ is for one who does 
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not know it, so too one cannot understand what ‘good’ is. With this understanding, we 
can proceed to examine the OQA. 
The OQA simply says that you can take anything ‘A’, and to call ‘A’ good would 
not be analytic or self-evident. For example, a person’s belief that ‘steak is good,’ it is not 
self-evident. Steak is by no means good by definition because the meaning of steak is not 
identical to the meaning of good. Moore may insist that it is analytically true that a 
‘bachelor is an unmarried man,’ but one can find no such analyticity in saying ‘steak is 
good.’ It is in the nature of an open question that it is possible to doubt the answer. Open 
questions are certainly not self-answering because the predicate is not contained in the 
subject. The contention is that the term good does not express a natural property, or it 
would be self-answering, but because it is not then in no case is good identical to it.  
In sum, there are several aspects of this analysis the natural law theorist should 
respond to. First, there is the worry that Moore’s argument hinders a naturalistic ethic for 
the primary reason that it makes goodness indefinable. Of course, it may just be the case 
that one doesn’t need to be able to define the good but that it can be identified regardless. 
Second, one may question whether a person even needs a reason for choosing something 
beyond saying that it is good. In other words, why does it matter if a person can reduce 
the good to something else? Third, is there any problem with saying that a natural 
property is value neutral? If there isn’t, then perhaps the apparent tension between 
Moore’s discussion and the view of the Thomist is really just a case of two ships passing 
in the night.  
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B. Two Contemporary Defenders of the Open Question 
 
Moore’s OQA has fallen into some disrepute recently. There are two philosophers 
that have slightly altered this argument in order to keep it from some common objections 
that have been raised. This section discusses the nuances of the OQA that Caj Strandberg 
and Connie Rosati offer that aim to bolster Moore’s case.  
The first explanation to consider is that of Caj Strandberg. He explains that there 
are two parts to Moore's OQA. Strandberg's modified argument is based on the following 
passage from Moore: 
The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is disagreement with 
regard to the correct analysis of the given whole, may be most plainly seen to be 
incorrect by consideration of the fact that, whatever definition be offered, it may 
always be asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself 
good. To take, for instance, one of the more plausible, because one of the more 
complicated, of such proposed definitions, it may easily be thought, at first sight, 
that to be good may mean to be that which we desire to desire. Thus if we apply 
this definition to a particular instance and say “when we think that A is good, we 
are thinking that A is of the things which we desire to desire,” our proposition 
may seem quite plausible. But, if we carry the investigation further, and ask 
ourselves “is it good to desire to desire A?” it is apparent, on a little reflection, 
that is question is itself as intelligible, as the original question “Is A good?” - that 
we are, in fact, now asking for exactly the same information about the desire to 
desire A, for which we formerly asked with regard to A itself. But it is also 
apparent that the meaning of this second question cannot be correctly analysed 
into “is the desire to desire A one of the things which we desire to desire?”: we 
have not before our minds anything so complicated as the question “Do we desire 
to desire to desire to desire A?” Moreover any one can easily convince himself by 
inspection that the predicate of this proposition- “good” - is positively different 
from the notion of “desiring to desire” which enters into its subject: “That we 
should desire to desire A is good” is not merely equivalent to “That A should be 
good is good.” It may indeed be true that what we desire to desire is always also 
good; perhaps, even the converse may be true; but it is very doubtful whether this 
is the case, and the mere fact that we understand very well what is meant by 
doubting it, shews clearly that we have two different notions before our minds.110 
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The first part of Moore's argument, according to Strandberg, is that if the question is 
'open' as to whether “whatever is desired to be desired ‘good’?”, then ‘desire to desire’ 
and ‘good’ do not mean the same thing.111 The second part claims, “There can be no 
successful reductive analysis of 'good,' since 'whatever definition be offered,' we will find 
the corresponding question intelligible.”112 
 Strandberg modifies the OQA in several ways to avoid traditional objections to 
Moore's argument. The following will explain two ways Strandberg alters Moore's 
argument.113 He will apply the argument to the “thin” terms “morally right,” “morally 
good,” and their counterparts.114 These “thin” terms are simple and basic, whereas a 
“thick” term is something that adds descriptive content to a “thin” term. For example, 
“courage” is considered as “thick” because it not only includes the “thin” term “good,” 
but also the specific action that is performed.  
 He offers two reasons for this alteration. This modification allows him to call 
into question whether the acts to which “thin” moral properties are ascribed are reducible, 
and to assert that saying something is right or good presupposes it is right or good in a 
particular way.115  A second modification Strandberg makes involves the proper response 
to the OQA. He takes the proper response to whether one has the correct answer to be 
doubt.116 If doubt is the proper response, the “the presence of doubt merely suggests that 
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the analysis is incorrect.”117 This objection is based on the lack of the self-evidence of 
saying that anything is good. The force for this argument rests on the response of doubt. 
If there is doubt, then there cannot be self-evidence.  
 To clarify, Strandberg sets forth the following in order to bolster Moore’s OQA: 
(I) If it is an open question that an act can be called morally right, then two 
things follow. First, the act is not reducible to morally right (or good), and 
second, saying the act is right presupposes it is right in a certain way. 
(II) If it is an open question whether an act is good, then the reasonable 
response is to doubt whether it is good. 
The first argument focuses on the irreducibility of the good from an act, and the question-
begging nature of saying something is right. The second explains that doubt is the proper 
response to the lack of self-evidence for calling an act ‘good.’ These two are the essence 
for the rejection of a natural definition for ‘good’ and are given to support Moore’s view. 
 Connie Rosati, directing her arguments against naturalistic accounts, defends the 
OQA by clarifying which specific questions are left open in these accounts. She suggests 
many reasons the OQA succeeds against naturalistic accounts.118  The primary reason is 
that “the new naturalism succumbs to the open question argument, I suggest, because it 
fails to account for our character as persons, as creatures who construct and guide 
ourselves by ideals of the person.”119 She adds that we think that what we desire can 
diverge from our good.120  Rosati's initial description of good is either “'what a person 
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desires' or 'what a person desires to desire.'”121  This is suggested so the new naturalists 
can try to link the normativity of goodness with “an internal connection to the individual 
whose good it is” with “epistemic warrant.”122   
 Rosati argues that three questions “are left open by past definitions of good.”123 
These three questions are: 
1. Does what is said to be good carry motivational force? 
2. Does what is said to be good for a person reflect what that person most values? 
3. Does what is said to be good for a person meet conditions of justification?124 
 
The past definitions of good are inadequate because these questions are not closed.  The 
inability to answer these questions, because of the OQA, leaves an incomplete account of 
what good is.  Also, Rosati admits, closing these questions may show how the descriptive 
and the normative can be bridged.125     
 
C. Problems with Defending Moore's Open Question 
 
This section raises problems with Moore's OQA and the contemporary challenge 
that its defenders promote. In addition to exposing the questionable underlying 
presuppositions of Moore's argument, this section will contain the classical response to 
Moore. Once the foundation for the classical response is in place, the natural law 
definition of goodness will be defended against the contemporary critique. 
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 Moore's first criticism of a natural basis for defining ‘good’ is that it cannot be 
defined in terms other than itself. However, when a person encounters an act that he 
views as good, he does not think that the act contains all particular types of goodness. On 
the contrary, goodness can be said to be in the act in some way. The classical explanation 
from the Thomistic natural law tradition of the relationship between goodness and good 
is comparable to the relationship between the whole and a part. When a person refers to 
the goodness of a certain act, he refers to its formal principle. This may be understood 
from the example of how humanity exists in Socrates and Diotima. Humanity is the 
formal principle that exists in the universal concept in the mind. It can be granted that 
humanity (as a formal principle of the species man) exists only in the mind in one sense, 
but understanding this distinction, humanity exists in each individual human in another 
sense.126 It is common to Socrates and Diotima that humanity is the formal principle of 
their species. However, one cannot say that Socrates or Diotima is humanity, since this 
only represents the formal aspect of the individual. Matter is included with form in the 
essence of individuals. Since matter is excluded from humanity as such, one cannot say 
that Socrates or Diotima is humanity, though one can say that Socrates or Diotima is 
human (which does not represent only the formal aspect).   
                                                          
126Thomas Aquinas would say that the term ‘humanity’ refers to the formal principle of the species 
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what is common to species is described. Under the category of species, the specific nature or form of what 
is common to individuals is described. Thomas explains abstraction as the process of considering things 
according to what is in common.    
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 Similarly, application of the aforementioned distinction between the formal aspect 
and the particular instance can help resolve difficulties about goodness.  Goodness would 
be the formal part of the act that allows a person to call it good.  Acts are called good 
because an act's specific nature or form makes it good in all instances. The goodness in a 
specific act is identified and the act is called good. One can understand that there can be 
many things that are called good, but only one thing called goodness. Goodness has the 
status of a universal with intentional existence.127  
 Some may charge that Moore begs the question in the assertion that good cannot 
be capable of analysis. However, he has three reasons for this assertion that aid him in 
avoiding this fallacy. On the one hand, he says that goodness is only identical to itself as 
a simple property; on the other, when any property beyond ‘good’ is used as a definition, 
one can question whether this outside property really is ‘good.’  Third, he offers an 
argument by analogy to explain how ‘good’ is simple and thus indefinable. In this 
argument he compares the concept of 'good' to the concept of 'yellow'. The two are 
analogous in that both 'good' and 'yellow' are simple, and because of this are indefinable.  
 One may also compare what definition and description tell a person. Both explain 
the qualities or properties of something. A definition may differ from a description in that 
a definition ‘bounds’ essential properties. A definition, in this case, explains particular 
determining qualities of a concept. A description may add accidental properties to the 
concept being considered. Some may point out the difficulty, and some say even the 
impossibility, between making the distinction between accidental and essential 
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properties. If this is the case, and good can be described in some way, then it is possible 
that ‘good’ can be defined.  
Moreover, there are two problems with Moore’s argument by analogy. First, 
'good' can be natural just like 'yellow.' 'Yellow' may not be identical to another natural 
property, but it still could be natural in its own right as could be ‘good.’ A second 
problem is Moore fails to consider the natural law theorist’s definition for 'good.'  The 
term ‘good’ can be defined as ‘being insofar as it is desirable,’ and goodness is the formal 
principle whereby something is perfected. The natural law theorist considers the 
goodness of an individual act to be the formal principle whereby one identifies that act as 
perfective. Insofar as an act perfects the agent, the act is called good.  As Joseph Owens 
explains: 
A horse is absolutely a horse as long as it is just alive, but is it a good horse if it 
lacks sight, hearing, and sound limbs? Hardly. The reason is that goodness is 
based upon perfection, and accidents are necessary for anything finite. If all the 
required physical perfections are present, the thing is physically good. A lack of a 
required physical perfection is called a physical evil, like blindness in a man. The 
required moral perfection in human conduct is called moral goodness, and its 
privation is called moral evil.128   
 
Goodness in the second act, i.e. the act at the level of operation, perfects a person 
morally. Goodness in the first act is based on the perfection of a person’s essence. 
 Let us consider perfection as it relates to goodness in these two acts before 
touching on Moore’s aforementioned account. Something is good only insofar as it is 
perfect. This definition is not circular as what perfects something is taken to mean that 
which makes it complete. This is the classical understanding of perfection. In first act, 
which refers to the metaphysical level, something is good insofar as it perfects the 
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essence of a being in some way. In second act, which refers to the level of operation, acts 
that are seen as good are considered to be morally good. This is not the case in the first 
act. A thing may be morally good, but metaphysically bad in some way. For example, it 
is morally good to save someone’s life by removing a part of the body that is gangrenous, 
even if it is metaphysically destructive (evil) for some of the body.  
What does Moore mean when he claims that ‘good is not the same as anything but 
itself’? Is he simply asserting that the principle of identity (that A is A) is all that one can 
say of good? If this is Moore’s view, it seems to be a plausible account if anything else 
said of good is equivalent to saying A is non-A, thus violating the law of non-
contradiction. In fact, some philosophers have thought that Moore makes this claim.129 It 
is hard to dispute Moore’s claim if it is simply saying that something is itself, and is not 
another thing. Denying this means one must reject the law of identity, although the 
consequence for doing so leads to self-contradiction. Perhaps Moore’s claim links the law 
of identity with definition because of his emphasis on our inability to analyze goodness. 
It is evident that there is a necessary link between the law of identity and the 
definition of a thing.  Definition is important for analysis in order to clarify the terms that 
are used. A definition clarifies in setting that which is defined apart from other things and 
helping us to identify it. That is to say, the purpose of a definition is to distinguish one 
thing from other things. It is certainly the case that a thing is identical to its definition, 
and if it is not, then it is a bad definition. All of these considerations, however, do not rule 
out the possibility that goodness can be defined or analyzed. On the contrary, ‘good’ can 
definitely be distinguished from ‘bad.’ Consider a functional definition of ‘good’ as ‘that 
                                                          
129See Henry Veatch for example in his book Two Logics, (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1969): especially in chapters 4 and 5, and in Rational Man: A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian 
Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962): pp. 188-203.   
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which works in the way in which it ought.’ One can use this definition as a way to decide 
whether an automobile is good or bad. The one that runs well is good, and the one that 
fails to start isn’t.  A good act can be defined from a consideration of looking at the 
proper function of the agent. If the agent acts in accord with its function, it is a good act, 
and if not, it is a bad act.  Moore’s contention that good cannot be defined or analyzed 
seems implausible given our ability to discern the difference between things that are good 
and those that are not.   
As the second chapter explains, the good can be considered from the first or the 
second act. Good in the first act refers to metaphysical goodness and in the second act 
refers to operational goodness. The basis for calling something morally good on this 
account is related to perfection, or, as explained in the first chapter, to the actual insofar 
as it is over the potential. This is but one challenge to the OQA and the claim that good 
cannot be defined.   
 How does the natural law theorist respond to Moore’s claim that good is neither a 
metaphysical or natural property? Chapter two explained that the term good, like being, is 
transcendental. This means that the term ‘good’ can be applied differently to many 
things. If natural properties are those that can be measured by science and metaphysical 
properties are those that cannot, then one may consider the various ways ‘good’ can 
apply to them. Good applies to these properties as a transcendental. On this 
understanding, one can reject Moore’s claim that ‘good’ is neither metaphysical nor 
natural. Consider two examples. If I have virtuous character, then it seems one can rightly 
say that I am good.  Also, if I am born with all the physical appendages that humans 
ought to have, then people would also be right to say that this is good too. These seem to 
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be examples of using the term good to what are normally referred to as natural and 
metaphysical properties. However, as previously mentioned, if Moore simply means that 
natural properties (and it seems to imply that metaphysical properties are included) are 
value-neutral, then perhaps Moore’s explanation is a moot point. But surely if natural 
properties are those that a being has or should have because of what they are then it 
seems Moore’s explanation of this value-neutrality is inadequate (if not simply an odd 
way to use the term). It is meaningful to say that it is good for my child to have all his 
digits when he is born. I say it is good because he naturally should have ten fingers and 
toes.  
It is important to reiterate that this is not saying that all things are good in the 
same way, even if goodness has the same definition. When I say that my professor is 
good, he is so in a different way than my veggie sub. Or, when I say that my child is 
good, I may be referring to any number of different ways that he is good. I may mean that 
he is healthy, or that he is behaving the way in which he ought. There is certainly a 
noticeable difference between these two things, but I can say that both of them are good.  
 An analogous argument can be made using the transcendental term ‘being.’ A 
person who uses this term can apply it differently. As a matter of fact, he does so when he 
says different kinds of things exist. For example, both I and unicorns exist. One has real 
existence and the other intentional existence (existing in my mind). This is not saying that 
they exist in the same way, but merely that the word ‘exist’ means the same thing when it 
is used. A transcendental term applies to all existing things in some way. Thus, as 
transcendental terms, ‘good’ and ‘being’ applies in some way to everything which exists. 
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Moore may respond that this analysis fails to understand the thrust of his 
argument. He may side with Strandberg in saying that, unless there is a conceptual 
identity between what is 'good' and a reductive analysis of what is called 'good,' a person 
has no justification for saying 'good' is a natural property. He may add that there is a gap 
in the definition between ‘good’ and all natural things called ‘good.’ All men should also 
have the object described as good in their minds when they think of ‘good’ if good is 
really definable. He may also add that the natural law theorist’s definition of good is 
circular, especially considering his claim that ‘good’ is a transcendental. After all, doesn’t 
the very concept of ‘good’ mean ‘perfect’ or ‘desirable’? 
  There are several ways the natural law theorist may respond. Natural law 
describes goodness as the formal aspect of all acts, and as such, does not suffer from 
having this gap. Everything that is called ‘good’ can be said to mean ‘perfective of the 
nature of a thing’ without a conceptual gap.  The natural law theorist may also hold that 
the property of goodness may be said to supervene on an object when certain natural 
properties are in place. This object that is called ‘good’ may be in the first act (applying 
to the metaphysical level) or the second act (applying to the level of operation).  One may 
also hold that things perfective of a nature are desirable ends and should be sought.  
There are certainly many natural things a person would say can perfect human nature and 
are good, so this explanation simply reveals that the good can be natural.   
 This also helps the natural law theorist respond to the charge of circularity in his 
definition of good. In a circular definition, the concept to be defined is unanalyzed 
because a term used in it is synonymous with the concept.  For example, if someone tells 
you the definition of moonlight is light from the moon, he has offered no new 
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information. The term to be defined is used in the definition. Based on this, the natural 
law theorist argues that his definition for good is not circular. A metaphysical definition 
of good is ‘being insofar as it is desirable,’ or ‘that at which all things aim.’ As was 
mentioned in chapter two, one can make a conceptual distinction between being and 
goodness, in that goodness expresses desirableness that being alone does not. Similarly, 
desirableness does not mean good, but attraction or what is pleasing. Yet, some find 
things that are not good to be pleasing. So, everything that is good may be pleasing, even 
if not everything that is pleasing is good.130 This means the two are not synonymous.  
One can also consider the operational definition of the good as acting in a way that 
perfects one’s nature.131  The way one ought to act is in accord with perfecting a person’s 
nature. Perfection includes the idea of completeness or wholeness. These terms are 
complementary, but not univocal or identical. Good and perfect are not synonymous and 
using perfect in the definition is not circular. Consider the following proposition. A 
student’s test can be good, even if it is not perfect. If ‘good’ here means ‘perfect,’ then 
there is the following contradiction: “A student’s test can be good, even if it not good.”  
Because of the fact the first proposition is not contradictory, then ‘good’ and ‘perfect’ are 
not synonymous.  
Hopefully the following illustration will make this explanation clearer, especially 
in regard to the relationship between the metaphysical and the operational definitions of 
‘good.’ If I tell you that the coffee that I had was good, I am not telling you that it was 
perfect, whole, or complete. I’m simply meaning the metaphysical definition for good 
                                                          
130This is a classic example of an illicit conversion of an A-term.   
131A person moves from potentially doing a virtuous act to actually doing it in the process of 
perfecting one’s nature. It is assumed that when habitually performing virtuous acts it eventually leads to a 
person becoming a virtuous man.   
79 
 
which implies desirableness regarding the coffee. If I tell you that Mr. T’s teaching is 
good, it not only tells of a certain desirableness, but also indicates that it met certain 
criteria that justify calling it such. Or, suppose I tell you that Mr. T is good. Considered 
from the perspective of morality, this claim not only refers to the desirability of how he 
acts (which keeps us from injury), but also that he acts in a way that perfects his nature 
and is virtuous.  This explanation may help the natural law theorist answer Strandberg’s 
argument. 
 Strandberg argued that when one applies the OQA to certain judgments of moral 
acts, it is an open question as to whether an act called good is good. Can an act be good if 
the act itself is not self-evidently reducible to ‘good’? Perhaps the answer comes from 
understanding two things about this evaluation. The first is that the natural law theorist 
says that there are degrees of goodness. This means that a comparison of two acts as good 
may reveal many differences between the two acts. There will certainly be a similarity in 
that both acts are good, but this also leaves it open to broad differences. It would be hard 
to map one right on to another and the analyst would be hard-pressed to reduce one to the 
other. The second is that although each moral act is complex and has many parts, there is 
a common basis for calling something morally good when looked at as something that 
perfects human nature. With these two things in mind, one can find a common basis for 
identifying morally similar acts as good, and recognize that some acts are better than 
others.     
 Strandberg's other argument focuses on what may be the question-begging nature 
of the way the natural law theorist or neo-naturalist qualifies certain acts as 'good.'  He 
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explains that when the natural law theorist says an action is good, he presupposes that it 
is good in a certain way. This point fails to be a criticism with teeth for several reasons.  
 One reason is that it does not look at the comprehensive nature of moral acts. 
When the natural law theorist calls an act good, the goodness of the act comes from 
certain good aspects of the action all being present. This is the point at which the 
threefold distinction, explained in the second chapter, between the formal object, the 
circumstances, and the end come into play. When all three of these are present in an act 
and are good, then the entire act is good.     
 A second reason is that any type of evaluation can be qualified, but the 
qualifications made do not make the evaluation incorrect. For example, when one is 
grading a piece of writing there may be certain criteria necessary for it to be called good 
in every way. One can easily say that a person's grammar, spelling, and ideas in a 
particular writing are good, but the structure was not good. Thus, the writing can be good 
in a certain way. Similarly, distinctions may be made when one is evaluating a particular 
action. For example, suppose a person pulls hundreds of people each year out of the 
water, effectively keeping them from drowning. Aside from other information, these 
particular acts may be called good, as saving someone from drowning is good. However, 
when the circumstances are considered, one finds that some people were simply 
swimming and were in no danger of drowning, and others were actually trying to escape 
from the island they were on because of the person who rescued them, Mr. T, had created 
a dangerous environment. With the additional information, one may say that the action 
was not absolutely good, even if it was good in some way.  
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A third reason is that Strandberg seems to commit a genetic fallacy in his 
criticism. Suppose that it is the case that someone believes one act is right and another is 
wrong before he has developed reasons for thinking this way.  It could still be the case 
that the person's analysis is correct even without reasons. Simply pointing to the fact that 
the person holds a particular view before thinking through it, or to a source the natural 
law theorist uses, does not disqualify the view.  It may be the case that what a person 
believes before thinking through a position is actually true. But it is a non-sequitur to say 
that, because a person believes it before thinking it through, it is false.  The natural law 
theorist is not begging the question when he has reasons for saying that certain acts are 
good in a certain way.  
There is one line of reasoning that some have developed that tries to answer 
Strandberg with his own argument. Those who try to turn his argument on its head see 
Strandberg as offering a test for the truth of whether goodness can be defined in a 
naturalistic way. These people then take this test and apply it to Strandberg’s argument. 
So, in asking whether the proper response when something is not self-evident really is 
doubt, one can ask the same of Strandberg’s argument. If doubt is the proper response, 
then one may ask if his argument is self-evident. It is certainly intelligible to ask this 
question, and it does not appear to be self-evident then, at least on this interpretation of 
his objection, one must doubt it. Certainly it seems that part of his argument is that the 
proper response when a person cannot be entirely certain about whether something is 
good is to doubt that it is good. This line of thinking claims that the same argument 
Strandberg raises against the definition of goodness can be raised against his position.  
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Yet, there is a problem with using this argument against Strandberg. His argument 
is not that the OQA is a test for truth but that it is merely a test for a definition. Thus, the 
attempt to turn Strandberg’s argument on itself fails because it did not distinguish that he 
was only referring to a test for the definition of good.  
However, there may be another approach to Strandberg’s argument that is 
successful. This comes from a consideration of Strandberg’s criteria for understanding 
what is good. He says that a definition of good must be self-evident in order for it to be 
accepted. However, as St. Thomas notes, something can be self-evident in two ways.132 It 
can be self-evident in itself or self-evident in relation to a person.  A proposition that is 
self-evident in itself has the predicate contained in the concept of the subject. A 
proposition that is self-evident as it relates to another is only self-evident to the wise. In 
this case, understanding or reasons for holding such a view would be enough for self-
evidence. The natural law theorist can then respond that a wise person is one who 
understands that certain natural things are good.  In this case, it may be that the one who 
is wise does not doubt because of his understanding and that the one who doubts is not 
wise because of his lack of understanding.  
 Connie Rosati uses a different approach to defend Moore’s thesis. She establishes 
her argument by giving a definition of good that the natural law theorist does not hold. 
She explains that good is either 'what a person desires' or 'what a person desires to desire.'  
These definitions are not acceptable to the classical natural law theorist.  In natural law, 
on a foundational level, good is defined as being insofar as it is desirable. Some may 
accept the definition, good is what a person desires to desire, when everything relevant 
                                                          
132This explanation follows St. Thomas’s reasoning in ST, Q. 94, Art. 2.   
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has been taken into account. This definition seems to fail to distinguish between right and 
wrong desires. Right desires aim at real goods and wrong ones aim at apparent goods.  
  One may also take into account the varied goodness of the nature of things. Finite 
things are limited in their goodness because they are finite. No finite thing determines the 
one choosing it since there are so many finite goods to choose among. A person may 
choose among many acts, all of which are good because they perfect a person. Acts that 
perfect people have being insofar as they are desirable. One act may be more desirable 
than another because of how it contributes to perfecting an individual.  Thus, the natural 
law theorist would point out that Rosati's definition shifts the focus from the object that is 
desirable or good to an individual's subjective mental state.  
 Rosati raises four objections that the natural law theorist should be able to answer. 
She admits that if these are answered then the 'normative and descriptive could be 
bridged.' The criticisms are whether the natural law theory can account for our character 
as persons, whether the good for a person carries motivational force, whether it reflects 
what a person most values, and whether it meets conditions of justification.133  
 The first objection can be understood to mean either (1) natural law theory does 
not account for our character as persons, or (2) natural law doesn’t account for the 
goodness or badness of a person’s character. If Rosati means (1), the natural law theorist 
can simply point to his account of the virtues. The virtues, which are excellences of 
character, are an essential part of natural law theory. St. Thomas devotes twelve chapters 
                                                          
133It seems Rosati also presupposes that the natural law theorist must be an internalist, or one who 
grounds motivation for action in internal desires. There does not seem to be a necessary connection 
between natural law and an internalist account. Support may be given to the view that St. Thomas was an 
externalist. Thomist Eleonore Stump describes Aquinas’s account as externalist. She writes in Aquinas, “In 
light of Aquinas’s views about human cognitive faculties, it seems reasonable to take his theory of 
knowledge as a species of externalism, with some reliabilist elements. On Aquinas’s account, when they 
function as they were designed to function, our cognitive faculties, in in particular our senses and intellect, 
work in a reliable way to yield knowledge of ourselves and everything else as well.” (p. 234)  
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in the Summa Theologica to the virtues before explaining natural law.  He spends 
significantly fewer chapters on the subject of natural law than he does on virtue. As the 
first chapter explains, the classical natural law theorist is justified in adopting many 
aspects of virtue-ethics. Thus, natural law theory not only accounts for our character but 
also provides criteria about how to improve it. 
 This explanation does not answer Rosati if she means (2), namely that natural law 
doesn’t account for the goodness or badness of someone’s character. This means that 
either (i) natural law does not explain how a person’s character is good or bad, or (ii) that 
natural law doesn’t say how one can judge a person’s character, or (iii) that natural law 
doesn’t determine the character of a person. These objections fail for the following 
reasons. As chapter two explains, natural law is simply the law that says a person should 
act in accord with what is most essential to his nature--  namely, rationality. He who does 
so actualizes the dispositional properties of his nature, acquires virtue, and attains 
happiness.  The answer to (i) is that a person’s character is determined by his choices 
about whether to follow the natural law. The response to (ii) is that a person’s character is 
judged in accordance with how he has responded to natural law. To respond to (iii), the 
natural law theorist can simply point out that it is not the function of natural law to 
‘determine the character’ of anyone. Each individual determines his own character by 
how he responds to natural law. The character of an individual is a habit; whereas natural 
law is the principle in man recognized by the practical intellect by which discerns good 
and evil. A man can use natural law to discern or to discover whether a person’s character 
is good, but natural law in no way determines it. It seems the main point of this objection 
says that there is no link between character and natural law, and with no connection, a 
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person has no motivation to develop good character.134 This is dealt with in the next 
objection.  
 To Rosati's second objection the natural law theorist responds that the good for a 
person carries more motivational force than other accounts. Rosati's psychological 
definition of 'good' uses an individual's preference as the basis for what is good. 
However, the natural law definition shifts the 'good' to the object. The object is what 
perfects each person and makes him good in some way. Some things that are considered 
good are food and water.  Other things that are good are acts that perfect the individual 
and make him more virtuous. A person may have difficulties discerning what is actually 
good because he has confused what appears good with what good really is.  Regardless, 
in shifting the source of what is good from the individual subject to the object that is 
desirable because it is good, one establishes an objective basis for goodness. Shifting the 
good to the object also establishes the good in some way as supporting an externalist 
account. This objective basis provides motivation for a person seeking to perfect 
himself.135 
                                                          
134
 The natural law does not determine someone to develop good character. There are always a 
number of goods to choose between, some real and some apparent. The internalist account for motivation 
says that moral beliefs are internally motivating.  Although he identifies the real good with the desirable, 
the natural law theorist seems to have more in common with the externalist account, which says reasons 
independent of a person’s internal motivations spur action. It is in this second account that a theory of right 
reason, or natural law, can find itself operating within as there seem to be no things that determine one to 
act a certain way. The reason for this is the result of the nature of all the possible goods one can choose. 
The limited nature of each good means that one can decide between various competing goods.  
135
 Rosati's response may be to expand this argument by pointing out how few people are virtuous 
and how few people agree about which acts are good.  In the first, one may easily see that just because 
there are only a few instances of someone being dealt a perfect bridge-hand, it does not follow that no 
person has ever been dealt such a hand. Just as some people have been dealt such a hand, so, too, some 
people are truly virtuous.  These people may be rare, but they are examples for the rest of us to follow so 
that we too can strive to become people of virtue. An additional problem with Rosati's argument is that 
most people do agree on the goodness of many acts. The majority of humans think that it is good to love 
and not to torture one’s child. Thus, there seem to be more people in agreement about what is good than are 
in disagreement about it. 
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 One can ask whether natural law holds that there is something within man that 
inclines him to virtue. Inclinations, or dispositional properties as these have been called, 
are varied. As we have discussed, some dispositions are good and others are bad. 
Whether a disposition is good or bad is discovered by reference to a person’s nature. One 
must not forget that there is a difference between disposition and habit. Anthony Kenny 
explains, 
A habitus, or disposition, we are told more than once, is what can be exercised at 
will; but an action, in so far as it becomes a habit, to that extent escapes voluntary 
control. The difference between disposition and habit might be roughly 
characterized thus. If one has a habitus to q then it is easier to q than if one has 
not: examples are being generous and speaking French (cf. De virtutibus I, ad 13). 
If one has a habit of q-ing, then it is harder not to q than if one has not: examples 
are smoking and saying 'I say!' before each sentence. 136 
                                                   
Everything we can do at will we have a disposition to do. If we have a habit, then it is 
harder not act in accord with the habit. We are not determined from our dispositions to 
either be virtuous or not as these can be either good or bad. All people have the potential 
to be virtuous, as each can develop the habit to do what is right.  
Rosati's also questions whether a naturalist explanation accounts for what a 
person values most. Again, the natural law account does explain this. First, traditional 
theories of morality say that one needs to properly align his values to what should be 
valued. This occurs because a person may have values that are wrong or immoral. 
Consider the connection between value and desire. If what a person values means what a 
person desires, then it is possible that what a person values most may not be something 
that he really ought to value. Our position is that people should only value real goods. 
Second, if a person values what is wrong, natural law accounts for this in saying that the 
                                                          
136Anthony Kenny, Preface to St. Thomas’s Summa Theologica  Q. 49-54.  
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value he has is merely an apparent good and not a real good. He has simply made an error 
in judgment in valuing the apparent good. Fergus Kerr explains Aquinas’s account: 
He is not tempted by the modern (‘Cartesian’) idea that one knows nothing 
directly except one's own sensations, impressions or ideas, and thus that one never 
has certain knowledge of anything outside one's own head — an idea, then, 
leaving one always open to doubt about the existence of ‘other minds’ or ‘the 
external world’. The problem, for Aquinas, is not (as in post-Cartesian scepticism, 
supposedly) to account for our ability to have sure and certain knowledge at all; 
but rather to explain the fact that we are so often in error, in a world created by a 
good God. For Aquinas, that is to say, error, deception and so on, far from 
seeming threateningly ‘natural’ in creatures in our epistemic situation, are the 
result of sin, or the punishment for sin, and not ‘natural’ at all, in beings created to 
know the truth. When our senses and intellect function as God designed them, 
then they work in a reliable way to yield knowledge of ourselves and everything 
else in our reach.137 
 
This explanation is clearly externalist. People know what is good in the world through 
their senses and intellect when they are properly functioning.  
 Rosati's fourth challenge to the natural law theory raises the problem of 
justification. Rosati's primary problem with justification seems to revolve around finding 
someone who is sufficiently rational and well-informed to make a decision.138  The 
difficulty in making a rational decision about moral issues arises because two different 
people may have different motivational tendencies, traits, and desires.139 The problem is 
that the justification of a judgment of goodness depends upon an “ideal of the person,” 
and this rests not upon a natural property, but upon their motivational tendencies, traits, 
and desires.140  This constitutes the thrust of her argument. 
 One point that Rosati overlooks helps to answer the aforementioned problem.  
Rosati fails to distinguish what is good for a man qua man, and what is good for a man 
                                                          
137Fergus Kerr, “Thomistica III,” New Blackfriars, Vol. 85, Issue 1000, Oct 20, 2004, pp. 628-641.  
138Rosati, p. 56. 
139Ibid. 55. 
140Ibid.  
88 
 
qua banker, golfer, or lawyer. If one discusses the good for these two different categories 
without recognizing that there is a difference, then one will invariably come up with 
some difficulties. Although what is good for man qua man will be equally so for the 
banker, golfer, and lawyer, what is good for each individual to excel in his respective 
trade is different. The trade itself may even be something that is called morally 
questionable or bad. For example, if someone is a thief, this would not be a good trade, 
even if some of the skills the person has are skills that are good. In contrast to individual 
skills that may allow one person to succeed at one profession as opposed to another, all 
people who are good qua man benefit from this. As it is good for all men, one should 
strive to attain rational activity and virtue. Rational activity may have as its end either the 
perfection of the intellect, or, as McInerny writes, “perfection of an activity other than 
thinking.”141 When the intellect is used for the purpose of other acts, it ought to order the 
goodness of various courses of action. The constituent goods that are possible in life are 
many and allow for any number of different realizations.142 Although these individual 
goods one can pursue may differ, the moral and intellectual virtues are the same for 
everyone. When these virtues are acquired, one is considered to be good qua man.  
 These distinctions are relevant for Rosati's challenge about both the 'ideal of a 
person' and closing the question about a person's good. The 'ideal' for a person is 
answered when considering man qua man. Rosati's arguments only seem to work because 
of the ambiguity of her standard for an 'ideal' and her description of what is necessary to 
close a question about a person's good. However, the problem disappears once one 
understands that the 'ideal' for a person can be fixed even if the way he attains the ideal is 
                                                          
141McInerny, Thomistica Ethica, p. 32.  
142Ibid.  
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not. In the same way, a person's ultimate good or his constituent goods can have any 
number of ways to become part of a person. The means to attain each virtue may change 
and may differ among persons even if the virtue itself does not change. Consider the 
analogy of desiring to have a car. One can lease, rent, borrow, or buy the car to fulfill this 
desire. A person can use any number of ways of paying for the car, if that is required for 
having it in his possession, without changing the end.  In the same way, one can become 
virtuous through a variety of activities. The virtue does not change, even if the means to 
attain it does.   
 One may consider this small sampling of modern attempts to defend the open 
question argument.  The problems with each of these arguments are exposed and the 
natural law explanation is given. Yet there remains one major unexamined challenge to 
natural law theories and contemporary neo-naturalism from Hume that is dealt with in the 
next section.  
 
D.David Hume and the Is-Ought Problem 
 
David Hume’s challenge comes from what some have called 'Hume's Fork,’ and 
others have called the problem of arguing from facts, or what is the case, to values, or to 
what ought to be the case. To say that Hume's is-ought problem is the same as the 
naturalistic fallacy misidentifies the two. The famous passage on what has been called 
this is-ought problem is found in his work A Treatise on Human Nature.  He writes, 
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, 
be found of some importance. In every system of morality which I have hitherto 
met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the 
ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes 
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observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find 
that, instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no 
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is 
imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or 
ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it 
should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be 
given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a 
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not 
commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; 
and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems 
of morality, and let us see that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded 
merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.143 
 
The ‘is-ought’ question has been the subject of an entire book to which many of the best 
philosophical minds in the world contributed.144  The primary defense of this position is 
that one cannot have more in the conclusion than is contained in the premises of the 
argument, unless one is fallaciously reasoning. Stated another way, some say that one 
cannot derive values from facts.  
 The strength of Hume's argument is that it seems to be correct in at least two 
ways. First, one indeed cannot have more in the conclusion than is contained in the 
premises. Second, few would argue that many things that are done ought not to be done. 
For example, it is a fact that children are molested and killed. One cannot deny that this is 
the case. However, it is repulsive to think that this is the way it ought to be. The argument 
that Hume makes is that when one looks at certain facts there are no values that can be 
derived from the facts themselves. Humans project values onto certain acts that they 
observe, based upon how they feel. Hume highlights this point when he writes: 
                                                          
143David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, contained in Ethics: Selections from Classical & 
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144The Is/Ought Question: A Collection of Papers on the Central Problem in Moral Philosophy. 
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Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, 
that are the objects of science; but if examined, will prove with equal certainty, 
that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discovered by the 
understanding. This is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made 
evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason. But can there 
be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose 
existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allowed to be vicious: Wilful 
murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find what matter 
of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In whichever way you take it, you 
find only certain passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts. There is not other 
matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider 
the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own 
breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this 
action. Here is a matter of fact; but it is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies 
in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character 
to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you 
have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.145  
 
 One may concede certain aspects of what has been said without fully committing 
to the conclusion that some draw about the is-ought problem. It is said that one cannot 
draw any conclusion about values from propositions that are factual. One obvious 
problem for Hume arises from the following argument: 
 P1: Everything Jesus believes is true. 
 P2: Jesus believes that his father is good. 
 Therefore, Jesus' father is good.146  
Given the premises are true, the conclusion, a judgment of value, must also be true. This 
is an obvious counterexample of Hume's claim. As the aforementioned example shows, 
certain facts do entail values.   
 Hume may respond that this aforementioned argument doesn’t work for two 
reasons. First, he may point out that the claim of values that are implicitly contained in 
human nature is question begging. Second, he may point out that premise 1, which says 
                                                          
145Hume, p. 184. 
146 Dr. Michael Wreen used a similar example in conversation. 
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everything Jesus believes is true, includes judgments of value and therefore falls on the 
Ought side of the divide.  
 Hume’s hypothetical response shows the foundational difference in approach to 
these problems. It is certainly evident that each of the parts of a person has a teleological 
function. The eyes are for seeing, the ears for hearing, etc. As each of the parts of a 
person has a teleological order, so too does the whole of man. What is true of the parts is 
also true of the whole- there is a telos. Every man strives toward the same common end—
what has been referred to as happiness.  This end helps guide a person’s actions.  A 
person’s decision to pursue one course of action over another is chosen to try to attain 
this end. An individual doesn’t reach his goal for various reasons, but without exception 
those that do have developed virtuous character and perfected various traits. Progressing 
toward an end and toward becoming a better person, which people certainly recognize, is 
an indication of the teleological aspect found in mankind.  
 A couple of points may be made to Hume’s hypothetical objection to the logical 
syllogism. If the thrust of Hume’s argument is that my syllogism is question-begging, 
then it appears that I’m in what one may refer to as a ‘tis-taint’ standoff with him. 
However, this doesn’t seem to be the case as I’ve provided reasons to believe that there is 
a teleological structure in man. This teleological order makes sense of our ability to 
recognize how one person is better than another in any variety of ways (e.g., a person 
may be morally better or simply more adept at a particular skill). One can easily 
recognize the moral superiority of Mother Teresa over Adolph Hitler. The problem with 
the second objection (which points out Jesus’s true beliefs about value fall on the ought 
side of the divide) shows that ought or value judgments are part of factual judgments. 
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One may then say, in the Jesus example, although all his value judgments are also factual 
judgments, not all his factual judgments are necessarily value judgments.  
 A second point that natural law theorists make comes from the two properties one 
can observe in many acts. There is a teleological aspect to human action; many acts 
humans do are for an end-- that of perfecting one’s nature. There is also an ontological 
property to consider, because these acts exist in relation to the kind of thing that acts. 
There is a link between this ontological aspect, the nature of the agent, and the 
teleological aspect of the end sought.  Specifically, man is a rational creature that seeks 
what he perceives as good as a way to perfect himself. Now one can concede that a 
person sometimes confuses the real good and the apparent good. However, this is because 
the person thinks that the apparent good is the real good. As explained in the second 
chapter, the perfections a good man has include the four virtues.  The natural law theorist 
answers Hume's challenge by noting that the acts of man have a teleological dimension 
because of human nature. Thus, the problem with Hume's account is that he fails to 
consider the values that one can draw from human nature. This is another point of 
agreement where the natural theorist agrees with the neo-naturalist who says that certain 
facts entail values.147   
Hume’s explanation of morality raises a deeper problem that must be dealt with in 
a separate chapter. He provides the foundation for the contemporary moral relativists who 
deny the reality and factual nature of any judgments of value. Whereas Moore and Hume 
provided the original attack on natural law and neo-naturalists, the relativists are the 
philosophers who provide the contemporary assault. It is a subject of speculation whether 
                                                          
147See Philippa Foot, “Moral Beliefs” in The Is/Ought Question, (London: MacMillan Publishing, 
1969).  Foot argues that certain words are action-guiding as to whether or not to act.  The action-guiding 
nature of these words eliminates the gap between factual premises and moral conclusions.  
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Moore envisioned the way that his arguments would be used to undermine any objective 
account of ethics. Some may dispute whether his arguments really undermined such 
accounts. However, short of developing an intuitionist approach, which Moore himself 
supported, there seems to be many other approaches to ethics that don’t need to go the 
route of intuitionism, especially given the arguments offered against his position. 
 
E. The First Wave of Attacks 
 
This chapter has exposed the flaws in Moore’s and Hume’s objections to natural 
law and contemporary neo-naturalism. The problems with the contemporary defenses of 
Moore by Caj Strandberg and Connie Rosati were also considered.  The arguments in this 
chapter provided the impetus to reject the natural law and neo-naturalist explanation, but 
the challenge from moral relativism remains. As a consequence to the arguments Hume 
provides, many moral relativists reject the view that values can be a subject that are 
objective or mind independent. Hume’s view that vice is something that is not in the act 
itself, but only in the individual, has paved the way for the moral relativists. This is the 
debate that will be examined in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
MODERN OBJECTIONS II: 
RELATIVISM'S CHALLENGE TO NATURAL LAW 
 
 
 “Who are you to say that I’m wrong?” This popular slogan exhibits a mind-set 
that calls into question several things. It may be asking whether the person who says 
another is wrong is qualified to judge what is wrong. Or, this may be asking whether 
anyone can judge another person as to if he or she is wrong. It may even be an assertion 
that no one can judge another person. Few would doubt that these expressions indicate 
the degree to which moral relativism has been accepted into our culture. On one account, 
moral relativism is a normative theory, which simply means that it says some acts are 
right are wrong. David Wong writes that normative moral relativism says, “it is wrong to 
pass judgement on others who have substantially different values, or try to make them 
conform to one’s values.”148 The basis for the claim that it is wrong to judge is that there 
are no universal standards of value. 
The opposite view from normative moral relativism is proposed in the natural law 
account.  As was explained in chapter two, natural law says there are universal 
standards to which a person can appeal to judge right or wrong acts. Natural law stands 
opposed to moral relativism and must answer its arguments. The claims moral relativists 
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Blackwell, 1991): p.  442. 
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make include that ethical claims are at best constructs of our own making, that there is no 
objective framework to understand them, and that morally conflicting views can be 
equally true.149 Since ethics is not objective, some say, it engages in describing subjective 
feelings about things seen as right or wrong depending on the individual.150 These differ 
between people because they interpret differently, or because of an individual's culture.  
 Many relativists, following David Hume, tend to argue for two points. First, they 
contend that morality is constructed rather than discovered. People create their morality. 
Second, they contend that either moral claims are not factual claims, or if they are factual, 
then they are only relatively so. Although many prominent philosophers have made 
contributions to this debate, this chapter will only focus on a handful of arguments that 
moral relativists offer against a natural law theorist’s conception of morality.  
 It is important to understand that this chapter will not deal with every type of 
relativism. The focus in this dissertation is on relativism as it applies to morality. 
Relativism in matters of science or in linguistics is not the subject that will be treated 
unless it is so accidentally as it relates to moral relativism. 
 This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section will explain what moral 
relativism is. The second explains some common arguments offered against natural law 
that seems to undermine its account of ethics. The third section shows these arguments 
are inadequate to undermine the natural law account. The fourth advances arguments in 
support of a basis for natural law theory. The fifth section exposes three contemporary 
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 Relativism is a species of anti-realism. J. L. Mackie summarizes and defends the views of some 
forms of anti-realism in his work Logic and Knowledge: Selected Papers in the chapter titled “Anti-
Realisms,” Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). Many relativist arguments are indebted in some way to 
Thomas Kuhn. See Thomas S. Kuhn.  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996. 
150Although this is what some forms of moral relativism say, relativism does not entail this, and what 
relativism actually is will be explained in section three of the chapter.   
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arguments for moral relativism. The sixth section critiques these arguments and shows 
that the foundation upon which the relativist stands when advancing these arguments is 
sinking sand. 
 
A. Identifying Moral Relativism 
 
 Some claim that nothing is absolute and all is relative. This is an easy claim to 
grasp, but does not represent our concern in the context of ethics. Although relativism is a 
view that takes many different forms, only ethical relativism is relevant to understand as 
opposing natural law. Thus, it only seems proper to understand exactly what this theory 
says in order to respond to it. Many principles that seem easy to grasp at first become 
similar to smoke upon closer examination. Relativism argues that many things that some 
think are clear and unambiguous become otherwise. The same holds for finding a 
description of relativism. First, there are many forms of moral relativism. Second, one 
may be a relativist about some things and not others.151 Third, few have taken the time to 
give a precise definition of moral relativism. Taking all this into consideration, we must 
proceed carefully to understand the nature and raison d’etre of moral relativism.152 This 
section will address the definition or description of relativism.  
 There is a basic definition of relativism that is easy to grasp. This is one that 
states, “there is no Truth, but rather a multitude of truths, corresponding to the multitude 
                                                          
151This same thing can be said about the many forms of anti-realism. See the first footnote in this 
chapter.    
152One of the most important challenges to natural law theory, if not the most important contemporary 
challenge, comes from moral relativism. One important article  that argues all forms of moral anti-realism 
collapse into moral relativism is written by Paul K. Moser and Thomas L. Carson in Moral Relativism: A 
Reader,  titled “Relativism and Normative Nonrealism: Basing Morality on Rationality,” Ed. And 
Introduction By Paul K. Moser & Thomas L. Carson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): pp. 287-
304. 
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of frameworks within which human beings attempt to conduct their lives.”153 Neil Levy 
conjoins two claims to define moral relativism: 
1. Moral claims are only true relative to some standard or framework. 
2. This standard or framework is not itself uniquely justified.154  
The framework or standard used in this description is most often the culture,155 although 
it has also been described as “a collection of methods and habits of thought and action 
that determines what those who adhere to it regard as good and true.”156 
Although it may be difficult to find agreement about what is central to many 
theories, the essence of relativism is straightforward. Michael Krausz, in the book 
Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation, explains:  
But we may broadly characterize relativism as holding, characteristically, the 
cognitive, moral, or aesthetic claims involving such values as truth, 
meaningfulness, rightness, reasonableness, appropriateness, aptness, or the like 
are relative to the contexts in which they appear. Often such contexts are 
formulated in terms of conceptual frameworks. And the range of such conceptual 
frameworks may extend from a highly localized person-specific or occasion-
specific state to that of a community, culture, tradition, historical epoch, or the 
like. Relativism denies the viability of grounding the pertinent claims in 
ahistorical, acultural, or absolutist terms.157  
The emphasis of this description of relativism is that ‘conceptual frameworks’ determine 
value and truth in judgment. In general relativism all norms are regarded as relative as 
they are dependent upon and determined by a framework. 
                                                          
153Philip E. Devine,  Relativism, Nihilism, and God, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
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156Devine, Relativism, Nihilism, and God, p. 38.  
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 Consider Paul Moser and Thomas Carson’s description of meta-ethical 
relativism.158 They write the meta-ethical relativism holds “that no moral judgments or 
standards (about any moral questions) are objectively true (or, correct) or false (or, 
incorrect).”159 Moser and Carson also explain that this entails that one cannot “justifiedly 
believe whether things are good or bad or right or wrong.”160 They also say that 
relativism (on some accounts) allows that some moral judgments are objectively true or 
false and some moral judgments are not.161   
A second kind of relativism to consider is normative relativism. This view, 
according to Carson and Moser, “states that different basic moral requirements apply to 
(at least some) moral agents, or groups of agents, owing to different intentions, desires, or 
beliefs among such agents or groups.”162 Either the individual’s or the society’s moral 
principles are the basis for deciding whether an action is morally obligatory. One may 
have moral obligations, but these come from the beliefs an individual or society has 
created. It may be that a person’s morality is not chosen but determined by culture- in this 
case the society. However, if morality is constructed by society the problem is that 
society itself is a construction.  If the moral obligation comes only from what the 
individual has created- what was the source of the norms he uses as a guide for action? 
Does he need any source external to himself? 
These options present two models. One may opt for the individual moral-
requirement model or the social moral-requirement model. On both models an individual 
is obligated to obey a system of morals, but it is not a universally binding system of 
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 Moral Relativism: A Reader, Paul K. Moser & Thomas L. Carson, p. 3. 
159Ibid.   
160Ibid.  
161Ibid.   
162Ibid. p. 1-2.   
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morals because it is relative either to an individual or a culture. In other words, not all 
humans have to obey the same system for two reasons. First, not all live people in the 
same society. Due to living in different societies there can be different moral systems. 
Second, not all individuals are going to choose the same set of principles by which to 
live.  
One additional distinction may be made to normative relativism as it relates to the 
individual moral-requirement model and the social moral-requirement model. Michael 
Wreen distinguishes between agent-centered and appraiser-centered relativism:  
At least two basic forms of relativism are thus possible, one which (basically) says 
that the code to use in evaluating conduct is the agent’s own, or that of the group 
that he belongs to; the other which says that it’s the appraiser’s, or the appraiser’s 
group, that counts. In other words, and to be clear: the first form, agent-centered 
relativism, says: Judge acts by the (valid) standards that the agent himself, or the 
agent’s group, subscribes to; the other, appraiser-centered relativism, says: Judge 
acts according to the (valid) standards that you, the appraiser, subscribe to, or that 
your group does.163 
 
The distinction in this explanation is between two kinds of relativism. One may adhere to 
agent-centered relativism, or to appraiser-centered relativism.   
There is a significant consequence of holding to one of these two theories as a 
relativist, along with the fact that relativism is a normative theory. This explanation 
clarifies that a person can judge acts in one of two ways. When a person acts, then one 
can judge the act according to the agent’s standards (or those of his group), or the 
observer’s standards (or those of his group). Thus, one still makes moral judgments with 
this distinction, contrary to the criticisms that many raise against relativism.  
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Both normative and meta-ethical relativism agree on one thing. There can be no 
universal moral norm. As Michael Wreen explains, “In stark contrast to relativism is 
universalism, the view that there’s a single true or valid moral code which is binding on 
all mankind, at all times, in all places.”164 Although the normal position that stands in 
contrast to relativism is objectivism, Wreen notes that relativism also is incompatible 
with a universalistic subjectivism, or a theory that grounds moral truths on universal 
human states.165  
In sum, two things can be said to describe moral relativism. First, moral relativism 
is a theory that stands opposed to moral universalism. Moral universalism says that moral 
judgments are true because of universal standards that exist. Relativists deny such 
standards. Second, moral relativism says that the moral relativist ought to judge. 
Although there is no universal standard that applies across cultures, there can be two 
equally valid, morally conflicting claims that are both true because they only apply 
relative to a person or group.    
 
B. The Argument for Relativism 
 
 Various arguments have been given for relativism. Although some have greater 
explanatory force than others, this section will summarize the basic argument for 
relativism.  Philip Devine explains the argument in five theses: 
1. Whenever someone makes an assertion, he presupposes some standard, 
according to which his assertion is judged to be either true or false, and on 
which its intelligibility depends. 
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2. People have employed incompatible standards in making assertions about the 
same subject matter.  
3. Sometimes these differences in standards are ultimate. That is to say, there is 
sometimes no further standard to which appeal can be made to determine 
which of the rival standards is correct. 
4. Where the condition described in (3) obtains, it is nonsense to speak of one 
set of standards as correct. Such fundamental standards can only be 
described. 
5. A decision to accept or reject some fundamental standard, to the extent it lies 
within our power, must of necessity be arbitrary.166 
 
Numbers (4) and (5) are taken to follow logically and necessarily from the truth of theses 
(1) to (3). Numbers (1) and (2) are pretty straightforward, and number (3) is taken to be 
the most controversial claim that needs support. Even though (1) and (2) are pretty clear, 
a brief explanation is called for before proceeding to (3). 
 The first thesis is about presuppositions that apply to a certain type of statement. 
These statements are not questions, commands, or exclamations. They are 
presuppositions that apply to propositions that are judged to be true or false.  The 
presuppositions involved in judging these propositions are standards of an individual or 
of a collective. Those who claim that these presuppositions are intuitive still have a 
challenge from relativism. Devine explains, “an intuition is nothing but a clear and lively 
propensity to believe, whose claim to disclose a universally accessible reality at least 
requires defense against the relativist’s argument.”167 One approach to defend (1) offers 
reasons in support of the position espoused absent any counterevidence.168 Those that 
seek to avoid (1) end in overt subjectivism thereby “abandoning the concept of truth,” or 
they shift the reasons for belief from positive to negative which shows a proposition “has 
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been refuted rather than when it has been confirmed.”169   Both these attempts to avoid 
(1) do nothing to negate its significance. 
 Thesis (2) deals with standards that people use which are not compatible. The 
focus of this thesis is not about an individual’s convictions.  It is about what seems to be 
obvious to most people—there are incompatible differences in what people take to be 
foundational norms and standards.170 When these differences are evident “the notion of 
truth…is relative to the intellectual and social framework and that alternative frameworks 
are not wrong but different.”171  
 The truth or falsity of thesis (3) is taken to be the primary issue separating 
relativist and non-relativist. Although non-relativist’s have offered arguments against it 
that are inadequate (Devine notes the leaky boat argument for one172), the strength of the 
relativist argument is at the point where two people reach the end of a conversation 
having attained a shared understanding and still have differing ultimate principles. This 
emphasizes the point that people have fundamentally different moral beliefs and 
principles. 
One can also consider the negative case that can be made in favor of relativism. 
Neil Levy has pointed out that there are two fallacies that stand in the way of any anti-
relativist system of morality- begging the question and Hume’s fork.173 As we have 
already discussed Hume’s fork, let us examine the problem of begging the question 
against relativism. The intellectual case against moral relativism, Levy contends, 
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considers arguments against relativism to be true only if relativism is false.174 As such, 
anti-relativist arguments are invalid because they assume the truth of one of the premises 
that is in contention.  
 
C. The Argument Against Relativism 
 
 There have been several approaches used to refute relativism. Many of these 
remain unconvincing—which accounts for the number of philosophers who believe in 
relativism. Levy and Devine offer a number of problems with the arguments against 
relativism. Levy also offers a negative argument in favor of relativism. This section will 
answer Levy’s arguments and examines what I take to be a couple of the best responses 
to relativism a little more closely to see whether or not they are effective. 
 One approach used to show that relativism is false tries to circumvent the 
frameworks inherent in the relativist approach. This approach, as Devine notes: 
[A]ttempts to find some point outside all frameworks, or necessarily common to 
them all, that provides a basis for their acceptance or rejection. What we are 
looking for here is norms biding upon all rational beings, which will determine or 
place limits on the frameworks they can accept.175 
 
The obvious candidate for such a task is the principle of non-contradiction. This principle 
is the best candidate for several reasons. First, communication is only possible if this 
principle is true. Those that seek to communicate the truth of relativism or that even 
‘preach to unbelief’ in it presuppose that the opposite of what they are saying is false. As 
Aristotle noted, when there are those that object to this principle, “if our opponent would 
only say something,” it is shown that this principle cannot be denied without assuming it 
                                                          
174Ibid.  46.   
175
 Devine, 49. 
105 
 
is true.176 One can also surmise that this aspect of the principle of non-contradiction—its 
undeniability—makes it an excellent candidate for a foundation against relativism.  
 But, the relativist may aver, there are certainly some people that deny that this 
principle practically in that they hold doctrines that are self-contradictory. One need not 
look so far as theologians who hold what appear to be contradictory doctrines, but one 
can merely look at our own lives.  However, there is something that is missed in this 
objection. No one is saying that our beliefs are the standard for what is true. We all 
certainly may hold beliefs that are contradictory. What is certain is that contradictory 
beliefs cannot both be true. So, regardless of the contradictory beliefs we hold, it is 
impossible that these beliefs are both true.  If beliefs were the test for whether something 
is true or false it would render them incoherent as there would be no difference between 
them.  If there were no difference between opposites, then communication and learning 
would be impossible. But, we know that we have learned and that we do communicate. 
The critic who disagrees with me only does so because he thinks I am wrong about the 
truth. All of these arguments point to the fact that the principle of non-contradiction is 
undeniable. Undeniability seems to be a pretty good test for truth.   
 However, although the principle of non-contradiction does well in addressing 
relativism generally, how can it be applied to moral relativism? Can’t a person believe 
that there are some things that are true and false, and believe that there are no moral 
standards that are framework-independent (or that can be reduced to one framework)? It 
is important to note that it is not merely about what people believe that matters, but what 
they actually ought to believe. Many people believe all sorts of wacky things (I’m sure 
I’m included as believing in some), however, should we believe this way? Should people 
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believe that some truths are really contradictory, but this doesn’t relate to morality? I 
think that people really ought to believe things as they really are. This can apply to 
speculative or practical truth.177 If 2+2=4 is a speculative truth that everyone ought to 
accept, and if practical truth is similar, then people should also accept these truths. So 
then, how is practical truth similar? Mortimer Adler explains that practical truth is 
actually analytic. 178  Adler bases this observation off a comment by Aristotle in 
Nicomachean Ethics VI, 2. After making the distinction between apparent and real goods, 
he points out the obvious fact that real goods ought to be desired and pursued.179 A denial 
of this is tantamount to saying that a real good should not be pursued or something really 
bad for us ought to be desired.180 Adler admits the claim that this truth is analytic differs 
from the modern conception of analytic truths (which he finds to be uninformative 
tautologies).181 
 What does the discussion of practical truth do for this argument? In linking real 
goods with what humans ought to desire, one can infer that identifying real human goods 
one ought to pursue is similar to identifying knowledge that every human ought to know. 
These real human goods are such that befit (and benefit) the nature of man.182  
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 However, what about Levy’s objection about the question-begging nature of 
arguments against relativism? A problem with this argument is that the law of non-
contradiction is actually undeniable. Foundational truths like the principle of non-
contradiction are not question-begging. These are simply evident by their very nature 
(and they are actually undeniable.) Even the relativist uses this principle to deny it. 
Similarly, in understanding the difference between real human goods and apparent goods 
that are really bad, it is evident that to attain happiness (the end that all men strive 
toward) one needs to pursue real goods. One may allow room to debate what these real 
goods are, but one cannot deny that one can discover whether some things are good or 
bad (this would render the debate useless).  
 The relativist may appeal to the problems or indeterminacy of translation between 
people or cultures. This suggests that the difference between the two groups leads to 
foundationally different frameworks leading to different concepts of truth, right, and 
wrong. The standard objection to this view is that many have learned and communicated 
to others in foreign languages.183  But a more serious problem is raised by Mohammad 
Shomali, a philosopher who thinks this objection actually works against moral relativism. 
He writes, “Without being able to understand properly what the other people say, how 
can the relativist assure us that, in spite of different appearances, there are no common 
moral principles? Indeed, this theory teaches us not to be hasty in inferring fundamental 
differences from mere different appearances.”184 On this account, and in accordance with 
natural law, apparent conflicts are not necessarily real conflicts.  
   
                                                          
183Mohammad A. Shomali makes this point in Ethical Relativism: An Analysis of the Foundations of 
Morality, (London: ICAS Press, 2001): 84.  
184Ibid. 84-85.   
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D. The Argument Supporting Natural Law 
 
This section advances one argument in support of the natural law claim that there are 
universal moral values. Up to this point, the chapter has primarily answered arguments 
relativists have leveled against universalism. Although there were a few arguments 
suggested in the last section as a response to modern objections, this section bolsters the 
natural law position. The argument of this section is that there is a human nature that is 
universal upon which one can build a moral system. This common nature gives a 
foundation for ethics, explains a way for people to morally improve, and undermines 
relativistic moral approaches.  
Human nature was identified as important throughout this work, and its existence 
has been presupposed in much of the discussion. Although there appear to be several 
ways to argue for its existence, two ways of arguing for human nature seem to be most 
obvious. First, a nature for each species accounts for stability between different species. 
Second, one can appeal to aspects of human nature that make them unique from all other 
creatures. There are two considerations one can make from these arguments. On the one 
hand, what is unique in man ought to be the highest guiding principle in his life. On the 
other, this account establishes a foundation for how each man should treat all others as 
there are universal things necessary for perfecting human nature. 
 The first argument is from the general stability in a species.185 All this means is 
that each creature has an essential form from which it doesn’t change. This essential form 
does not take into account what Aristotle has listed as accidental properties. The color or 
                                                          
185Those that are grouped in the same species in this description indicate those who are capable of 
interbreeding.    
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size of a species can differ, but that does not change the species essentially. For example, 
one can find men that are short or tall, skinny or obese, lighter or darker skinned, with or 
without hair. Despite the different accidental characteristics, one recognizes that these 
people are all men. A person may even go from lighter to darker skin, or from having hair 
to being without, in an extremely short period of time. These changes do not affect the 
fact that they are human. The thing that accounts for their humanity is a common human 
nature. 
 Moreover, every person expects this stability offered in a common nature 
throughout life. Despite some discredited scientific accounts186, when a female of a 
certain species gives birth everyone knows that she will give birth to the same type of 
species.187 One doesn’t have to be a farmer to know that rabbits give birth to rabbits, 
cows give birth to cows, and humans give birth to humans.  A reasonable explanation for 
the stability of these species is the common form or universal nature that they share.  
 Second, there is a rational aspect of man that sets him apart from all other 
creatures. This aspect is essential to his nature. The natural law theorist discovers the 
existence of this nature from an observation of the way a creature acts. Certain operations 
presuppose the existence of particular powers that are inherent in the creature. In the case 
                                                          
186Richard Goldschmidt’s ‘Hopeful Monster’ theory is one example of a discredited theory that 
attempts to explain a different account.  For a description of the details of this theory see the link:  
www.dartmouth.edu/~dietrich/NRG2003.pdf 
187It is said that females may produce offspring of another species. The problem with this assessment 
is what is meant by ‘species.’ Jonathan Wells points out the problem is evident in Jerry Coyne and H. Allen 
Orr’s book Speciation (2004). In it they point out that biologists can’t agree to a definition of “species” as 
no definition fits every case. The website discovery.org has several articles dealing with this.The problem 
of speciation for Darwinism runs deeper than just being able to define a species. What biologists refer to as 
primary speciation is required for Darwinism to be plausible. However, as famed bacteriologist Alan 
Linton noted after reviewing the literature for examples of this, “None exists in the literature claiming that 
one species has been shown to evolve into another. Bacteria, the simplest form of independent life, are 
ideal for this kind of study, with generation times of twenty to thirty minutes, and populations achieved 
after eighteen hours. But throughout 150 years of the science of bacteriology, there is no evidence that one 
species of bacteria has changed into another.” (“Scant Search for the Maker,” The Times Higher Education 
Supplement (April 20, 2001), Book Section, p. 29.) 
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of man, a rational nature is present before he functions rationally. Just as the structure of 
an airplane must be a certain way before it can fly, so too must the essence (which 
accounts for the structure) of man must be rational before he functions rationally.  One 
can quickly observe that man functions very differently than non-human creatures around 
him. For example, a man not only uses language, but builds hospitals, schools, and 
machines to work for him. Why don’t we find dolphin hospitals (even if we find schools 
of dolphin)? The reason comes from the essential difference between man and other 
creatures—namely, our rational nature.   
 This universal human nature, which both accounts for rationality and the stability 
of our species, is the foundation for a theory of natural law ethics. As explained in 
chapter two, each human nature has certain capacities that it is possible to develop.  
Beyond the physical needs man shares with other creatures, he has certain rational 
potencies that are good to develop, and actions that keep him from developing these 
capacities are bad. Although the rational principle in man is the highest for guiding 
decision-making, some of the essential needs man has that are shared with other living 
beings (i.e. the need for nutrition, rest, etc.) are necessary in order to allow a person to 
develop these rational capacities. Because each person has a common nature that is 
universal, this establishes a non-relativistic basis for ethical decision-making and is a 
challenge a relativist account must overcome.   
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E. The Contemporary Challenge to Natural Law 
 
 One can imagine that there are better arguments for moral relativism than the six 
in the second section. Three prominent arguments against natural law are offered in 
different forms from contemporary philosophers that argue for moral relativism.  In this 
section, these will be expounded in their strongest possible form.188 Before turning to the 
arguments, moral relativists claim that there is one important virtue that is a consequence 
of relativism.  
 It is said that relativism requires a person to develop the virtue of tolerance. This 
virtue arises from each individual approaching all moral issues from a view of 
accommodation.189 The common complaint against moral realism is that it is intolerant, 
and thus does not accommodate views that differ from it. Moral relativism, because it 
does not say that there is any universal moral truth, says that people should tolerate others 
because moral relativism is true. David Wong explains why the virtue of accommodation 
is important: 
Given the inevitability of serious disagreement within all kinds of moral traditions 
that have any degree of complexity, a particular sort of ethical value becomes 
especially important for the stability and integrity of these traditions and societies. 
Let me call this value “accommodation.” To have this value is to be committed to 
supporting noncoercive and constructive relations with others although they have 
                                                          
188There are several arguments that I will not address in this section due to the accusation that they 
miss the mark of being strong arguments for relativism. For example, the argument from disagreement is 
commonly given as an argument for relativism. One can easily see that just because people disagree it does 
not follow that no one is right. For example, people may disagree whether the earth is spherical or flat. 
Disagreement about the subject does not entail that everyone is right.  
189David Wong, Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2006): pp. 63-65. 
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ethical beliefs that conflict with one’s own. Why is this value important? From the 
standpoint of the integrity and stability of a society, this value is important given 
the regularity of occurrence of serious ethical disagreement. If such disagreement 
always threatened to become the source of schism, no society could survive very 
long without brutal repression. 190 
 The importance of accommodation or tolerance arises because there is obviously going 
to be moral disagreement. This virtue allows for the possibility that one can learn from 
another, and it allows that people can peacefully coexist despite their disagreement.  
 The relativist claim is much stronger than merely that the relativist should have 
the virtue of tolerance. A moral relativist links relativism with tolerance because no 
person has a corner on moral truth, and because of this no person or culture can judge 
another. Hye-Kyung Kim and Michael Wreen explain: 
Relativism has a lot to say for it, according to its proponents. One point in its 
favor, they say, is that it recognizes that there’s not just one correct way of doing 
things, not just one right answer to every moral question. To think otherwise, to 
think that one moral code has all the answers, is to think that one moral code is 
capable of validly criticizing another. But criticism of one moral code from the 
standpoint of another is baseless. There simply is no absolute moral code, no 
moral code that transcends cultural, personal, and societal standards, and in virtue 
of which other moral codes can be judged. Relativism thus requires us not to 
interfere with or condemn behavior, conduct, attitudes, and so on that are not 
approved by our own moral code. In other words, relativism requires us to be 
tolerant. With no moral code being any truer or more valid than any other moral 
code, there is no rational attitude to take toward another’s conduct except 
tolerance.191 
As a relativist, tolerance is the only reasonable virtue one ought to exercise. What 
arguments are given that make relativism plausible?  
 One may call the first the argument from convention. Saying a moral system is 
based on convention means that people construct their system of values, rather than 
                                                          
190Ibid., p. 64.   
191
 Hye-Kyung Kim and Michael Wreen, “Relativism, Absolutism, and Tolerance,” in 
Metaphilosophy, Vol. 34, No. 4, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, July 2003): pp. 448-449.  
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discover it. This view rightly points out that everyone learns what is right or wrong from 
different sources, and that each person constructs his moral system from his beliefs. 
Sometimes these sources are in conflict with each other as to what is right or wrong. 
People may hold identical views on some scientific matter, but still differ in belief 
regarding what action is right.  As Wreen says,  
Moral relativism, then, is simply cognitive relativism applied to moral judgments. 
Moral reality and moral truth are perspectival under relativism, and constructed 
out of our experience and cognizing, in the broadest senses of the terms, even if 
there are conceptual, quasi-conceptual, and empirical constraints on what counts 
as moral reality and moral truth.192 
 
Just as an individual’s non-moral beliefs are perspectival, so too moral beliefs on this 
view are perspectival. The moral relativist believes that there is no objective framework 
by which a person can evaluate a different framework about what is morally correct.  
 The second is the argument from the relativity of justification. This basically says 
that there is no way to find a basis for one rational justification over another when people 
disagree. Gilbert Harmon explains that any proposed course of action may be rational or 
reasonable for the person acting.193 One cannot scientifically discover a sufficient reason 
for saying a person ought to act one way rather than another. 194 In addition, rationality 
and reasonableness, if they do exist, are only relative standards.195 For example, one may 
condemn a criminal as wrong for a certain act, but the criminal carries out the act for 
certain reasons that seem reasonable. One may not condemn this person according to his 
moral standards, especially using a criterion of reasonableness, because he is only doing 
                                                          
192Wreen, p. 267.   
193Gilbert Harmon, “Is There a Single True Morality,” in Relativism: Interpretation and 
Confrontation: p. 366.  
194Ibid.   
195Ibid.   
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what he thought was most reasonable in his situation. Science does not appeal to 
normativity except as a relative notion.196   
 All moral justification can have is reflective equilibrium. This simply means that 
the system should strive to logically cohere, but it does not necessarily correspond to 
reality. When a person constructs his moral system, he may find that he has two 
conflicting views, and then he revises his system in order to prevent conflict.  Because 
the system is completely internal and relative to the individual or culture, and there is no 
universal standard to which a person may appeal that can justify one system over another, 
the best one can attain is a reflective equilibrium. The most one can expect to find is a 
person striving to be logically consistent in his moral system, even if most do not attain to 
this standard.    
 The third is the argument David Wong makes based on two features he finds in 
analyzing our moral beliefs. 197 The first aspect we have he refers to as moral 
ambivalence. Our ambivalence comes from being unable to decide between conflicting 
basic rights or values. For example, a person may face a tough decision about whether to 
invest in helping the poor or a retirement account. Basic values may conflict as one tries 
to make a decision about whether to take steps to secure his future with an investment, or 
to help those in need in the present. The second aspect we have is called value pluralism. 
This says that there are many basic values that are irreducible. If there are many values, 
then a monistic view that there is only one basic value that is universal is false. It appears 
that we do hold to many values that cannot be reduced to one another. Thus, this seems 
like a strong argument against universalism. 
                                                          
196Ibid.   
197
 The following argument is a brief form of Wong’s central thesis in his book Natural Moralities.  
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 The argument for value pluralism rests on conflicting human values. These 
values cannot coexist in a culture because of their conflicting nature. People recognize 
many societies that promote some values and exclude others. This is a consequence of the 
intrinsically contradictory nature of some values. In addition, there are many basic values 
that different cultures recognize. This is said to undermine universalism, which claims 
there is one single true morality. Value pluralism argues that there cannot be one single 
true moral code, when it is clear there are many basic moral beliefs.  
Moral relativism purports to give a better explanation of moral ambivalence and 
value pluralism than universalism. As Wong explains, “The kind of moral disagreement 
that poses the steepest challenge for moral universalism is the kind in which others share 
values with us but in which they have made different choices in the fact of conflicts 
among these values.”198 Moral ambivalence arises from seeing how others made different 
decisions than we would, even when sharing the same values. “The reality of moral 
ambivalence,” Wong writes, “calls for a deeper explanation than universalist theories of 
morality can provide.”199 Moral relativism is said to provide a more plausible account for 
ambivalence and moral pluralism than universalism. When cultures clash, one view 
imposes upon another and has the illusion of being universal only because it is dominant.   
The relativistic explanation is purported to be better than any universalistic account due 
to the existence of different moral systems in different cultures.  
                                                          
198Ibid., p. 6.  
199Ibid.   
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F. Answering the Contemporary Challenge 
 
There are a multitude of arguments that have been given against moral relativism. 
Many of these, however, miss the mark because they falsely characterize what moral 
relativism actually says.200 Two things must be kept in mind when dealing with these 
arguments. First, there are many fully rational and intelligent people that believe 
relativism is true for various reasons. Second, there are some good arguments for moral 
relativism that must be answered, and the last section only explained a handful of them. 
There are aspects within the arguments in the last section that rightly point out many 
truths that can add to our understanding of ethical theory. However, these truths do not 
require a person to adhere to moral relativism. Therefore, this section will do two things. 
First, it will expose some of the flaws in some of the arguments for relativism.201 Second, 
in answering the relativist, it presents some additional arguments that make universalism 
plausible.    
In the first argument relativism says that morality is constructed and thus 
conventional. There are several problems with this. First, just because people construct 
moral systems it doesn’t follow that the values that the systems express are conventional. 
There may be multiple expressions of one set of values. The expression that each society 
                                                          
200For a sampling of some arguments offered that miss the mark against moral relativism see Michael 
Wreen’s aforementioned article titled, “A Prolegomenon to Moral Relativism,” Philosophia Vol. 32, nos. 
1-4 (2005): 253-274.    
201This is by no means an exhaustive survey of all the arguments moral relativism offers, nor of all the 
responses that can be given to their arguments. However, these are some of the most popular arguments, 
and some relativists even reject some of these as fallacious. For a survey of a relativist that attempts to 
tread a middle ground through many arguments on both sides see David Wong, “Relativism,” pp. 442-450.  
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constructs may be different, but may still reflect values that are common. It is certainly 
possible that values are universal, even if the expression of those values is not. Second, 
the moral relativist has failed to point out how foundational values or virtues contradict 
each other. The relativist would probably agree that simply highlighting how different 
values are emphasized in different cultures does not mean that there is an inherent 
conflict between values. Third, the point that is made that morality is perspectival is not 
as significant as one may think.  Saying someone’s view is perspectival could mean 
nothing more than it is a view from one’s own perspective. However, if this is the case, 
then all views are perspectival.  Yet, just because a view is perspectival it does not mean 
that it cannot be universally true. If every person’s perspective included the same 
universal moral principles this would support the natural law position. Thus, a person’s 
moral values can be both perspectival and universal. Given these three considerations, 
this argument is not as strong as some may think. 
In the second argument one must deal with the problem of the relativity of 
justification. It seems evident that it is difficult to decide who is right when there is 
disagreement. If there is a true conflict between virtues or the most basic values, then it 
seems this is a very difficult problem for the universalist. Although the difficulty for the 
universalist has been mentioned, there is also a difficulty for the relativist. The relativist 
has to find two virtues that are truly in conflict. Many universalists and relativists would 
agree that there are differences in laws that would seem to make them conflict in many 
nations. Both would also agree that these differences and conflicts do not necessarily 
entail either position. Thus, it is not enough to point to a difference in laws, but the 
relativist must truly find a conflict between virtues or basic values. 
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Suppose that the relativist succeeds in finding the aforementioned conflict for 
argument’s sake. How can the universalist answer this charge? There seem to be a few 
different responses available for the universalist. He may point out that disagreement 
about basic values between people or even cultures means one of three things has 
occurred. 1) One group or person has found the true good and those with conflicting 
values or virtues have not. 2) Both groups have conflicting virtues or values that really 
conflict but both are wrong about these virtues or values being good. Or, 3) there is a 
transcendent virtue above both positions that resolves the conflict and the disagreement 
has occurred because of a non-moral belief (e.g. the aforementioned case about abortion). 
It certainly is possible that good and reasonable men differ about basic moral values. The 
relativist would concur that the differences of judgment may be caused by any manner of 
things. There may be different standards by which each judges, different ways the people 
were raised, and a variety of other factors. Each of these can be examined to try to locate 
the source of disagreement. An analysis like this would probably resolve the problem the 
vast majority of the time.  However, there is a more difficult case to consider. 
Suppose one finds that two people share all the identical beliefs but still come to 
different moral conclusions about some basic virtue or value. How, then, can the 
universalist resolve this? It seems that the universalist can again make an argument from 
analogy to resolve this problem. Two people may be looking at the same painting and one 
can see what the other cannot. This can occur when one observer is color-blind, and the 
other can see all the colors. There are some universalists, certainly natural law theorists, 
who hold that it is possible for some people to suffer from some type of moral blindness. 
In these cases, it is not as if the universal nature of basic morality has changed, but only a 
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person’s ability to see it. Just as one cannot make a color blind person see certain colors, 
so too, the natural law theorist proposes, one cannot make the morally blind person see.  
The consequence of holding the position that some people are morally blind does 
not change the nature of universal values or virtues. This defect is attributable to 
something wrong with the observer, and not something in the nature of the universal 
value. When virtues or values are called universal this simply means that if a person is 
fully rational he has the potential to discover them. Moral blindness, according to this, 
indicates that a person is not fully rational. If two people are fully rational, then reasons 
can be provided in order to discover what is universal. It cannot be overlooked that the 
moral relativist often holds all the same basic values and principles as the universalist. He 
justifies these principles on a different basis, but recognizes them just the same which 
indicates that he is just as rational, though, according to the universalist, he is mistaken 
about his belief in moral relativism.  
The third argument against universalism covered moral ambivalence and value 
pluralism. There are several ways the universalist can respond to this challenge. First, the 
relativist presupposes that in universalism, a person is morally permitted to perform one 
act per situation. This is not true on many universalistic accounts. In the classic natural 
law approach, that which is universal is the abstract moral principle. The particular 
situation, as a thing that is constrained and has various circumstances surrounding it, may 
allow for different acts that are all morally acceptable. The universal moral principle may 
be that a person should love his neighbor as himself. The expression of this principle may 
come from the act of shoveling a neighbor’s drive, bringing the neighbor soup when sick, 
or visiting when lonely. There are a variety of morally good acts that are allowed even on 
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a universalistic system. The assertion that there is only one morally acceptable act per 
situation is false.  
This explanation helps one understand why there are so many societies that have 
what appears to be different moral codes. The abstract principles are often the same, but 
the expression of those principles often differs. The universalist may even go so far as to 
say that many of the ways the principles can be expressed are conventional. Consider 
again the principle of loving our neighbor.  One society may have it as an expression of 
love to sing to the neighbor under certain circumstances, and a different society may 
make an equivalent expression as killing a fattened calf for your neighbor under the same 
circumstances. The principle guiding the act is universal, even if the expression of the act 
is not.  This does not mean that all the particular expressions of a principle are morally 
right. Some acts that are done may not actually express the principle that the person 
thinks it does. Consider the man who thinks he is expressing the principle to love his 
neighbor when he coerces her to marry him.202 In this case he has wronged his neighbor 
due to an error in judgment on the level of the particular action. The universal principle is 
good, but the act fails to fall under it.  
Lastly, one must consider seriously the claim that relativism better accounts for at 
least one virtue—namely tolerance. However, despite the claim to lead to the virtue of 
tolerance, relativism entails no such thing. All it entails is that an individual or society 
can choose whether or not to be tolerant. After examining the two claims of the relativist 
                                                          
202One may point out that some cultures find the practice of killing your parent shows respect after 
they’ve reached a certain age. Yet even this practice shows the universal value of respect for parents, even 
if the actual practice is seen as flawed. A similar application can be made to Herodotus’s example of 
burying versus eating dead relatives.  
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one can see the absence of logical relation between relativism and tolerance. Kim and 
Wreen identify and show the relation between the two claims: 
(1) There are two or more- a plurality- of equally true or valid moral codes,  
and (1) doesn’t entail 
(2) Tolerance of moral practices or moral codes other than one’s own is 
morally required.203 
This shows that, contrary to the relativist claim, moral relativism does not entail or 
require one to be tolerant.  Thus, what is extolled as the greatest strength of relativism—
the promotion of the virtue of tolerance—is not even entailed by adhering to moral 
relativism. There are actually no virtues that are entailed in this system, and, just as 
predicted, what seemed to be such solid ground ended up as sinking sand.  
 One cannot neglect the claim that relativism may contend that its view gives us 
the best reason to be tolerant. However, relativism actually may have to support 
intolerance when the differences between cultures are most significant (e.g., like between 
American and Nazi culture). Although relativism is said to uphold tolerance as a virtue 
that is a transcendent principle that governs “relations among moralities,” in reality it 
cannot do so as it presupposes “that there is some standard to which one can appeal in 
evaluating moral systems or sensibilities, which is precisely what the relativist denies.”204 
If one rejects certain assumptions made by relativist, like the value (which I find quite 
appealing) of equal human worth, then one will reach different moral conclusions.205 
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 Kim and Wreen, “Relativism, Absolutism, and Tolerance,” p. 450.  
204Philip E. Devine, “Relativism, Abortion, and Tolerance,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Sep. 1987): 137-138.  
205Ibid.  
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 In sum, this section has considered a few of the contemporary arguments for 
moral relativism. Although there are many more that are offered, those included in this 
section are among the most popular. One can see the many insights moral relativists bring 
into the discussion about ethics and universalism. One significant contribution relativists 
make is revealing that certain customs in society often taken to be universal values are 
not really universal. Despite these positive aspects of relativism, it still seems more 
plausible that universalism is true.  
 
G. A Brief Recapitulation 
 
 This chapter considered some arguments supporting and opposed to universalism. 
The primary arguments that opposed universalism, appealed to human convention as a 
source of value, revealed the problems that occur when people disagree on basic values, 
extolled the virtues of relativism, and tried to show that relativism was more internally 
coherent than universalism.  These arguments were worthy of serious consideration and 
cannot be easily dismissed. Moral relativists have much to offer in many aspects of their 
ethical analysis.206  However, despite the many truths in the relativist’s description of 
morality, there were some aspects of their evaluation that did not include some 
distinctions that were very important to make. Arguments in support of universalism 
were implicit in the responses to relativism. The explicit argument was based on human 
                                                          
206
 One consideration that the relativist offers is the test of internal coherence.  This is a fantastic test 
to discover whether a theory is false. No theory can be true that is not at least internally coherent. One must 
admit that the relativist and the universalist are internally coherent in the views each hold.  However, 
internal coherence fails as a test for truth as a romance or science fiction novel can also be internally 
coherent. One may also point out that internal coherence can make matters worse when a person 
consistently treats people worse than he ought to given his view (e.g., treating slaves worse because they 
are not seen as persons).  
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nature as a foundation for universal virtues or values.  The combination of these two 
factors favors the plausibility of holding to some form of universalism.  
 
 
 
 
  
124 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
THE TENSION BETWEEN NEO-NATURALISM 
AND NATURAL LAW 
  
Isn’t it the case that a natural law approach is foundationally different from one 
that is naturalistic? After all, theists and the religiously minded usually are those 
defending the natural law approach, and naturalists are usually trying to work to avoid 
references to religion or God.  This difference indicates that the motivation for the two 
theories seem to be in opposition. Further evidence for this can be found from looking at 
the sources of the work that has been done in these two areas. Scientists are the major 
proponents of various forms of naturalism. This group may claim that science can explain 
all that is necessary to live a good life. Theologians, on the other hand, have done much 
of the work on natural law theory. Many in this area have developed natural law systems 
that are inextricably tied to theological ethics.   
One can also find that two opposing camps use the same arguments against 
naturalism and natural law ethics. Certain ‘Christian’ philosophers oppose naturalistic 
ethics and ‘atheistic’ philosophers oppose natural law ethics for the same reasons. The 
similarity between the natural law theory and one that espouses a form of naturalism 
allows for the same criticism to be equally applied. Both naturalists and natural law 
theorists allegedly commit the naturalistic and is-ought fallacies discussed in chapter 
three.   
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This chapter will explicate several differences that are important in understanding 
the neo-naturalist and natural law position. The first section explains neo-naturalism. 
Naturalism as well as the modern ‘naturalized’ approach to ethics is distinguished from 
neo-naturalism. The different approaches for ethical decision making between these 
systems will be explicated. The second section explains the agreements between neo-
naturalism and natural law theory. The third section exposes and answers the arguments 
that Christian philosopher J.P. Moreland uses that can be applied to neo-naturalism and 
natural law theory. The fourth section uncovers the real distinctions between neo-
naturalism and natural law. The fifth section compares natural law theory and divine 
command theory.  
 
A. What is Distinctive about Neo-Naturalism 
 
One may surmise that there must be some difference between naturalism, neo-
naturalism, and naturalized ethics. I will not be using these different names 
interchangeably as each uniquely represents a different approach to ethics. The purpose 
of this section is twofold. First, the section compares neo-naturalism with both naturalism 
and naturalized ethical theory. Second, it explains several aspects of neo-naturalism that 
make it a distinct ethical theory.   
Of the three aforementioned theories, the first two are cognitivist theories, and the 
third is a non-cognitivist theory. The following are definitions of each theory: 
a. Naturalism or ethical naturalism is the view that says moral judgments are a 
class of facts about the natural world. 
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b. Neo-naturalism is the view that there are virtues that guide a person to 
recognize facts about certain natural goods for man.  
c. Naturalized ethics is the view that values are invented and as such not 
absolute. 
Both naturalism, which is sometimes called ethical naturalism, and neo-naturalism are 
cognitivist and objectivist. These two theories hold that moral claims are true or false 
independently of our beliefs about morality. As cognitivist theories, these also claim that 
it is possible for people to know what is right or wrong.  The third theory, naturalized 
ethics, is usually presented as a non-cognitive theory. As a non-cognitivist theory, 
naturalized ethics does not hold there are any ethical propositions that are true or false. 
Although it may seem counterintuitive given that this view says no ethical proposition is 
true, naturalized ethics holds that at the most ethical propositions are true or false relative 
to a person’s own individual belief or his community’s teaching.  
One can identify several similarities between naturalism and neo-naturalism. They 
both emphasize what they take to be natural properties. These natural properties are 
thought to include goodness and to be knowable in both systems. They also have 
problems with G.E. Moore and David Hume’s ethical theory. Specifically, these groups 
would take issue with Moore on our ability to define and identify goodness in natural 
things. Also, these systems would argue against Hume’s contention that one cannot 
derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’207  
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There are two different ways of thinking about the relationship between neo-
naturalism and ethical naturalism. In the first, neo-naturalism can be thought of in 
relation to ethical naturalism as being related as species to genus. Thus, although all neo-
naturalisms are a form of ethical naturalism, not all theories identified as an ethical 
naturalism are neo-naturalist. According to this view, for example, some utilitarian 
philosophers can be said to hold to a form of ethical naturalism. They would be so if they 
held that goodness is pleasure. It is recognized that utilitarians like Mill and Bentham 
sought to explain a scientific approach to ethics that used ‘good’ to mean ‘pleasure 
produced.’208 However, one can also find neo-naturalists like Philippa Foot arguing 
against it.209 Ethical naturalists are the group, as Antony Flew explains, that may be 
considered as those who take “the naturalistic fallacy to be not really a fallacy” and 
“insist that value words are definable in terms of neutral statements of fact.”210 A slightly 
different perspective says that neo-naturalism is not a straightforward naturalism, as it 
doesn’t subscribe to the belief that “value terms can be defined by factual statements.”211 
However, neo-naturalism still holds that “certain facts logically entail values.”212 Philippa 
Foot takes the first view as indicative of neo-naturalism. Neo-naturalism specifically 
argues against Moore’s anti-naturalism and against “the subjectivist theories such as 
emotivism and prescriptivism.”213 Unlike, neo-naturalism, naturalism may accept 
Moore’s intuitionism, even if it denies his anti-naturalism. 
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Another difference between these theories (i.e., naturalism and neo-naturalism) 
may be understood from looking at where they fall in the genus to species relationship. 
The difference between realism and anti-realism is the most general difference that one 
can grasp in meta-ethics. Under moral realism one can find naturalism and non-
naturalism. According to naturalism, ethical terms refer to natural properties and in non-
naturalism they don’t. One could conceivably be either a natural or non-naturalist and an 
intuitionist. This is primarily because in intuitionism one knows what is good intuitively. 
Intuitionism merely describes the epistemological process one uses to know either the 
natural or non-natural good.214 However, neo-naturalism rejects intuitionism. Thus, there 
seems to be a difference between naturalism and neo-naturalism that goes beyond a mere 
genus to species relationship. Neo-naturalism is a form of naturalism that rejects 
intuitionism as a theory of moral knowledge. Also, in neo-naturalism there is an emphasis 
on virtue as providing the way to answer what goodness is. Other ethical theories that 
hold principles of moral realism from a non-virtue ethic approach are naturalism, but are 
not what this work has referred to as neo-naturalism.215 This modern, virtue-based theory 
is what is referred to in this work as neo-naturalism.216 
What of the relationship between neo-naturalism in and naturalized ethics?   One 
may admit that some who call themselves ‘naturalists’ hold the view that is here 
described as naturalized. Looking at what is common among naturalized non-cognitive 
theories allows a contrast with neo-naturalism. It is helpful to turn to Harman for a 
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description of naturalized ethics to contrast with neo-naturalism. Although he calls his 
theory a naturalism, and not naturalized ethics, Gilbert Harman’s description of his view 
is in diametric opposition to both ethical naturalism and neo-naturalism. Harman 
describes this ‘naturalism’: 
I am using the term “naturalism” more broadly in a more traditional and accurate 
sense. Naturalism in this sense does not have to lead to naturalistic reduction, 
although that is one possibility. Another possibility is that there is no way in 
which ethics could fit into the scientific conception of the world. In that case 
naturalism leads to moral nihilism, as in Mackie (1977). Mackie supposes that 
ethics requires absolute values which have the property that anyone aware of their 
existence must necessarily be motivated to act morally. Since our scientific 
conception of the world has no place for entities of this sort, and since there is no 
way in which we could become aware of such entities, Mackie concludes that 
ethics must be rejected as resting on a false presupposition. That is a version of 
naturalism as I am using the term.217 
 
The contrast is immediately evident in that neo-naturalism and ethical naturalism hold 
that there are absolute values, and a naturalized approach does not.218   Harman clearly 
holds the view that Mackie so fully explains in his book Ethics: Inventing Right and 
Wrong. Mackie’s title is illuminating in that, according to this naturalized account, all of 
ethics is merely invented. Harman, echoing Mackie’s thesis, can argue that moral truths 
are certainly not discovered.219  
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Consider the parallel between naturalized epistemology and what I have dubbed 
naturalized ethics. Naturalized epistemology seeks a scientific explanation for the 
reasoning process. Although the idea of epistemology naturalized was popularized by 
W.V.O. Quine, his explanation of what this means is not the only one.220 The common 
elements between these various epistemological accounts are the emphasis on the 
empirical method and that man has biological limitations that must be considered.  Just as 
the naturalized accounts of epistemology emphasize biology and the empirical method, so 
too does naturalized ethics.  Harman argues that a person’s approach to ethics and moral 
judgments can affect his view on whether to be an absolutist or relativist.221 If one places 
a greater emphasis on science (i.e., the empirical method) in his approach he will be a 
relativist, and if he doesn’t he will be an absolutist.222 This is not to say that Harman 
claims an absolutist allows no role for science. However, he does argue that the role of 
values and obligations explained from a completely scientific perspective will lead to 
relativism.223 Relativism, thus conceived, claims there is no moral truth. 
Naturalized ethics can appeal to certain biological and psychological desires, and 
Harman recognizes the legitimacy of evaluating certain biological structures of man 
functionally.224 Also, naturalized ethics attempts to explain away certain acts and 
attributes that a naturalist may call good with a scientific explanation as to why one calls 
certain things good. Any explanation for the goodness of certain acts may be reduced to 
an analysis as to why someone calls something good. The shift in emphasis in this 
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explanation diverts attention from the act, and places it instead on the psychological 
reasons of the one who explains the act as good. 
Naturalized ethics also denigrates ethical theories that stress virtue. Harman, for 
example, offers a scientific account as to why character-based virtue ethics are 
foundationally wrong.225 He finds several problems with virtues as a foundation for 
ethics.  Harman writes, “the main point is that this sort of virtue ethics presupposes that 
there are character traits of the relevant sort, that people differ in what character traits 
they have, and that these traits help to explain differences in the way people behave.”226 
He argues that the foundation upon which the virtue ethicist starts is faulty. This is 
because experiments have shown the circumstances often affect a person’s behavior more 
than his character.227 Another problem arises, according to Harman, because virtue 
ethicists commit the fundamental attribution error.228 What this means is that virtue 
theorists overlook relevant details of a situation to explain a person’s behavior and 
instead attribute the action to character. This calls into question whether character drives 
a person to act a certain way, when it is certainly sometimes the case (or according to the 
naturalized ethicist it is always) that the circumstances explain behavior in a more 
complete way. Harman goes beyond saying that it is merely sometimes the case that 
circumstances explain behavior. He argues that there is actually no such thing as 
character, and thus a virtue theory of ethics that seeks to improve character is a vacuous 
notion.229 Harman concludes, 
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We very confidently attribute character traits to other people in order to explain 
their behaviour. [sic] But our attributions tend to be wildly incorrect and, in fact, 
there is no evidence that people differ in character traits. They differ in their 
situations and in their perceptions of their situations. They differ in their goals, 
strategies, neuroses, optimism, etc. But character traits do not explain what 
differences there are.230  
 
In this account virtue theorists suffer from confirmation bias and overlooking that 
behavior can be explained from situations without having to appeal to character. With 
the assumption of character dismissed as vacuous, any virtues that are supposed to help 
form, guide, or build character are useless.  
Despite the bleak picture some may see emanating from the naturalized account 
of ethics, the neo-naturalist assures us of the possibility of human flourishing.231 The 
virtues mark the target at which one must aim in order to flourish. This view stands in 
stark contrast to Harman’s account. The neo-naturalist says that virtue plays a key role in 
ethics. Philippa Foot argues that certain dispositions we call virtues are dependent upon 
certain facts about human beings.232 Thus, contrary to the naturalized ethicist, the neo-
naturalist says that scientific facts do not lead away from virtue, but toward it. Biological 
and sociological facts can direct us to see what is virtuous. Each individual should strive 
to recognize, pursue, and attain the virtues that can lead one to happiness or human 
flourishing.    
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B. Similarities between Neo-Naturalism and Natural Law 
 
Natural law and neo-naturalism both hold many of the same foundational 
principles. These principles are similar between the two views and justify moral 
decisions. One can give an account in five specific areas that overlap from both a NL and 
neo-naturalist perspective.   
The first of the area of overlap between these two views is the idea that goodness 
is a natural property. Both link a being’s natural goodness to its teleological function.233 
Both agree that this attribution of goodness is not a reference to psychological states or 
positive attitudes. The moral norms that help a person discover whether something is 
good may be taken from facts about what that thing is. This judgment can be made about 
human or non-human things. Foot explains,  
the norms that we have been talking about so far have been explained in terms of 
facts about things belonging to the natural world. We have not had to think that in 
evaluations of non-human living things our use of ‘good’ has to be explained in 
terms of ‘commendation’ or any other ‘speech act’, nor as the expression of any 
psychological state. The main thesis of this book is that propositions about 
goodness and defect in a human being—even those that have to do with goodness 
of character and action—are not to be understood in such psychological terms. In 
describing my view, Thompson rightly said that I saw vice as a form of natural 
defect, and I have therefore used a corresponding wording in the title of this 
book.234 
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This emphasis on goodness not coming from a mere psychological or attitudinal 
disposition is against the non-cognitivist description of morality.235 In this attribution of 
goodness as natural both NL and neo-naturalism align themselves completely against the 
three non-cognitivist views, namely, emotivism (moral judgments only express attitudes), 
subjectivism (moral judgments based on feelings), and prescriptivism (moral judgments 
have no truth-value but are universalizable, and there is a radical separation of facts and 
values).236 
The second area of agreement is that biology and science can give us insight into 
the nature of things to help us make informed decisions about what we ought to do. 
Biology and technology can inform and equip us about the best way to feed and clothe 
ourselves in order to survive. Sociology and psychology may inform us about the best 
ways to attain friendship and love. Survival, love, and friendship are examples of good 
natural ends of man.237 Thus, many scientific fields of study can provide guidance to aid 
a person making a decision about how to act in a given circumstance.  
The third area of agreement is that the function of something can help us discover 
its goodness. This is the case whether one is referring to the goodness of the individual 
part, the good of the act as a whole, or even the good for a person. In the first case one 
can consider individual organs. For example, consider the heart’s function as a pump.  A 
heart is called good when it is properly functioning and bad when it is not. Or, a person 
may examine whether one action is better than another. He would have to take into 
account the entire act, including the motivation, the action itself, and the 
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circumstances.238 One may also consider an individual as a whole. She may be called a 
good golfer because she shoots a low score, or a good dancer because of her performance 
of the proper steps. Both would recognize that there are virtues characteristic of a good 
man as well. Thus, the NL theorist and neo-naturalist share the view that one can look at 
the function of something or someone to see how it is good.239 
The fourth area of commonality is that the virtues can play some role in helping 
us to make morally good decisions. Gilbert Harmon recognizes the role of virtues in neo-
naturalism when he writes, “One type of virtue ethics appeals to a type of functionalism 
that seeks to derive normative results from assumptions about functions.”240 One cannot 
discount the eighteen chapters that St. Thomas devotes to virtue in the Summa Theologica 
and the role these play in NL theory.241 The role of the virtues was also explicated in the 
previous chapter on The Metaphysics of Natural Law Theory. Philippa Foot is very open 
about the influence of Aquinas’ writing on the virtues as having an influence on her neo-
naturalism. She writes: 
However, there are different emphases and new elements in Aquinas’s ethics: 
often he works things out in far more detail than Aristotle did, and it is possible to 
learn a great deal from Aquinas that one could not have got from Aristotle. It is 
my opinion that the Summa Theologica is one of the best sources we have for 
moral philosophy, and moreover that St. Thomas’s ethical writings are as useful 
to the atheist as to the Catholic or other Christian believer.242  
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Foot’s account of natural goodness relies heavily on the virtues as helping one discover 
the teleological structure of human acts.243  
 A fifth common area, as is evident from the last chapter, is the defense of a 
cognitivist and objectivist account of ethics. Again, the NL theorist finds himself to have 
an ally in arguing against non-cognitivist accounts of ethical theory. These two ethical 
theorists are also united in arguing for ethical objectivism, contrary to accounts that say 
moral statements cannot be true or false.  
Thus, one can find five common areas of agreement which are very important for 
moral explanation between neo-naturalism and natural law theory. These areas include 
the views that: goodness is a natural property; science gives an individual insight about 
which moral acts are good; identifying the function of something helps us discover what 
is good for it; virtues play a crucial role in making moral decisions; the objectivist and a 
cognitivist approach provide the correct account of ethics. These five areas form a 
common backbone for two ethical theories which are both cognitivist and objectivist.  
 
C. Moreland’s attack on the foundation of Classical Natural Law 
 
One of the leading Christian philosophers has expounded a theory of ethics that 
appear to be a double-edged sword. Considered as one who has written many articles 
defending various forms of Christian morality, Moreland used an argument that can also 
be used to undermine the foundation of natural law, which is a view he claims to support. 
That this foundation is undermined is problematic at many levels. First, there is the 
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admission of certain epistemological problems one may have in knowing the natural law. 
The seriousness of this charge, at least to many Christians, is that natural law is a 
foundation whereby even the Gentiles, who do not have the written law, have a moral law 
written on their heart, according to the Bible in Romans chapter 2.244  Second, the 
uncritical acceptance of certain premises contrary to a classical NL approach can be said 
to be the equivalent of removing the heart from the body, or the engine from the car. This 
section will briefly examine and critique the ethical explanations the Christian 
philosopher J.P. Moreland provides that seem to undermine a classical NL approach.245 
J.P. Moreland sets forth an apologetic against atheism that is supposed to show 
that Christianity is true. Bearing this in mind, one can look at J.P. Moreland’s explanation 
of morality in his book Scaling the Secular City.246 The NL theorist is typically a theist, 
and as such, there is an important aspect of J.P. Moreland’s arguments that the he can 
agree with. Moreland uses arguments from the existence of objective moral norms 
against those who deny God’s existence to show that God exists. The NL theorist can 
agree quite easily with this argument. However, even though he may agree with the 
implication of God’s existing occurring concurrently with objective moral norms, what 
the NL theorist may still deny is the moral account Moreland sets forth that undermines 
the NL as it has been described.  
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Moreland offers the standard arguments against ethical naturalism and NL as it 
has been defended here. Contrary to a naturalistic account, he holds the view that a form 
of intuitionism seems to be the best account for discovering what is correct.247 He claims 
that the two objections that were dealt with in chapter two seem to be reasonable 
arguments against ethical naturalism. He writes,  
Two major objections can be raised against ethical naturalism. First, it confuses 
an “is” with an “ought” by reducing the latter to the former. Moral properties are 
normative properties. They carry a moral ought with them. If some act has the 
property of rightness, then one ought to do that act. But natural properties like the 
ones listed do not carry normativeness. They just are. Second, every attempted 
reduction of a moral property to a natural one has failed because there are cases 
where an act is right even if it does not have the natural property, and an act can 
have the natural property and not be right. For example, suppose one reduces the 
moral property of rightness in “x is right” to “x is what is approved by most 
people.” This reduction is inadequate. For one thing, the majority can be wrong. 
What most people approve of can be morally wrong. If most people approved of 
torturing babies, then according to this version of ethical naturalism, this act 
would be right. But even though it was approved by most people, it would still be 
wrong. On the other hand, some acts can be right even if they are not approved of 
(or even thought of, for that matter) by most people.248 
 
Moreland succinctly sets forth Hume and Moore’s arguments, and adopts Moore’s 
solution of intuitionism as well.  
In addition to the problems with these objections that were previously addressed, 
it seems Moreland also has the following problems. First, he begs the question. His 
argument can be constructed as follows: 
 P1: Moral properties are normative.  
P2: Natural properties are not normative  
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 Therefore, moral properties are not natural properties.  
The second premise is question begging. As has been discussed, natural properties are 
naturally teleological and thus have a normative element built into them. In his second 
argument, he criticizes the reduction of moral properties to properties that are natural. 
When a person acts in a way that is good, which is definitely a moral property, it can also 
be said to be a rational act, which is naturally how man should act. One can concede that 
a person should not define rightness as being what the majority approves of. However, 
the natural law theorist doesn’t hold this position. Thus, at least this argument Moreland 
offers here against natural law fails.  
Moreland also attacks a person’s ability to have anything beyond a general grasp 
of acts described as good. In other words, he implies that in natural law one cannot know 
whether specific acts are good or not. 249  He finds natural law theory to be not only weak, 
but also best reduced to divine command theory. There is what he calls a problem with 
‘epistemological adequacy’ in the natural law account.  Although one can have “broad, 
general ethical knowledge” from a natural law theory, Moreland thinks there is a serious 
problem with this account.250  Moreland writes of the natural law, 
This [general ethical knowledge] is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go very 
far. The immanent purpose view cannot offer much help in trying to decide what 
specific values are true and worthwhile. This epistemological problem is solved in 
Christian theism by supplementing natural law or general revelation- broad ethical 
principles which exist and can be known by all men- with special revelation in the 
Bible. This is not to deny the reality of natural law. It is merely to point out its 
epistemological inadequacy if it is unsupplemented by special revelation.251 
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Moreland clearly thinks that a natural account is epistemologically inadequate. As 
Michael Wreen explains, “Moreland’s charge is that instead of directions to a destination, 
natural law hands you a compass. Unless something is added in the way of guidance, 
natural law doesn’t do what an ethical theory should do: provide sufficient guidance.”252 
There are several problems with this criticism. First, in order to answer the 
problem with whether natural law provides sufficient direction about how to live one 
must first consider the various accounts of natural law. One common feature in each 
account is that good acts are those performed in accordance with reason. There are many 
acts that fit this description. The natural law reveals that there are many actions that a 
person can perform that are good, even if some acts may be better than others. For 
understanding a natural law approach consider the following analogy. One may think of 
himself as a person who is on a playground where it is morally acceptable to play on any 
piece of equipment as long as he remains on the playground. No matter how the person 
acts within the boundaries set for the playground the person has acted rightly. However, 
if the person transgresses the boundary of the playground one has acted wrongly.  As 
detailed in chapter two, the natural law provides sufficient guidance about how to act 
morally- using both virtue and reason as it is applied to the three areas of every act.  
The second significant problem is that his criticism of natural law can be applied 
to his ethical account which allegedly provides a superior explanation for decision-
making. Moreland’s criticism is that natural law is epistemologically inadequate although 
it provides and weighs different reasons for acting. However, his own account does 
nothing of the sort. On the contrary, Moreland defends ethical non-naturalism 
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(specifically intuitionism) as being the best moral theory.253 Yet this does not give a 
person any epistemological account about what is good or bad. One either does an act 
because he knows it is the right thing to do on account of his intuition, or he does 
something because there is some form of divine revelation that guides him about how to 
act.254 The criticism that Moreland levels against natural law, regardless of which form of 
non-naturalism he holds, is a more significant objection to his view than it is to natural 
law.  Moreland does not offer an adequate epistemological account.  He doesn’t explain 
why his procedure yields knowledge or justified belief rather than mere guesses.255  
Moral argument is pointless given his position as reason is abandoned and one knows 
‘intuitively’ what to do.  
 Moreland seems to be open to some serious objections.   As an intuitionist, the 
accounts that are given are open to standard objections to intuitionism. It is not surprising 
that he falls into intuitionism, given his embrace of Moore’s ‘naturalistic fallacy.’ Also, 
his account makes the nature of things irrelevant for deciding how one ought to act. This 
may not be a problem for some philosophers, but for Christians it is problematic, given 
the differences between the nature of men and that of other animals. This criticism again 
appeals to a human nature that he has rejected. Lastly, Moreland can be charged with 
accepting too quickly the ‘naturalistic’ and ‘Is-ought’ fallacy before investigating 
whether these are even well founded.  
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D. The Real Distinction between Classical Natural Law and Neo-Naturalism 
 
What then is the real distinction between classical natural law and neo-
naturalism? Of course the two are the same in many ways, but the classical natural law 
account has an implicit theism at its foundation, upon which is based a transcendent 
standard of morality.256 Neo-naturalism avoids references to any transcendent basis for 
goodness.257 In fact the originator of neo-naturalism, Philippa Foot, proudly calls herself 
a card-carrying atheist.258  
One can hardly fault neo-naturalists as seeing a system of ethics without God as a 
potential strength of their position.  Some even call the ‘New’ natural law theorists, like 
John Finnis, neo-naturalists.259 Finnis appeals to both non-Christian and non-religious 
philosophers who argue against homosexuality on the basis of reason alone.  For 
example, in his article about same-sex relations, Finnis explains the views of five non-
Christian and non-religious philosophers who argue against homosexuality in this way.260 
One would expect this sort of thing as the results of natural law ethics are accessible to all 
people. The similarity between this view and neo-naturalism is the emphasis on reason 
for action and no indication of any divine guidance or basis for goodness. Because each 
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of these philosophers uses reason and base moral judgment on what is perceived as an 
intrinsically moral act, one need not have any theological basis to decide whether 
homosexual acts are wrong. Philippa Foot, as a philosopher who promotes a form of 
virtue-ethics, also appeals to specific virtues as standards that can be used for moral 
decisions. Many hold that one need not appeal to any transcendent standard beyond what 
is virtuous for man to make moral decision. Foot’s neo-naturalism does base moral 
goodness on human nature. As she writes, “To determine what is goodness and what 
defect of character, disposition, and choice, we must consider what human good is and 
how human beings live: in other words, what kind of a living thing that a human being 
is.”261 
 The apparent strength of the neo-naturalist view comes from some significant 
features. First, the neo-naturalist does not have to grapple with or even defend the 
existence of God as a basis for ethical decision. Second, the neo-naturalist can appeal to 
what is seen as intrinsically right or wrong to make judgments about the morality of 
certain acts. If a person’s act violates some basic good essential to man, the action is bad. 
Or, suppose a person’s action undermines the virtue towards which the ‘ideal’ person 
should strive. This act would also be bad.  Third, it is a strength of the position to develop 
an objectivist account without appealing to a deity in that there will be a broader 
consensus to appeal to. It is more likely that people would be willing to accept an account 
that is simpler. On these accounts, one would not have to deal with the extra 
metaphysical baggage that an appeal to a deity entails.  
There are a couple of problems with this view according to many in the Christian 
philosophical tradition. One is based on whether one can have a basis for ethics without 
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God’s existence. Another involves how the ethicist who ignores the question of God’s 
existence may actually be losing what could be a robust metaethical basis for his theory if 
it is true that God really exists.  A third is that if God exists there may be more that is 
morally entailed by this existence- perhaps certain obligations to Him. The first two 
problems may seem to be making the same point. The difference between them is the first 
calls into question whether anything is actually wrong or evil if there is no God; the 
second touches on what God’s existence can give you beyond a minimum foundation for 
justifying judgments of good and evil.  
The first problem is that the neo-naturalist seems to hold two incompatible 
positions. First, neo-naturalists hold that there are objective moral truths. Second, they 
believe that the existence of God is not really a significant question for ethics. The 
problem with holding these two views, as many atheists and theists have pointed out, is 
that these two beliefs seem to be in conflict.262  As John Rist notes, “Where we have 
found common ground with the Nietzcheans is in the fact that without God there can be 
at least no objective moral truth.”263 
  Also, if God exists this certainly may actually provide us with some insight about 
moral decision-making. If the philosopher is really a seeker after truth and knowledge 
about reality, and if God really exists, then God’s existence and his nature certainly at 
least have the possibility of contributing something to our moral understanding. God’s 
existence may supplement our moral framework for making moral decisions. Perhaps 
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knowledge of God’s existence can also add to understanding how one can know what is 
good.  
There are several potential objections to the theistic explanation for morality. One 
may argue that morality ends up being reduced to a sort of divine command theory. Thus, 
natural law becomes plagued with the objections raised against this view. A second 
objection is that if one can recognize what is good and evil independent of whether God 
exists, then it matters little whether he does exist. What this objection confuses is an 
epistemological and a metaphysical claim. It is not the theist’s contention that one must 
recognize God’s existence in order to know whether some act is good or not. That is a 
mischaracterization of his argument. The theist’s argument is that God must exist for 
there to be a basis for good and bad acts. Recognizing good and bad acts is an 
epistemological matter. The foundation for the morality of acts is God’s existence. The 
classical natural law theorist would make a distinction between a proximate and remote 
end of an act.264 The proximate end is the goodness of the act itself and how the act is in 
accord with reason. The remote end is the eternal law against which the act can be 
judged.  
Given the classical natural law account of the quest for the attainment of 
happiness, especially in the afterlife, one might expect there to be a difference in this 
respect with the neo-naturalist. This expectation is confirmed. Consider Foot’s 
explanation of happiness: 
In terms of the contemporary discussions of happiness and its relation to virtue, I 
should describe my own view in the following terms. I agree with John McDowell 
that we have an understanding of the word ‘happiness’ that is close to Aristotle’s 
eudaimonia in that operation in accordance with the virtues belongs to its 
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meaning. In my own terminology ‘happiness’ is here understood as the enjoyment 
of good things, meaning enjoyment in attaining, and in pursuing, right ends.265  
 
Happiness on Foot’s account is in accord with Aristotle. Happiness is only considered 
from the standpoint of this life- which is not an unreasonable position if this life is all 
there is. Virtue is necessary for its attainment, but, due to the misfortune that life can 
bring, it can be out of reach for even the best of men.266  
 The classical natural law account of happiness is different from Foot’s. It is 
because the classical natural law theorist’s examination of happiness extends beyond this 
life. As was discussed previously, the constitutive goods of the exercise of virtue are 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for attaining the superordinate good of happiness. 
Contrary to Aristotle, who holds happiness is attainable in this life, the classical natural 
law theorist, at least in the Christian tradition, holds that happiness is attainable only in 
the next life if one lives well now. Of course this touches on a theological belief, which 
may or may not be true.   
 Thus, the neo-naturalist and the classical NL theorist part company in two ways. 
First, the neo-naturalist holds that it is unnecessary to postulate anything beyond the 
natural world to account for the goodness of certain acts. The natural law theorist would 
disagree with this assessment, and many theist and atheist philosophers recognize the 
slide towards nihilism without a transcendent basis for goodness.267 Second, the neo-
naturalist focus deals only with happiness in this life. Of course the neo-naturalist may be 
thought to have a particular strength in this view given that happiness is attainable in this 
life. It must be reiterated that the natural law theorist doesn’t hold that temporary feelings 
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of happiness are unobtainable, especially to those who have led virtuous and fortunate 
lives. However, if the classical natural law account is true, then one need not say those 
millions who have lived virtuous but unfortunate lives have no chance for happiness.     
 One last point is very important to emphasize. I have only described the 
difference between classical (i.e., a Thomistic) natural law and neo-naturalism. One claim 
I have not made is that an agnostic or atheistic reconstruction of natural law is 
impossible. I do not think it is. Larry Arnhart has done this very thing and explains how 
human nature, virtues, and the end need not refer to the supernatural for morality.268  This 
reconstruction looks identical to neo-naturalism. This may be expected as both Arnhart 
and Foot rely heavily on the writings of St. Thomas—minus any theological 
underpinnings. Again, there can be great advantages to such an approach. However, 
insofar as such a view overlooks an important aspect of reality, I think it is insufficient.  
 
E. A Comparison between Natural Law and Divine Command Theory 
 
Because a classical natural law theory requires the existence of God in order to 
make sense of morality, it is often attacked as if it is a divine command theory. Although 
the two are similar in recognizing God’s existence and even a hierarchy of goods, they 
are not identical. As such, and contrary to popular belief, natural law theory is not open to 
the same criticisms made of divine command theory. This section explains some 
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similarities and key differences between the two theories, along with the ways natural law 
escapes some of the criticism made of the divine command theory.  
Consider the tenets of divine command theory before contrasting it with natural 
law theory. Ethicist Scott Rae writes, “A divine command theory of ethics is one in 
which the ultimate foundation for morality is the revealed will of God, or the commands 
of God found in Scripture.”269 Pojman says that in the divine command theory moral 
principles “derive their validity from God’s commanding them.”270 Rightness and 
wrongness, according to the traditional divine command theory, simply means being 
willed by God.271  Divine command theory also believes that God’s will is revealed in 
sacred texts. Thus, divine command theory emphasizes God’s will for morally right acts, 
are valid because of God’s will, and right acts are revealed in sacred texts. 
In contrast to divine command theory, one can be a natural law theorist and still 
deny divine commands as revealed in the holy books of all the different religious 
traditions. This is certainly the case when one looks at the historical record of many of 
the ancient Greek philosophers.272 Consider the writing of Cicero, 
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, 
unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts 
from wrongdoing by its prohibitions… It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it 
allowable to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We 
cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need tot look 
outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be 
different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but 
one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and 
there will be one master and ruler, that is God, over us all, for his the author of 
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this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is 
fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, even if he escapes what is 
commonly considered punishment.273 
 
Cicero clearly holds a natural law position without adhering to any religious tradition. 
Although Greek philosophers appealed to reason, they would not have recognized as 
authoritative the religious teachings expressed in Judaism or any ‘revealed’ religious 
system.  This is especially true given that Christianity and Islam were not even around at 
the time the ancient Greek philosophers wrote. Finnis argues for this very point about 
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and the Stoic Musonius Rufus, using the power of 
reason to show that acts were intrinsically immoral apart from any sacred writing.274 
In addition, some classify the divine command theory as a kind of non-
naturalism.275 That is not to say divine command theory is non-cognitivist. In a theory 
that is non-naturalistic, as Pojman explains, “ethical conclusions cannot be derived from 
empirically confirmed propositions.”276 The two major cognitivist views that are non-
naturalist are intuitionism and divine command theory. According to intuitionism, what is 
right or wrong is known through intuition alone. In divine command theory, according to 
Pojman, revelation confirms the right thing to do and is not based on independent reasons 
for acting.277  
One cannot classify natural law theory as a non-cognitivist theory given that it is a 
kind of naturalism. There are certain tenets of ethical naturalism and neo-naturalism to 
which the natural law theorist would also hold. These three theorists all can hold that 
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goodness is a natural property in things. They also all hold that the good is knowable. 
Thus, natural law theory differs from divine command theory in that one is a naturalistic 
theory and the other is not.  
  There is other evidence that natural law theory is not a divine command theory.278 
Some versions of divine command theory say that something is right if God wills it. The 
natural law theory says that God wills something because it is right. The natural law 
theorist takes the second horn of what has become known as the Euthyphro dilemma, and 
the divine command theorist often takes the first horn.279 The non-theist may then 
respond, “If you think God wills something because it is right, then the goodness does not 
entail God, because the goodness of the act is intrinsic to the act.” This criticism basically 
says that God’s existence isn’t needed to account for ethical truth. This is partially true, 
but overlooks one aspect of morality according to the theist. The natural law theorist 
agrees that goodness is intrinsic to the act, but also adds that there is a transcendent 
standard against which one can measure the act as good or bad. This transcendent 
standard is of course God. That is not to say there is not a measure of goodness in the act 
itself. According to the classical natural law theory, as I have explained it, goodness is 
seen both in the act and as measured against a transcendent standard of goodness. Yet, 
how is it the case that God is still necessary given the natural law account? 
One must consider two things in natural law theory. First, there is a teleological 
dimension of all human acts that have varying degrees of importance. Some human acts 
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are necessary in order to attain other things. For example, if one doesn’t eat or sleep, one 
would be unable to carry out a variety of other human activities. These are foundational 
for other acts. Furthermore, one can recognize that a person must develop certain virtues 
to become a good person. There are a very specific and complex set of virtues that may 
be actualized in a number of ways. Anytime we have discovered specified complexity 
within the sciences a person rightly points to an intelligence behind the information. 
Similarly, the specified complexity one finds in the criteria necessary for a man to be 
considered to be good bears the marks of having an incredible design. It is the natural law 
theorist’s contention that God is the best explanation for this design.  Second, consider a 
parallel between natural law and civil laws in our society. Societal laws are only followed 
because someone with a mind has formulated them. If societal laws came about because 
of a computer typographical error then there is no reason to follow them because they are 
accidental. Similarly, if there is no mind behind the natural moral law then there is no 
reason to follow that either.  Thus, according to natural law theory God is the best 
explanation for the design or teleology intrinsic to both human acts and the virtues of a 
good man in addition to the objective force of a natural law given by a being with a mind. 
If the natural law theorist is correct about this then God is necessary. 
This part of the natural law treatment is a good segue to discuss the moral 
argument for God’s existence. Although there have been various forms of this 
argument,280 I will only deal with one popular explanation of it. I will summarize C.S. 
Lewis’s argument in Mere Christianity: 
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1.  There must be a natural law that universally applies to all people to make 
sense of (a) moral disagreement, (b) moral criticism (e.g., the Nazi’s are 
wrong), (c) our obligation to keep promises, and (d) the reason we make 
excuses for breaking this law, as we all do. 
2. But the source of this requires a Law Giver since it (a) gives commands 
(as lawgivers do) and (b) is interested in our behavior (as moral persons 
are).281 
Lewis explains that we can each look inside ourselves and discover that there is a law that 
we feel as if we ought to obey.282 This law communicates a message about what we ought 
to do, and makes “me feel responsible and uncomfortable when I do wrong.”283 Now a 
person would feel no obligation in a scenario where he drops scrabble pieces on a board 
and it spells ‘go out.’ When the pieces fall the laws of gravity aren’t commanding him to 
do something.  The natural law, however, has a binding force, which derives from a 
moral Law-Giver. 
 Many objections have been brought against the moral argument. John Hick 
summarizes the problem: 
The basic assumption of all argument of this kind is that moral values are not 
capable of naturalistic explanation in terms of human needs and desires, self-
interest, the structure of human nature or human society, or in any other way that 
does not involve appeal to the Supernatural. To make such an assumption is to 
beg the question.284 
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Whether one reasons from objective moral values or the voice of conscience to a 
transcendent Ground of Value, one is simply begging the question in assuming God is a 
better ground than a naturalistic explanation.285 
 Although it is far beyond the scope of this dissertation to offer the needed defense 
for the moral argument, and I will not attempt to extricate it from a number of difficulties, 
I think several things work in its favor to support the existence of God. Consider the 
following aspects of the natural moral law. Francis Beckwith explains, “moral norms are 
a form of communication, an activity in which one mind through statements conveys 
meaning to another mind.”286 Also, Gregory Koukl writes that the natural moral laws 
“have a force we can actually feel prior to any behavior. This is called the incumbency, 
the ‘oughtness’ of morality….It appeals to our will, compelling us to act in a certain way, 
though we may disregard its force and choose not to obey.”287 Beckwith notes that this 
moral law can be illusory, accidental, or from a Mind (as it transcends all other minds).288  
If it is merely illusory, then there can be no moral conflict or progress—for all morality is 
just an illusion. Yet this seems to be a pretty hard pill to swallow. One may say he 
believes morality is an illusion, but shows his true belief the moment he is wronged. If it 
is merely accidental, then a difference in morality is comparable to the difference in the 
color of people’s skin.289 However, a consideration of morality as accidental means that 
following moral laws is equivalent to following the command of the scrabble pieces 
falling. It seems that neither the binding force or the communicative aspects can be 
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explained according to this account.290 Therefore, God’s existence makes both the 
binding force of morality and its communication coherent.  
 How can one who defends the moral argument answer Hick’s objection? Two 
ways immediately come to mind. First, to his charge that those promoting the moral 
argument don’t consider naturalistic explanations for morality, I find this to simply be 
untrue. As far back as 1885 William Sorley dealt with and claimed to have refuted these 
naturalistic explanations. As William Lane Craig explains: 
In his The Ethics of Naturalism (1885) he had refuted the historical, evolutionary 
approach to ethics, and now he turns to refute psychological, sociological 
explanations of value. The fundamental error of all these approaches is that they 
confuse the subjective origin of our moral judgments and the objective value to 
which the judgments refer. Just because the origin of our moral judgments can be 
historically or sociologically explained does not mean that there are no objective, 
corresponding values in reality.291 
 
Now it may be the case that Sorley failed in his attempt, but he certainly considered 
naturalistic option. Secondly, Craig’s explanation is that there can be both a subjective 
origin—which includes culture, human nature, needs, desires, and the like—and an 
objective, transcendent source to which these moral norms appeal. Hick’s objection may 
simply be presenting a false dichotomy to avoid the implications of a transcendent 
source.  This explanation by no means exhausts the extent of the work that needs to be 
done to find a reasonable defense of the moral argument, but it does present some 
potential responses to Hick’s position. 
One must properly understand what is being said about the relation between the 
natural law and God’s existence. The natural law claim is not to say that people cannot 
see the goodness in certain acts if they do not believe in God. Nor is the claim being 
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made that unless people believe in God they cannot make judgments about what is 
morally good. What is being said is that in the classical natural law account there is a 
transcendent measuring rod against which the goodness of certain acts can be judged. The 
natural law theorist claims this is the eternal law, of which the natural law is a part. 
What is this eternal law?  The eternal law, in the classical account, is the divine 
essence or reason.292 This eternal law is the transcendent source of the natural law that 
each person finds within. William May explains: 
Thomas taught that all creation—the cosmos and all thing within it—is under the 
governance of God’s intelligence. Thus the eternal law is the ratio or divine plan 
of the governance of all things insofar as this ratio or divine plan exists within the 
mind of God himself as the ruler of the universe. The eternal law directs the entire 
created universe and the activity of all created things, including the activity of 
human persons.293 
 
Natural law is taken to be a participation in eternal law.294 The evidence that men 
participate in the eternal law comes from, Aquinas notes, “its being imprinted on them, 
they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends…. Therefore 
[rational creatures] has a share of the eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination 
to its proper act and end; and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature 
is called the natural law.”295 Thomas concludes with this explanation: 
He thus implies that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good 
and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an 
imprint on us of the divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is 
nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law.296 
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This is the explanation of eternal law and its distinction from natural law. This 
explanation says that the binding obligation of moral norms comes ultimately from the 
eternal law. 
Despite this arrival at God’s existence in a classical natural law approach, it 
differs from one that is a divine command. Although there is a difference, there are two 
significant ways that natural law theory complements a divine command approach 
without having to answer some of the serious charges brought against it. One thing a 
natural law theory is open to, although it is by no means required by it, is the possibility 
of divine revelation as a guide. The natural law theorist can acknowledge that the 
different ‘holy books’ of the various world religions may have conflicting ethical 
principles. However, just because there is disagreement that does not mean that all the 
books are wrong. Thus, if one or more of the ‘holy books’ are true, it or they could 
provide a guide in cases in which the human mind cannot find a clear answer to a moral 
problem. This could be especially helpful insofar as the natural law theory holds that 
reason is a guide for making moral decisions. If reason fails to ascertain which action is 
the good one in a given scenario, then divine revelation certainly has the possibility of 
being helpful. It would be incumbent upon the natural law thinker to sort through which, 
if any, of the versions of divine command is the one that is true. A second way natural 
law theory complements the divine command approach arises from a consideration of 
what these commands are. The natural law theorist can point to the common ethical 
values that are taught in the various ‘holy books.’ These values, on the classical natural 
law account, are included in the different works because each person has access to a 
transcendent natural law no matter what religion he follows. Although the natural law 
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theorist allows for the possibility that some deity spoke to each individual who wrote the 
various works about the common moral standards, the transcendent law seems to be a 
more plausible explanation of the similarities in each of the works.297 Again, the NL 
theorist doesn’t hold that every act can be measured against this transcendent moral 
framework.  The NL theorist can then attribute similarities in the different religious 
traditions to NL, and differences in the various moral perspectives to errors in reasoning. 
It must be reiterated that sorting through the various religious traditions to determine 
which, if any, is correct remains a task that lies far beyond the scope of the present work.  
 There were three significant features of this chapter which help one to recognize 
where the tensions lie between natural law and neo-naturalism. The first is the argument 
that one should use different terms to refer to the different types of naturalism. Confusion 
abounds in the discussion. Using terms consistently that correspond to each of the 
different types of naturalism is most useful for clarity and understanding. Adopting 
different terminology will also add to understanding where the real tension lies between 
natural law and neo-naturalism. Second, one can see the real distinction between natural 
law and neo-naturalism focuses on the question of God’s existence. If God exists, as the 
natural law theorist claims, then there are morally significant implications. The neo-
naturalist does not really see this question as being that significant to the pursuit of moral 
philosophy. The third feature of this chapter drew the distinction between natural law and 
divine command theory. Many charge natural law with being identical to divine 
command. They will then argue against divine command theory and think in doing so 
that they are bringing the same charges against natural law theory. Natural law theory is 
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 This can be ruled out only if one can present a plausible argument against the existence of a 
deity.  
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much more nuanced than these critics understand. Because natural law accepts elements 
of naturalism, neo-naturalism, and divine command theory, the moral truths discovered 
from these other approaches can easily be assimilated into natural law theory. These three 
theories can complement a natural law approach. Natural law theory, therefore, has allies 
among all these ethical theories as it may draw upon the strengths of each view, while 
avoiding many of their weaknesses.  
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Chapter 6 
 
NATURAL LAW AND DOUBLE EFFECT 
 
 
Patients have many different fears about going to hospitals.  Although bizarre 
incidents like leaving things in patients after surgery are among them, it is probable that a 
greater percentage of the time the patient has fears about how he will be treated. 298 These 
fears are warranted at least some of the time.299  Although each hospital takes great pains 
to do what is ethically best, there remains a number of vexing moral problems that makes 
many nervous about what the right action is. It is the goal of this chapter to briefly expose 
the ways some principles taken from natural law ethics can give guidance in medical 
ethics. 
Moral theories need to take into account the dilemmas people encounter daily in 
the realm of medicine.300 Due to the complexities of reality, every moral evaluation 
should consider all relevant elements in order to reach a right judgment. A person’s moral 
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 Although crazy things occasionally happen, the emphasis here is that people are likely to be 
much more concerned with the ethics of health-care workers. Although people hear of things like this: “A 
10-inch metal surgical device was left inside a patient for a month and when he pointed out the problem to 
doctors, he was told he may need a psychiatrist.” 
http://kdka.com/kdkainvestigators/surgery.retracterUPMC.2.651494.html.  More practical considerations 
probably influence their thinking much more.  
299Much of the recent fear can also be seen from the reactions people have had to the suggested 
changes in healthcare in America. The natural law approach does not necessarily relieve fears about issues 
of payment for treatment or level of care, but can significantly reduce fears about those making the 
decisions for care.  
300See Higgs, R. “Certainty and Uncertainty: Medical Ethics and the General Practitioner,” Family 
Practice 1985 Dec;2(4):193-4; Pattison, S and H.M. Evans. “Cause for concern: the absence of 
consideration of public and ethical interest in British public policy,” Journal of Medical Ethics 2006; 32: 
711-714. 
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judgment is only as good as the breadth and accuracy of the data used in making the 
decision.  
Among other things, this chapter deals with some tools the natural law theorist 
offers to medical ethics. These include an exposition of the doctrine of double effect and 
proportionate reason- not necessarily a defense of them. With this in mind, let us proceed 
to the divisions of this chapter. The first section introduces the case of Tony Bland for 
consideration. The second section explicates the difference between proportionate and 
disproportionate treatment. The third applies the doctrine of double-effect (DDE) to Tony 
Bland’s case. The last section summarizes my treatment of the classical natural law 
approach. 
 
A. Patients with Brain Death 
 
A patient diagnosed as brain dead provides an ideal candidate for consideration of 
how the doctrine of double effect works in hospitals today. There is great controversy 
surrounding the type of treatments a patient in a PVS ought to have. Peter Singer presents 
the case of Tony Bland for consideration.  
The case of Tony Bland goes to the essence of this discussion. In 1989 eighteen-
year-old Tony Bland suffered serious brain injuries sustained at a football game he was 
attending. After having been crushed by a crowd, Tony’s biological life was saved—i.e., 
his heart and lungs still functioned—but he suffered a serious brain injury and lost the 
‘higher functioning areas’ that were not associated with the brain stem. The brain damage 
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was a result of having been deprived of oxygen for such a long period of time after his 
initial injury. His body was being kept alive only by ‘artificial nutrition and hydration.’ 
Peter Singer raises the question about whether one ought to continue to sustain the 
life of a person is suffering from a serious brain injury—like Tony Bland. After 
explaining the history of recent redefinitions of death—including the whole-brain and 
higher-brain oriented definitions—he explained that a patient’s organs can be 
transplanted even if his heart is still beating if he adopts the brain definitions of death.301  
Although the traditional definition of death was a cardiac version—saying a person is 
alive as long as the heart still beats—the other two definitions were developed to try to 
take into account what could be done with emerging technology and in order to have 
more organs available for transplantation. This indicates that science fiction writers were 
not the only people that imagined keeping the brain alive in a vat separated from the 
body. The whole brain criterion says that a person is dead, “when there is irreversible 
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.”302 The relevance 
of the brain stem is that it is primarily responsible for cardiac and respiratory function. 
This criterion basically says if the machine that operates the cardiopulmonary function is 
destroyed, then one may be classified as brain dead. The higher brain criterion describes 
death as evident when “there is an irreversible loss of higher brain functions” because of 
damage to the cerebrum.303  The cerebrum is primarily responsible for communication, 
memory, and imagination. Complete damage to the cerebrum, because it controls these 
‘higher functions,’ is seen to take away a human’s personhood. 
                                                          
301Peter Singer, “Is the Sanctity of Life Ethic Terminally Ill?” Bioethics Vol. 9 No. 3 (1995): pp. 
327-343. Singer primarily draws on the report of the Harvard Brain Death Committee.  
302Robert Veatch, The Basics of Bioethics, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 2003): p. 37.  
303Ibid. 39. 
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 Singer rejects both of the modern criteria to determine death in favor of the 
cardiac criterion. He writes: “people have enough common sense to see that the brain 
dead are not really dead.”304 Even if the brain dead are alive, what he goes on to argue 
one can still attain the same results that the Harvard Brain Death Committee (the original 
group that made distinction of brain death in order to have more usable organs for 
transplant) were seeking if he would only “break out of the intellectual straight-jacket of 
the traditional belief that all human life is of equal value.”305 If one does this, he can keep 
the cardiac definition of death AND still allow for the withdrawal of life-support and 
distribution of organs from a person whose heart is still beating.306 The intention involved 
in ending a patient’s life is not relevant because not all life is of equal value. The patient’s 
life and organs may be taken because “the patient’s life is of no benefit to her…when the 
patient is irreversibly unconscious.”307 Singer adds that there is no sanctity of life in this 
case because a human’s life is not intrinsically valuable. The primary thing that is 
valuable is a person that can gain consciousness in this life. There seems to be several 
problems with this analysis. Those that are least likely to gain consciousness—people in a 
PVS—are the primary candidates for Singer and the Brain-Death committee’s 
exploitation (if their description is wrong).     
Singer rightly pointed out how the Harvard Brain-Death Committee introduced 
problematic criteria to determine whether someone was dead or not.  The problem with 
this analysis is, as Scott Henderson has pointed out, “brain death fails to correspond to 
                                                          
304Singer, “Is the Sanctity of Life Ethic Terminally Ill?” p. 333.  
305Ibid. 336.   
306Ibid. 343.  
307Ibid.   
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any coherent biological or philosophical conception of death.”308 Certainly those labeled 
as ‘brain dead’ meet the scientific criteria that are used to determine whether something is 
alive- namely, metabolism, responsiveness, growth, and reproduction.309  A person who 
is ‘brain dead’ may continue to respond to stimuli, grow, [re]produce cells, and even 
deliver children.310 This seems to be a problem for those who argue that a human is dead. 
Despite the apparent difficulty this raises, critics can simply avoid the problems of this by 
saying that the human being is alive, but the human person is not.  
There is much discussion about whether someone should be allowed stop certain 
life-sustaining procedures—like offering ‘artificial nutrition and hydration.’  However, 
there is an assumption when calling attention to these life-sustaining procedures that all 
‘treatment’ is equal. It seems question-begging to assume that providing ‘artificial 
nutrition and hydration’ are ‘treatments’ when these are the very things keeping each of 
us alive. There needs to be grounds other than the fact that the delivery mechanism is 
different for those in a PVS than us for stopping their ‘treatment.’ Babies in the womb, 
newborns, infants, and adults each have different ways their food is delivered to them. It 
is not obvious that the mechanism in itself is something that rules out the delivery of food 
and water to patients in a PVS. However, it may still be the case that the mechanism in 
itself makes it difficult to administer food and water. This would be a relevant reason and 
would fall under consideration when examining proportionate and disproportionate 
reasons.  
                                                          
308D. Scott Henderson, “An Assessment of Brain Death as a Means of Procuring Transplantable 
Organs.” This paper was delivered at the annual conference of ISCA in 2008. The PDF can be found at 
http://www.isca-apologetics.org/papers. 
309Gerard J. Tortora and Sandra Grabowski, Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, (New York: 
Harper Collins Publishers,1993): pp. 6-9. 
310Rosalie Ber, “Ethical Issues in Gestational Surrogacy,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 
Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 153-169.   
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Another issue emerges from the claim that it is in the best interest of all those 
involved that the lives of those in a PVS cease. This seems to overlook a couple of things. 
First, it is hard to see how something that that ends a person’s life is in his best interest. 
What is absent from this discussion is whether the person is in pain. It is not apparent that 
ingesting food and water cause pain. If they do so, then it would be relevant. Second, this 
seems to confuse the expedient with what is the best. Just because it may be easier on 
some (or even all) of those involved in caring for a person in a PVS, it doesn’t mean it is 
the best for them. Some virtues can only be realized through trials. If virtues are attributes 
that we ought to cultivate, then even if it is a trial to serve those in a PVS doing so can 
help us to build virtue. This is not to say it is the only way to build virtue, but merely that 
taking care of a loved one in this state gives us an opportunity to do so. Furthermore, I am 
not saying that this alone provides a demonstration that we ought to sustain the lives of 
those in a PVS. However, what I am saying is that one should have a reason other than 
the ‘best-interest’ argument as what is in our best interest is certainly sometimes 
something that appears to be difficult.  
There is also a controversial view of the human person that is assumed in this 
discussion. Competing models include the materialist, Platonic (or Cartesian), and 
Aristotelian view of persons. If a materialist conception of human nature is correct, then 
it follows that the physician is correct in assuming the brain is the mind, or at best the 
mind is an epiphenomenon of the brain.311 However, if an Aristotelian or Platonic 
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 Richard Taylor provides a survey of the different theories of human person in Metaphysics, 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,1963): Chapter 1. One may also find a good survey in Philosophy of 
Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Ed. By David J. Chalmers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002. Chalmers summarizes what each theory espouses in chapter 1.  As Chalmers points out, it is 
intuitively more plausible that thoughts and feelings affect the body than it is to believe that these do not as 
epiphenomenalism claims.  (p. 2) Despite this, Chalmers offers a defense of epiphenomenalism while 
recognizing the intuitively more plausible claim he has mentioned. (Chapter 27) Some non-reductive 
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account is correct, brain function is not equivalent to mind function.312 Arguments have 
been offered on both sides of the debate. Opposed to a materialist conception, one may 
consider the substantial identity of a person. A person may remember earning grades 
when she was young that were hers. She recognizes them as such even if her physical 
body is no longer the same. One may also remember many experiences that she went 
through in the past, despite the fact her body has changed. People rightly celebrate the 
day they were born. These experiences and this recognition provide evidence that there is 
more to us than merely the material. In fact, our identity is tied up not merely with the 
material aspects of our body, but our immateriality as well.  These arguments may be 
used to make a prima facie case opposing the materialist assumption, and though they 
cannot be touted as solving the debate, they at least allow for the possibility that the 
materialist conception could be mistaken. In introducing this doubt, the conservative 
course of action would be to error on the side of caution. Consider an analogous example. 
Suppose a person was going to demolish a building with explosives, and they hadn’t 
checked whether anyone was inside before detonating.  Those destroying the building 
would not only be foolish for acting without checking, they would be guilty of a serious 
                                                                                                                                                                             
materialist theories offer functionalist accounts where the relationship between the brain and mind is 
similar to that as between a computer and a computer software program. In this view, as Pojman notes, 
“Against reductive materialism, it denies that just one type of brain state can always be correlated with a 
type of mental event. Just as a watch can be operated by a battery or springs, different material 
constructions could yield the same kind of mental event.” In Who Are We? Theories of Human Nature, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 227. 
312John M. Cooper outlines Plato’s account of the dichotomy between the senses and the mind in 
“Sense-Perception and Knowledge,” in Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999): 355-376.  J. P. Moreland & Scott B. Rae argue that many ethical problems occur 
because of a foundational difference in opinion between which view of human nature is correct. They 
provide arguments supporting the Platonic view in order to remedy what they perceive to be many of the 
ethical dilemmas faced in healthcare. See Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics, Downers 
Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2000.  
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wrong if it were discovered that people are inside- especially when people can marshal 
evidence and arguments in support of this view.313    
What of the distinction between human person and human being? A problem with 
this distinction is that it assumes a functionalist view of persons. Those holding to a 
substance view of human persons can say that this distinction leads to the confusion of a 
sign of value with the source of value.314 The source of value is a person’s rational nature. 
He cannot act rationally unless he is already a rational being. Just as my wedding ring is a 
sign of my marriage, so too acting rationally is a sign of being rational. My wedding ring 
is not the source of my marriage, and a person acting rationally is not the source of his 
value. For example, if while on my honeymoon I lose my wedding ring in the ocean, then 
it doesn’t follow that I am no longer married. I’d still remain married even if I have to 
wait until a later date - after graduate school for example - to afford a new ring.  The 
value of man comes from the kind of being he is- a rational one. Whether conscious or 
not, as those holding the substance view of persons argue, humans remain rational beings 
of intrinsic value until death. Other creatures exhibit traits that follow upon having a 
certain nature. They do not acquire the nature after displaying the trait, but first have the 
nature in order to display the trait. The metaphysical assumptions on both sides of this 
analysis should be clear. The assumption that allows certain procedures which kill 
patients in a coma or a PVS is that a person is just a bundle of properties and not a 
                                                          
313One cannot deny that evidence can also be marshaled in support of materialism. However, there 
is much more at stake if the materialist is wrong than if the non-materialist is wrong. If the materialist is 
wrong then their actions cause an end to a human life. If the non-materialist is wrong then their action 
causes the prolonging of the function of body whose most important function is permanently lost. 
314
 Ibid. For those that think that a person is a substance, these distinctions and arguments are 
misguided at best insofar as they rest upon an incorrect metaphysical foundation.  Patrick Lee and Robert 
George offer arguments in support of a substance view that attempts to show the difference between man 
and other creatures. There is an emphasis that each person has a unique nature that distinguishes her from 
other animals. This nature, which includes both the material and immaterial elements, establishes the moral 
obligation humans have to one another. 
167 
 
substance. This lends itself to the assumption in much of modern thinking that a 
functionalist view of persons is correct.   
Despite the functionalist assumption, if a person is essentially a rational being, 
then this person does not lose this nature as long as they are living. This is the reason 
many pro-life advocates argue that an embryo is just as valuable as an adult despite not 
having a functioning or developed brain.315 Budziszewski adds, “Nonpersons do not turn 
into persons, any more than characters, given time, turn into actors….In short, one is 
either a person or not, just as one is either a human or not. Unborn human beings are not 
‘potential’ persons, but actual persons loaded with inbuilt potentialities which still await 
expression.”316 The implications for this may extend to non-human animals. If some time 
in the future it is discovered that there are other rational beings, then these too should be 
protected. One may certainly make the case that there are other animals that meet this 
standard. However, as this takes us far beyond the scope of this dissertation, we will have 
to save this treatment for another time. 
 
B. Proportionate and Disproportionate 
 
Before examining the scenario in more detail, briefly consider the difference 
between proportionate (or ordinary) and disproportionate (or extraordinary) means.317 As 
Kevin O’Rourke writes, “From an ethical perspective, there is general agreement that 
                                                          
315
 Patrick Lee. “The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity.” Bioethics, Volume 18 
Number 3, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 
316
 Budziszewski, The Line Through the Heart, p. 101. 
317Recent theologians have often used the terms proportionate and disproportionate to supplant the 
traditional ordinary versus extraordinary distinction. The terms ordinary and extraordinary mean the same 
thing as proportionate and disproportionate.  
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ordinary means must be used to prolong life when fatal or terminal illness threatens and 
extraordinary means may be forgone in the same circumstances.”318 The main problem of 
this distinction comes from describing what constitutes proportionate versus 
disproportionate means. Philip Devine writes, “An extraordinary remedy is a remedy the 
agent has a proportionate reason to omit. The only means of prolonging life which are 
ordinary whatever the circumstances are not remedies but such things as food, water, and 
air ingested in the usual way.”319  Devine apparently means the ‘usual’ ways to receive 
food, water, and air are those that do not require any medical apparatus. Although this 
description seems pretty straightforward, problems abound in the history of the changing 
ways these terms were applied. O’Rourke describes this problem,  
It seems the main reason for the suggested change in terminology arose from the 
tendency to interpret the terms ordinary and extraordinary in an abstract or 
generic manner; that is, the decision whether a medical means to prolong life was 
ordinary or extraordinary was often made without reference to the condition of the 
patient. Using the terms in an abstract or generic sense, only the cost, usual 
effectiveness, availability of a medical device, and potential pain inflicted would 
be considered when designating a medical or surgical procedure as ordinary or 
extraordinary. The overall condition of the patient was not considered until after 
the terms of ordinary or extraordinary care had been decided. This would often 
result in confusing terminology. The means in question might be considered 
ordinary in the abstract, but this designation would be changed to extraordinary 
once the condition of the patient had been considered. Thus, a respirator or a 
                                                          
318Kevin D. O’Rourke, “The Catholic Tradition on Forgoing Life-Support,” The National Catholic 
Bioethics Quarterly, Autumn 2005, Vol. 5 No. 3, pg. 537. This general agreement to prolong life is based 
on recognizing the value of each person. This reason can be used to motivate people to protect those dying 
of famine and genocide. Those dying of famine are not necessarily targeted by other humans, although for 
political reasons some corrupt and evil regimes do target people seen as their opponents. When aid is 
offered to countries to stop those dying of hunger, and the aid is kept from people, the famine becomes the 
means of killing the select group. Although Jonathan Glover mentions in his book Causing Death and 
Saving Lives that one should not resort to speciesism, i.e. the superiority of one species to another, because 
it is arbitrary and doesn’t cite relevant differences, the case can be made for speciesism, as Michael Wreen 
has done in his essay, “In Defense of Speciesism,” Ethics and Animals 5 no. 3 (1984): 47-60. One can find 
many arguments supporting the view that speciesism is not immoral like racism and sexism are. Whereas 
race and sex are accidental to being human, the rationality associated with humanness is essential to man 
even when it is not expressed.   
319Philip Devine, The Ethics of Homicide, p. 229.   
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feeding tube might be designated as an ordinary means to prolong life, but after 
consideration of the patient's condition, it might be considered extraordinary.320 
 
This inconsistent use of the distinction is obviously problematic if one were to use 
proportionate and disproportionate as a way to decide when one is to attempt to prolong a 
person’s life.321 Devine’s description seems to circumvent the problem of changing 
terminology as the basis for ordinary means are things necessary for every person’s 
continued life, although his language about these things as necessarily provided in the 
‘usual way’ may be challenged.322   
 The traditional natural law approach uses this terminology to help clarify when a 
treatment is obligatory and when it is not. It is important to understand that proportionate 
and disproportionate care does not mean what has commonly been associated with the 
terms. 323  
A treatment that is proportionate is morally obligatory, and one that is disproportionate is 
not. One uses a proportionate means in a treatment where the benefits outweigh the 
burdens to the patient and others. One uses disproportionate means in treatments where 
the burdens outweigh the benefits. Smith and Kaczor make the important point that, 
                                                          
320O’Rourke, p. 542.  
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 One would be remiss to ignore that there are limited medical resources everywhere, and the 
ceiling of care that can be provided seems boundless. The problem arises from trying to determine what is 
appropriate care compared to what is heroic. One may say that this judgment is really about weighing what 
is an ordinary and what is an extraordinary treatment. 
322Janet Smith and Christopher Kaczor argue that providing food and water (even by artificial 
means) is always a natural, ordinary way to preserve life. It is therefore proportionate and morally 
obligatory to provide these as long as the patient can assimilate them. Life Issues, Medical Choices, 
(Cincinnati: St. Anthony Messenger Press, 2007):pp. 112-115. 
323
Ibid. Smith and Kaczor explain, “The terms themselves are somewhat misleading, insofar as 
ordinary and extraordinary normally have to do with how common something is or how frequently it is 
used. Sometimes it is medically ordinary (that is, often used) may be morally optional and thus 
extraordinary in the moral sense. Similarly, sometimes what is medically extraordinary (that is, rarely used) 
may be morally obligatory and thus is called “ordinary” in moral judgments.”  (110) 
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“although human life is always a good, in a particular situation a medical treatment may 
be more burdensome than beneficial.”324 
 How does a person judge whether a treatment is beneficial or not?  In the case for 
consideration, the family must take into account the benefits and burdens for the patient 
being treated. The following chart illustrates the considerations that may be factored in 
when deciding the appropriateness of treatment: 
BENEFITS BURDENS 
Prolongs life Costly 
Cures Psychologically Repugnant 
Alleviates Pain Painful  
Relieves symptoms Unlikely to succeed & provide great benefit 
Restores Function Difficult to administer and experimental 
Engenders well-being Detrimental side-effects 
 
These benefits and burdens are factored into the consideration and constitute whether a 
person should take a particular action. In difficult cases, a proportionate reason justifies 
actions that may have two effects- one bad and another good.325 This principle will be 
discussed shortly when we introduce the intended/foreseen distinction. The same 
treatment that is beneficial to one patient may not be to another because of the 
circumstances. Consider a heart transplant for an otherwise healthy 20 year old versus 
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 For a detailed analysis about proportionate reason see Connery, John R., SJ, “The Teleology of 
Proportionate Reason,” Theological Studies, 44:3 (1983:Sept.) p.489-496; Johnstone, Brian V. CSSR, “The 
Meaning of Proportionate Reason in Contemporary Moral Theology,” Thomist; a Speculative Quarterly 
Review, 49:2 (1985:Apr.) p.223-247; Kaczor, Christopher, Proportionalism and the Natural Law 
Tradition, (Washington D.C.: CUA Press, 2002): p. 39-44; Janssens, Louis, “St. Thomas Aquinas and the 
Question of Proportionality,” Louvain Studies 9 (1982): 26-46. 
171 
 
one for a 90 year old whose body is riddled with cancer. Although the procedure is the 
same, the burdens and benefits for the patient are significantly different.  
Admittedly, there is an aspect of this analysis that is evidently less clear than may 
be preferred regarding the morality of all decisions regarding particular cases. This is the 
subjective nature that may constitute some of the ‘burdens’ upon the family- including 
cost of care. The cost of care may not be burdensome to some families, and it is to others. 
The previous chart shows objective factors for consideration. However, there are 
certainly non-objective factors that can play a role in the decision. Despite this, objective 
factors should be the preferred elements upon which to make a decision as they provide 
more concrete grounds to measure the morality of the act.   
 It is important to expose how the apparent similarities between Singer’s position 
and that of the natural law rest on altogether different premises. First, both views allow 
for the removal of life support for patients in a PVS. However, the nuances of the 
justifications for this action are different. The natural law view only allows for removal 
of food and water if a person’s body can no longer assimilate it. Singer allows it if a 
person has been diagnosed as irreversibly unconscious. Also, although both views say 
one can be justified in allowing someone to die, each offers a significantly different 
reason for this justification. Singer says intention doesn’t matter when allowing a person 
to die. The distinction between intended and foreseen effects is irrelevant in his view. The 
natural law view says the intention is extremely important as is the difference between 
intended and foreseen effects. In sum, although the actions that Singer and the natural law 
view allow are superficially similar, the ethical account given for justification is 
extremely different.   
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C. Application of DDE 
 
 Now we should consider what can be discerned in the scenario with Tony Bland.   
In addition to the object, circumstances, end, and virtue- the natural law theorist has 
another tool at his disposal. This can help one discover what the good action was with 
regards to Tony Bland, and is especially important when a person confronts a moral 
dilemma. This tool of moral analysis when there is a dilemma is called the principle of 
double-effect. Its use consists in analyzing the different ends and objects under 
consideration in an action. Understanding this may aid a person to make good decisions 
in some very difficult cases.  
 The principle of double-effect has been used in medical ethics to help people 
make decisions when two effects are foreseeable from one act - one good and the other 
bad.326 Simon Blackburn has defined the principle of double-effect as: “A principle 
attempting to define when an action that has both good and bad results is morally 
permissible.”327 The classic text discussing the principle of double-effect is found in 
Thomas Aquinas. He writes,  
Nothing prevents that there be two effects of one act: of which the one is in the 
intention, but the other is outside the intention. However moral acts take their 
species from that which is intended, not however from that which is outside the 
                                                          
326Double-effect reasoning has a long and varied history. Christopher Kaczor writes, “The history 
of double-effect reasoning (DER) has been shaped in its most important aspects by Thomas Aquinas’s 
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of this doctrine in the Summa Theologica II-II 64.7.  
327Simon Blackburn, "Principle of double effect" The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. (Oxford 
University Press, 2008) Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  Marquette University. 
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intention, since it is per accidens, as is clear from things said before. Therefore, 
from the act of one defending himself, a two-fold effect is able to follow: one the 
preservation of his own life, the other however the death of the aggressor. 
Therefore, an act of this type, from the fact that the preservation of one’s own life 
is intended, does not have the character of the illicit, since it is natural to anyone 
to preserve himself in his being insofar as he is able. Nevertheless, it can happen 
that some act proceeding from a good intention be rendered illicit, if it is not 
proportioned to the end. Therefore, if someone for the sake of defending his life 
uses more force than is necessary, it will be illicit. If however he repels the 
violence moderately, it will be a licit defense. For according to rights, it is licit to 
repel force with force with the moderation of a blameless defense. Nor is it 
necessary for salvation that a man forgo an act of moderate defense to that he 
might avoid the death of another, since man is held to provide more for his own 
life than for the life of another. But since it is not licit to kill a man, except for 
public authority acting for the common good, as is clear from what was said 
above, it is illicit that a man intend to kill a man, so that he might defend himself, 
save for him who has public authority, who intends to kill a man for his own 
defense referring this to the public good, as is clear in the case of a soldier 
fighting against the enemy, and an officer of the law fighting against thieves. 
Although even these too would sin, if they were moved by private animosity.328  
 
This explanation of self-defense is the passage often cited as an example of an act that 
has two effects. A person may defend himself and in doing this accidentally kill the 
person attacking him. Similarly, many medical treatments have multiple effects- some 
good and some bad.329 Heinrich Rommen says of double-effect, “It is morally permissible 
to perform an act (whether of commission or omission) good or indifferent in itself from 
                                                          
328St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, 64.7.   
329
 David Mapel explains this principle as: “The central idea of the Doctrine of Double Effect is 
that an act that is intended to have the effect of harming a person as a means to our ends is morally worse, 
other things being equal, than an otherwise identical act that brings about harm to a person as a foreseen but 
unintended effect.” David R. Mapel, “Revising the Doctrine of Double Effect,” Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, vol. 18, no. 3 (2001): p. 257. Mapel’s article powerfully critiques the doctrine of double effect 
espoused in Warren Quinn’s 1993 article, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double 
Effect,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.   22 no. 1, and Jeff McMahon’s 1994 article, “Revising the 
Doctrine of Double Effect,” in Journal of Applied Philosophy vol. 11, no. 2: pp. 201-212. He explains two 
views that try to revise this principle on different grounds. Warren Quinn argues that it is permissible to use 
another person as a means to our end unless some right is violated. Jeff McMahan argues that it is 
impermissible to use another person as a means to our end unless we have a moral duty to do so or the 
other person has provided consent. Mapel shows the problems of these views. For the historical 
development of this principle before 1950 see Mangan, J. T., ‘An Historical Analysis of the Principle of 
Double Effect’, Theological Studies, Vol. 10, 1949, pp. 41–61, at p. 43. For a recent explanation see Sophie 
Botros “An Error About The Doctrine of Double Effect,” in Philosophy (1999), 74: 71-83 Cambridge 
University Press. 
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which follow a good effect and a bad effect, provided (a) that the good effect follows 
from the act at least just as immediately as the bad effect, and it not obtained by means of 
the latter; (b) that the good effect alone is intended, the bad effect though foreseen being 
merely permitted; and (c) that the good resulting from the act outweighs or equals the 
evil.”330 Philip Devine summarizes what this principle entails. 
It is sometimes permissible to perform an act having as a consequence (e.g.), that 
someone dies, where it would be forbidden to kill.  It is sometimes permitted to 
do indirectly what one may not do directly.  It is sometimes permitted to act, 
foreseeing a consequence one is not permitted to intend.331 
 
The reason for allowing bad effects, or at least explaining how one is not responsible for 
them, is one may foresee certain consequences of an act that are not intended.332 
 This principle of double-effect is also structured in a way that does not allow for 
an ‘end justifies the means’ type mentality. However, this principle (and natural law 
theory for that matter) never justifies or permits using an ‘evil’ means or ‘bad’ means for 
a good end.  The reason for this is the same that said evil that enters into the three moral 
determinants corrupts the entire act. On the contrary, the structure of this principle says 
                                                          
330Heinrich A. Rommen, The Natural Law, (Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund, 1998) p. 197  
331Philip Devine, The Ethics of Homicide, p. 117.   
332The way this may be worked out in the case of a boat that is overloaded with people is 
discussed by Philip Devine. He argues the intention for those that choose to abandon the boat is not to 
commit suicide but to preserve the lives of those in the boat. See Philip Devine, Natural Law Ethics, pp. 
96-97.  One should certainly not overlook the debate surrounding whether there is a difference between 
what is ‘intended’ and ‘foreseen.’  A complete discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this work, 
but certainly those holding to the principle of double effect think the distinction between ‘intended’ and 
‘foreseen’ is legitimate. Although some of the leading bio-ethicists today reject this distinction, the 
arguments answering these critics seem more plausible to me. For those opposing the distinction see: Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments,” Ethics 109 (1999): 497-518; 
Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Tom Beauchamp and James 
Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): 210-214. 
Those defending the distinction include Joseph Boyle, “Toward Understanding the Principle of Double 
Effect,” Ethics 90 (1980): 527-38; Thomas Cavanaugh, “Act Evaluation, Willing, and Double Effect,” 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1997): 243-53; H.M. Giebel, “Ends, Means, and Character: 
Recent Critiques of the Intended-Versus-Foreseen Distinction and the Principle of Double Effect,” 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 81, No. 3 (2007): 447-468. In particular, (I believe) 
Giebel’s arguments show that criticisms against the intended versus foreseen distinction fail, and a prima 
facie case can be made for the legitimacy of the distinction.  
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several things.333  First, there is a difference between acting badly and acting in a way 
where bad consequences will result.  The one act is intrinsically bad; the other foresees 
bad consequences resulting from an action.  As Devine writes, “It should be clear that the 
distinction between doing something and only bringing the effect about as a consequence 
is crucial to both the formulation and the application of the principle.”334  Second, the 
principle makes a distinction between foreseen and intended consequences.  Intended 
consequences are desired and are considered as part of the ‘object’ of moral action.  The 
intention of an act answers the ‘what’ question and reveals the immediate effects the 
person desires.  Foreseen consequences are not intended, and the person does not desire 
them even if he knows they will happen.  Third, the principle of double-effect 
distinguishes the act from the consequence.  One certainly can see that some 
consequences following acts cannot be blamed on the agent.  For example, there is the 
case of the beautiful woman on the side of the road who was blamed for causing a car 
accident because the guy driving was looking at her.  The woman in this case certainly 
cannot be blamed, although she was an element in some way of the car accident 
scenario.335  Fourth, the principle distinguishes between direct and indirect acts.  As 
Devine notes, “Where the ascription of an act is negotiable, we can say that it was 
                                                          
333In their article titled “Business Ethics and Natural Law,” Manuel Valasquez and F. Neil Brady 
describe the Thomistic version of double-effect, “In a crucial qualification, Aquinas noted that destroying 
the good of life of another, in the course of defending one's own life, is morally licit because when an 
action has the good effect of preserving a basic good and the bad effect of destroying another basic good, 
the destruction of the one good is permissible, provided the person "intends only"  the preservation of the 
other good, and provided that the destruction of the one good is "proportioned" to the preservation of the 
other.” Business Ethics Quarterly, (Mar. 1997), p. 87. 
334
 Devine, The Ethics of Homicide, p. 106.  
335Devine explains that in our description of one thing doing another “we base our statement on a 
mixture of narrative, explanatory, and what may be called ascriptive considerations.” (The Ethics of 
Homicide), p. 116.   
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performed indirectly; where it is not, that it was performed directly.”336 Devine’s 
argument hinges on the distinction about whether an act is negotiable. One can recognize 
there are many ways to describe an act. A person’s movement can be described as 
pointing to something with his finger or poking another person in the eye. If a person’s 
act accidentally precedes some consequence, then the person cannot be said to directly 
cause the consequence (as in the previous scenario with the beautiful woman). This is an 
example of an indirect consequence where a description can be negotiable. When a 
person is to blame for an act connected to a consequence it is direct. A person’s desire for 
a certain consequence is present in a direct act as well.  
 One can find four conditions for the application of the principle of double-effect.  
These are: 
1.  The act itself must be good in itself or at least indifferent. 
2. The good intended must not be obtained my means of the evil effect. 
3. The evil effect must not be intended for itself, but only foreseen. 
4. There must be proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect.337 
Many point to the apparently utilitarian spin (which emphasizes the effects, the ends, or 
the results from the act) on many of these conditions.  To the contrary, the means, which 
are unimportant for the sake of the end for the utilitarian, must always be good or 
indifferent for an act to be morally good.338  The end never justifies bad means, nor does 
                                                          
336Ibid.   
337Mark P. Aulisio, “Principle or Doctrine of Double Effect,” Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Ed. 
Stephen Post. Vol. 2. 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004): p. 687.   
338John Stuart Mill seems to contradict this assertion. He writes, “Utilitarians are quite aware that 
there are other desirable possessions and qualities besides virtue, and are perfectly willing to allow all of 
them their full worth.” Utilitarianism, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003): p. 110.  He also says, “The 
utilitarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things 
being only desirable as means to that end.” Ibid. p. 122.  Virtue is said to be part of the end of happiness, 
but not naturally so. Although not all Utilitarians agree that the means are unimportant, it is a general 
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the end make a bad means good.  The first and second conditions also clearly refer to the 
object (the act itself and the intention).  The third clearly refers to the intention of the 
object (evil must not be intended – even if it is foreseen).  The fourth asks a person to 
consider the hierarchy of goods, and to make sure that the good intended (that is the 
motive) is equal to or greater than the evil foreseen.  This evaluation is an assessment of 
the act and appeals to the first (the object) and the third (the end) element of every moral 
action. 
 One can see how applying the principle of double-effect to the previous scenario 
can help achieve greater clarity about how to act.  In the scenario with Tony Bland, if one 
chooses certain acts to make him more comfortable, but withholds certain treatments that 
simply prolong his life for a day or so, and they have the foresight to realize he will dies 
nonetheless, and they need not blame themselves for the death because it is not intended.  
Food, water, and air are not ‘treatments’ per se for Mr. Bland and withholding these 
means is immoral as long as he can assimilate them. It is commonly thought that the 
skillful means by which these three are delivered may contribute to them being 
considered as disproportionate treatments rather than proportionate. There are two things 
to note about this. First, as has been mentioned, proportionate and disproportionate 
treatments actually refer to weighing the burdens and benefits of various treatments- not 
the skill involved in treatment or the rarity or frequency by which such treatments are 
given. Something infrequently given may be medically disproportionate or extraordinary 
(in terms of being rare) but morally proportionate or ordinary (and as such morally 
                                                                                                                                                                             
criticism that the Utilitarian end of happiness justifies evil means that may be used to attain it. This would 
seem to obscure or significantly reduce the importance of the means as long as happiness is attained. See 
James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1986): pp. 90-
103. Also, Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 
1990): pp. 82-86. 
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obligatory). Secondly, one can ask whether food, air, and water are treatment. Although 
this is a subject of debate, the traditional natural law theorist follows the view that “The 
administration of water and food, even when provided by artificial means, always 
represents a natural means of preserving life, not a medical act. Is use, furthermore, 
should be considered, in principle, ordinary and proportionate, and as such morally 
obligatory.”339   
Yet this seems to be question begging in some way. Isn’t the very issue at stake 
whether providing ‘artificial food and water’ is a medical act? It is not- although it is 
unfortunately the way Smith and Kaczor put it. The issue is whether administering food 
and water is an act that is proportionate. Putting a feeding tube in a patient is a simple 
medical act and is always proportionate on this view as long as the patient can assimilate 
these things. In sum, patients—including Tony Bland—should  receive air, food, and 
water- regardless of how it is delivered.  
 In sum, the principle of double-effect can be employed to help a person’s 
decision-making.  These principles can be traced in the natural law tradition to various 
sources. Aquinas’s double-effect reasoning has influenced the natural law tradition in 
end-of-life issues. Using the principles of this can help people clarify moral decisions to 
ensure that the best act is performed in each case. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
  This work has briefly exposited and defended aspects of a classical view of 
natural law. The first chapter surveyed much of the work that would be covered in the 
                                                          
339Kaczor and Smith, Life Issues, Medical Choices, quoting Pope John Paul II, p. 113.   
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rest of the dissertation. There is an explanation of the metaphysical structure of the 
classical view in the second chapter. The third and fourth chapters raise some of the 
common objections to natural law including those raised by David Hume, G.E. Moore, 
and some contemporary proponents of relativism. The fifth chapter drew some 
distinctions between natural law and other theories, and the last dealt with tools of natural 
law found in much of modern medical ethics today.  
Although I have tried to defend natural law from some common criticisms raised 
against the theory, I recognize there is much work to still be done. It is certainly a 
significant criticism that it is hard to ask people to accept an ethical theory that rests on a 
controversial metaphysical foundation.  Admittedly I’ve not dealt with many opposing 
views, but have offered some reasons throughout this dissertation for rejecting aspects of 
theories like intuitionism and relativism. The assertion from the beginning of this work 
was that I think a natural law approach is the best way to do ethics. This work is far from 
ending the debate in favor of natural law. However, I hope to have rendered the theory 
slightly more plausible than that of rival ethical theories. 
Of course, the goal of an ethical theory goes beyond helping a person come to 
know what acts are good and bad. In life it is not merely knowledge that is important. A 
theory of human action must be tied together with the goal of human life. As Ralph 
McInerny writes,  
In order to change our lives, to become what we ought to be, we must perform 
repeated acts of the same kind, first against our grain, perhaps, then with less and 
less resistance, until finally we do joyfully and with pleasure the right 
thing….When we reach that point we will have become the sort of person of 
whom Aristotle speaks. In questions of human good, of what ought to be done, 
the good man is the measure.340  
 
                                                          
340Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, pp. 126-127.   
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The habitual conformity of our will with what is in accord with virtue can make us good, 
help us do what is right, and guide us toward happiness.  
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